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Coastal resources play a significant role in supporting the livelihoods of marginalized 
communities in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces of South Africa. Through an 
analysis of three rural communities in these provinces, this research sought to understand how 
and why benefits arising from the use of coastal resources in the fisheries and mining sectors 
are shared and distributed in the manner that they are. Both qualitative and quantitative 
methods were used to collect the data and included 270 household surveys, 25 focus groups, 
and 33 key informant interviews.  
 
Findings reveal that despite the fact that communities have benefited from fisheries and 
mining, these activities have also had negative economic, social and ecological impacts on 
livelihoods. The benefit-sharing mechanisms used by the institutions involved in using, or 
regulating access to and benefits from resources in the fisheries and mining sectors have 
significantly impacted on people‟s ability to benefit from coastal resource use. These 
mechanisms included partnerships by the state and/or private sector institutions with resource 
users in the communities, the setting up of local committees for benefit-sharing, as well as 
NGO involvement in local tourism to enhance benefits to local fishers.  
 
The study showed that limited state involvement and conflicts with regards to the dual 
governance between traditional authorities and local government in rural coastal communities 
have curtailed the positive impacts of benefits from fisheries and mining activities. Moreover, 
dual governance and the lack of robust governance institutions have led to a multiplicity of 
actors from diverse sectors working within rural communities, largely operating in isolation.  
 
The findings affirm that in contrast to centralized management approaches, decentralized 
management of fisheries resources, involving partnerships between state, non-state 
institutions and local fishers, may enhance benefits from resource use. It is crucial for 
fisheries management approaches to pay adequate attention to social and economic issues 
facing resource users, in addition to the consideration of resource use sustainability. 
Alternative livelihood support options are crucial for the resilience of fishing communities, 
















Local power dynamics largely influenced the manner in which benefits were distributed from 
mining. The prevalence of unaccountable traditional authorities in rural communities is a 
major blockage to benefit-sharing. Findings of this study suggest that traditional authorities 
capture benefits without effectively distributing them to the wider community and use 
political patronage to determine who in the community benefits. Lack of accountability by 
local committees responsible for mediating benefit-sharing between the private sector and the 
wider communities impeded the ability of benefits to trickle down to the wider communities. 
These blockages to benefit-sharing were not unique to the mining sector, but were also 
evident within other sectors where economic benefits from high value coastal resources were 
involved, such as tourism. The findings of this study affirm the need for robust, representative 
and downwardly accountable institutional arrangements for equitable benefit-sharing of 



































First, I would like to thank God for the unending support and for divinely placing me in a 
position to pursue my Masters degree in such a great topic. Without Him, I would not be able 
to fulfill this work. I would also like to dedicate this thesis to my mother, my father, 
Nomkhosi Mbatha and Mthokozisi Mbatha, in thanks for supporting my decision to pursue 
this Masters degree, and my friends and spiritual family for all the prayers and support. I 
would like to also extend special thanks my cousin Nompumelelo Nzimande and Prof. Dianne 
Scott for believing in me and encouraging me to pursue this Masters degree. My utmost 
gratitude also goes to my supervisor, Dr. Rachel Wynberg, and my co-supervisor, Dr. Maria 
Hauck for giving me the opportunity to be involved in this project. I couldn‟t have asked for 
better supervisors. Their unfailing patience, care and academic support and guidance have 
been instrumental in assisting me to fulfill this Masters thesis. I would like to also thank Dr. 
Serge Raemaekers for assisting with expertise in mapping, data capture, and on Eastern Cape 
fisheries. Aldino Arendse, Fahdelah Hartley and the entire Environmental Evaluation staff are 
also thanked for their logistical and moral support. 
 
I would like to thank the communities in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, especially Skhumbuzo 
Mkhwanazi and the Zwane family, for their hospitality and their willingness to support me 
and the project. I would also like to extend thanks to the Mankosi community, especially to 
Mdumbi backpackers owners, Hyman van Zyl and Johan Stadler, as well as Sibongile Masiso, 
for introducing me to the community and accommodating me during my field visits. My field 
assistants in Sokhulu, Mbonambi and Mankosi, especially Thulani Jobe and Robert Cele, are 
thanked for their hard work and dedication. Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, Richards Bay Minerals 
and TransCape provided useful information and support to the project. Last, but not least, I 
would like to thank the Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA), the 
David and Elaine Potter Fellowship as well as the National Research Foundation (NRF) for 





















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................... iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ iv 
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................. viii 
LIST OF BOXES ................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................ viii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................... ix 
CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Rationale for study ............................................................................................................. 3 
1.3 Specific aim and objectives ................................................................................................ 3 
1.4 Case study sites ................................................................................................................... 4 
1.7 Structure of dissertation .................................................................................................... 6 
CHAPTER TWO – METHODOLOGY ................................................................................ 7 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 7 
2.2 Research approach ............................................................................................................. 7 
2.3 Data collection and sampling ............................................................................................ 9 
2.3.1 Household survey sampling ............................................................................................. 9 
2.3.2 Focus group discussions ................................................................................................ 11 
2.3.3 Key informant interviews ............................................................................................... 16 
2.4 Data analysis ..................................................................................................................... 18 
2.4.1 Analysis of quantitative data .......................................................................................... 18 
2.4.2 Analysis of qualitative data ............................................................................................ 19 
2.5 Research ethics ................................................................................................................. 20 
2.6 Study limitations ............................................................................................................... 21 
2.7 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 22 
CHAPTER THREE – LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................... 24 
3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 24 
3.2 Access, rights and benefits ............................................................................................... 24 
3.3 Institutional factors relating to benefit sharing ............................................................. 31 
3.4 Justice and equity ............................................................................................................. 31 
3.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 33 















4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 34 
4.2 Governing institutions in rural areas of South Africa .................................................. 34 
4.3 Overview of the small-scale fisheries sector ................................................................... 37 
4.3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 38 
4.3.2 Fisheries policy and legal reform in post-apartheid South Africa ............................... 38 
4.3.3 Benefits and losses from small-scale fisheries .............................................................. 41 
4.4Overview of the coastal mining sector ............................................................................. 43 
4.4.1 Global overview: trends towards Corporate Social Responsibility ............................... 43 
4.4.2 The South African coastal mining sector ...................................................................... 45 
4.4.3 Policy and legal context in South Africa ....................................................................... 45 
4.4.4 Identifying benefits, losses and benefit-sharing mechanisms ...................................... 47 
4.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 50 
CHAPTER FIVE – SOKHULU AND MBONAMBI CASE STUDY RESULTS ............ 50 
5.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 50 
5.2 A history of coastal resource use in Sokhulu and Mbonambi ...................................... 51 
5.3 The socio-economic status of Sokhulu and Mbonambi ................................................. 54 
5.4 The fisheries sector ........................................................................................................... 62 
5.4.1 The fisheries sector in Sokhulu and Mbonambi: actors and resources ....................... 62 
5.4.2 Mechanisms and tools for enhancing benefit-sharing in the fisheries sectors in 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi .......................................................................................................... 64 
5.4.3 Outcomes of benefit-sharing arrangements in Sokhulu and Mbonambi fisheries ..... 68 
5.4.4 Institutional arrangements’ influence on benefit distribution ..................................... 71 
5.5 The mining sector ............................................................................................................. 76 
5.5.1 The mining sector in Sokhulu and Mbonambi: actors and resources ......................... 76 
5.5.2 Benefits and losses from mining in Sokhulu and Mbonambi ...................................... 78 
5.5.3 Mechanisms and tools for enhancing benefit-sharing in the mining sector in Sokhulu 
and Mbonambi ......................................................................................................................... 81 
5.5.4 Outcomes of benefit-sharing mechanisms and institutional arrangements’ influence 
on benefit distribution ............................................................................................................. 85 
5.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 94 
CHAPTER SIX – MANKOSI RESULTS ............................................................................ 95 
6.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 95 
6.2 The background of Mankosi community and coastal resource use ............................. 95 
6.3 Socio-economic status of Mankosi ................................................................................ 100 
6.4 The fisheries sector in Mankosi ..................................................................................... 107 
6.4.1Fisheries actors and resources in Mankosi fisheries ................................................... 107 
6.4.2 Role of tourism in Mankosi fisheries ........................................................................... 109 
6.4.3 Role of TA and Community Trust in Mankosi ............................................................ 110 















6.4.5 Mechanisms and tools for enhancing benefit-sharing in the Mankosi fisheries sector
 ................................................................................................................................................ 113 
6.4.6 Perceptions of benefits, losses and negative impacts arising from benefit-sharing 
mechanisms in Mankosi fisheries ......................................................................................... 115 
6.4.7 Factors influencing benefit-sharing in Mankosi fisheries – losses and negative 
impacts ................................................................................................................................... 115 
6.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 120 
CHAPTER SEVEN – DISCUSSION ................................................................................. 121 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 121 
7.2 Decentralization or deconcentration of power............................................................. 122 
7.3 Accountability in institutional arrangements .............................................................. 128 
7.4 Multiplicity of institutions and benefit-sharing ........................................................... 132 
7.5 Limited statehood and benefit-sharing institutions in rural coastal communities ... 137 
7.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 140 
CHAPTER EIGHT – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.......................... 141 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 146 









































LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1: The location of selected case study sites in South Africa ....................................... 5  
Figure 2.1: Example of a timeline of key events that have influenced the use of coastal 
resources in Sokhulu and Mbonambi ....................................................................................... 14 
Figure 2.2: An example of a Venn diagram that was conducted with coastal resource users in 
Mbonambi ................................................................................................................................ 16 
Figure 5.1: Timeline of key events that have influenced the use of coastal resources in    
Sokhulu and Mbonambi…………………………………………………………………….. . 52 
Figure 5.2: The location of Sokhulu and Mbonambi within the Mfolozi Local Municipality.
 .................................................................................................................................................. 56 
Figure 5.3: Education levels in Sokhulu and Mbonambi  ....................................................... 60 
Figure 5.4: Occupation of survey respondents Sokhulu and Mbonambi ................................ 60 
Figure 5.5: Monthly household income ranges in Sokhulu and Mbonambi  .......................... 61 
Figure 5.6: Monthly household income contributing activities in Sokhulu  and Mbonambi.. 61 
Figure 5.7: Fishers at Sokhulu and Mbonambi ....................................................................... 64 
Figure 5.8: The institutional arrangement for fisheries management for Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi ................................................................................................................................ 66 
Figure 5.9: Varied perceptions of small scale fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi about the 
benefits and losses they have incurred due to the fisheries co-management arrangement ...... 68 
Figure 5.10: Network diagram depicting the perception of EKZN Wildlife by Sokhulu 
committees as the most influential stakeholder in decision-making regarding Sokhulu  ........ 72 
Figure 5.11: Network diagram depicting the perception of EKZN Wildlife by Sokhulu 
fishersas the most powerful decision-making stakeholder in Sokhulu mussel and line fish co- 
management ............................................................................................................................. 73 
Figure 5.12: Network diagram depicting the perception of EKZN Wildlife by the Mbonambi 
line fishers and line fish committee. ......................................................................................... 74 
Figure 5.13: RBM mining concession areas within Sokhulu and Mbonambi ........................ 76 
Figure 5.14: RBM mining operations at Sokhulu and Mbonambi .......................................... 78 
Figure 5.15: Institutional arrangements for sharing CSR and BBBEE benefits from mining at 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi ........................................................................................................... 84 
Figure 5.16: Perceptions of Sokhulu mining employees about decision-making power in 
mining sector benefit-sharing mechanisms.. ............................................................................ 90 
Figure 5.17: Perceptions of Sokhulu Youth Development Committee about decision-making 
power in mining.. ..................................................................................................................... 91 
Figure 5.18: Perceptions of the Mbonambi Community Trust about decision-making power 
in mining .................................................................................................................................. 92 
Figure 6.1: Key events that have influenced the use of coastal resources in Mankosi ........... 96 
Figure 6.2: Map showing location of the Mankosi community within the Nyandeni Local 
Municipality ........................................................................................................................... 102 
Figure 6.3: Occupation of respondents in Mankosi based on household survey data results 105 
Figure 6.4: Education levels in Mankosi based on household survey results ....................... 105 
Figure 6.5: Key activities contributing to household monthly incime in Mankosi ............... 105 
Bookmark not defined. 
Figure 6.6: Different parts of the coastal zone where the Mankosi community harvests 
different fisheries resources ................................................................................................... 107 
Figure 6.7: Institunal structure involved in Mankosi fisheries ............................................. 114 
Figure 6.8:  Network  webs between fisheries stakeholders in Mankosi and the perceived 
decision-making power held by each stakeholder, as perceived by the female and male fishers 
















LIST OF BOXES 
 
Box 2.1: Example of ranking of benefits and losses associated with interventions of events on 
the timelines in Sokhulu ........................................................................................................... 15 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 2.1: Sokhulu focus group schedule ............................................................................... 11 
Table 2.2: Sokhulu focus group schedule ............................................................................... 12 
Table 2.3: Mbonambi focus group schedule ........................................................................... 13 
Table 2.4: Mankosi focus group schedule ............................................................................... 13 
Table 2.5: KwaZulu-Natal key informant interview schedule ................................................ 17 
Table 2.6: Eastern Cape key informant interview schedule .................................................... 18 
Table 5.1: Sectors utilizing coastal resources at Sokhulu and Mbonambi .............................. 57 
Table 5.2: Profile of Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities ................................................... 58 
Table 5.3: Profile of fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi ......................................................... 63 
Table 6.1: Profile of the Mankosi community according to household survey data ............. 103 
Bookmark not defined. 
Table 6.2: Actors, resources and their role in the use/management of coastal resources in 
Mankosi .................................................................................................................................. 104 
Table 6.3: The socio-economic profile of male and female fishers at Mankosi ................... 108  
Table 6.4: Fisheries resource users and those with permits to harvest the specific resources
 ................................................................................................................................................ 109 
Table 6.5: Table showing state and private sector driven mechanisms for enhancing benefit-
sharing in the fisheries sector through fisheries and tourism activities .................................. 113 
Table 6.6: Benefits perceived by Mankosi fishers and the ranking of the benefits............... 115 
Bookmark not defined. 


























LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ANC    African National Congress 
ASCLME   Agulhas and Somali Current Large Marine Ecosystem 
BBBEE   Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
BBSEEC   Broad Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter 
BEE    Black Economic Empowerment 
CBD     Convention on Biological Diversity 
CDC    Community Development Council 
Co-op    Co-operation 
COPE    Congress of the People 
CSI     Corporate Social Investment 
CSR    Corporate Social Responsibility 
DAFF    Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
DEA    Department of Environmental Affairs 
DEDEA   Department of Economic Development and Environmental  
    Affairs, Eastern Cape Province 
DEAT    Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
DME    Department of Minerals and Energy 
DMR    Department of Mineral Resources 
DRDLR   Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 
DWAF   Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
EIA    Environmental Impact Assessment 
EMP    Environmental Management Plan 
GEAR    Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
GGP    Gross Geographic Product 
GIS    Geographical Information Systems 
EKZN Wildlife   Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 
FAO    Food and Agriculture Organization 
ICLARM   International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management 
ICM    Integrated Coastal Management 
ICMM   International Council on Mining and Metals 
ID    Identity Document 
IDP    Integrated Development Plan 
IFP    Inkatha Freedom Party 
LED    Local Economic Development 
MCM    Marine and Coastal Management 
MDGs    Millennium Development Goals 
MLRA   Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 
MMSD   Mining Minerals and Sustainable Development 
MPRDA   Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 
NEM: ICM   National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal  
    Management Act 24 of 2008 















NGO    Non Governmental Organization 
NPO    Non Profit Organization 
NUM    National Union of Mineworkers 
PRA    Participatory Rural Appraisal 
PSU    Primary Sampling Unit 
QTI    Queensland Trustees and Investment 
RBM    Richards Bay Minerals 
RDP    Reconstruction and Development Program 
SFMU    Subsistence Fisheries Management Unit 
SFTG    Subsistence Fisheries Task Group 
SLP    Social and Labor Plan 
SMME   Small, Medium and Macro Enterprise 
SNA    Social Network Analysis 
WIOMSA   Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association 
TA    Traditional Authority 
TAC    Total Allowable Catch 
TNC    Trans National Corporation 
UNDP    United Nations Development Program 
UNEP    United Nations Environment Program 






























CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Worldwide, coastal resources such as fisheries, forests and minerals are faced with increasing 
pressures from globalization and contestation for use by different stakeholders (Graham, 
2009). Pressures from increased coastal resource use limit and ultimately diminish access to 
coastal resources for coastal communities. Globalization, constituted by market liberalization, 
Westernization, increased consumption levels and disparities between the rich and poor, has 
affected various local and national economies, and as a result, it has also affected the way in 
which people use and rely on coastal resources (IUCN, 2000). Coastal resources are therefore 
faced with threats such as over-exploitation, mismanagement, degradation and pollution.  
 
In southern Africa, coastal resources are significant in supporting the livelihoods of poor 
communities adjacent to the coastal zone. For example, in South Africa, the provinces of 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape have poverty levels estimated at 33% and 40%, 
respectively (Glavovic and Boonzaier, 2007). A significant number of poor households living 
along the South African coastline rely on harvesting marine, forests, and agricultural 
resources for subsistence use, in order to support their livelihoods (Glavovic, 2000).  
Post-apartheid coastal zone policy and legislation in South Africa has been geared towards a 
pro-poor integrated coastal management approach in order to promote the sustainable use of 
coastal resources (Glavovic and Boonzaier, 2007). Many institutions ranging from 
government agencies to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are involved in supporting 
enhanced access to coastal resources, with the objective of developing sustainable livelihood 
opportunities for coastal communities (Glavovic and Boonzaier, 2007).  
 
Since the beginning of South Africa‟s democracy in 1994, efforts have been made to increase 
the participation of local communities in determining who can access, manage and benefit 
from natural resources.  There are three spheres of government in South Africa, i.e. local 
(including municipalities), provincial and national. Local government consists of local 
municipalities established throughout South Africa, including rural areas where they 
previously never existed (Ntsebeza, 2006). For rural development, one of the primary aims of 
national government in the post-apartheid era is to decentralize decision-making power to 
local level governments and to improve the livelihoods of previously disadvantaged people by 















Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996) declares marine resources, and their conservation, as a national 
government competency, it also states that provincial and local governments may have a 
development role at the local level and must be democratic and downwardly accountable to 
local communities through public participation and promotion of social and economic 
development (Ntsebeza, 2006). Hence, improved participation of local people in decision-
making processes is a principle that is enshrined in the Constitution and the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA) 107 of 1998, in an effort to empower local people. 
The National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008 
(ICM Act) also adopts a holistic approach to coastal zone management in order to meet the 
ecological, social and economic needs of the coastal zone and its users (DEAT, 2008).  
 
Through examining three case studies in the KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape provinces in 
South Africa, this dissertation aims to understand how institutional arrangements influence 
access to coastal resources; how benefits derived from coastal resources are shared and 
distributed among coastal stakeholders; and why benefits are distributed in the way they are. 
The focus of the study is on the small-scale fishery and mining sectors within rural 
communities
1
 along the coast of the KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape provinces in South 
Africa. 
 
Ribot and Peluso‟s (2003) „access‟ theory is used to inform the theoretical basis for this study. 
The concept  of „benefits‟ is articulated both in access and property literature concerned with 
how people relate to each other and how they derive, transfer or distribute benefits from 
resources. Access is defined as “the ability to benefit from things – including material objects, 
persons, institutions, and symbols” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003:1). In the context of this study, 
„things‟ refer to natural resources occurring in coastal environments. Understanding how 
people benefit from the ability to access natural resources is important as people, institutions 
and societies rely on, strive for, and compete over benefits from natural resources (Ribot and 
Peluso, 2003).  
 
This chapter provides the rationale for the study, the aims and objectives, and an overview of 
                                                 
1
 This dissertation acknowledges that the concept „community‟ is highly contested, but in this context, the term is 
used to refer to the common characteristics shared by the people in the respective areas that were studied, such as 















the research objectives and the case studies communities in which this research was 
undertaken.  
 
1.2 Rationale for study 
This dissertation forms part of a larger research project funded by the Western Indian Ocean 
Marine Science Association (WIOMSA). This wider initiative focuses on contributing 
towards poverty reduction and sustainable resource use and management by promoting the 
equitable sharing of benefits derived from coastal resources generally, and more specifically, 
in the Western Indian Ocean region. A key motivation for undertaking this dissertation is that 
in coastal resource use literature, there seems to be limited understanding of the role that 
institutional arrangements play in mediating access to coastal resources and enabling the 
sharing of benefits arising from their use in marginalized and rural coastal communities. 
Furthermore, although it is widely accepted that the principle of equitable benefit-sharing 
should apply to natural resources, there is still no conceptual clarity across the various natural 
resource sectors and disciplines as to its meaning (Byström et al, 1999). The Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) uses the concept of benefit-sharing to emphasize the significance 
of fair and equitable sharing of the benefits derived from genetic resources (UNEP, 1992). 
Most of the literature about benefit-sharing has focused on this narrow definition in the 
context of bio prospecting and genetic resources. This dissertation, however, adopts a broader 
approach, concerned with the use of, and benefits derived from, natural resources generally, 
and coastal resources specifically. Little evidence is found in the literature about benefit-
sharing in the fisheries and mining sectors and how institutions put in place at the local level 
influence the way in which rural communities benefit from the coastal resources utilized in 
these sectors. This research, therefore, seeks to develop an understanding of how fisheries and 
mineral resources are used, who benefits from them, how benefits derived from the resources 
are shared, and what role institutional arrangements play in influencing benefit-sharing 
processes. 
1.3 Specific aim and objectives 
Aim 
The aim of this study is to undertake an analysis of how institutional arrangements influence 
access to, and the equitable sharing of benefits from, the use of coastal resources in rural 


















Specific objectives of the study are: 
 To understand coastal resource use in the fisheries and mining sectors in three 
case study sites;  
 To identify who benefits from the use of these coastal resources; 
 To identify the institutions responsible for distributing benefits and the ways in 
which they facilitate and/or hinder access and benefit-sharing of coastal 
resources;  
 To determine the impact of benefit-sharing mechanisms  for  access, use and 
benefit-sharing of coastal resources; 
 To determine why benefits from coastal resources are distributed in the way 
that they are; and 
 To make recommendations for best practice to enhance access and benefit-
sharing of coastal resources in the fisheries and mining sectors. 
 
1.4 Case study sites 
This research was undertaken by using a case study method. Case study research is “a 
research strategy that focuses on understanding dynamics present within single settings”, and 
combines data collection methods like interviews, questionnaires and observations to produce 
qualitative and/or quantitative evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989:534). Case study research is geared 
towards understanding why things are the way they are, and provides an in-depth and rich 
insight pertaining to the particular problem or phenomenon being studied (Noor, 2008). The 
case study sites for this study were selected from the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern 
Cape. In KwaZulu-Natal, two case study communities, Sokhulu and Mbonambi, were chosen, 
while in the Eastern Cape, one case study community, Mankosi, was selected. Figure 1.1 






























Figure 1.1: The location of selected case study sites in South Africa 
 
The following criteria were used for selecting the case study communities: 
a) They had to represent rural and marginalized communities along the Western 
Indian Ocean region of South Africa; 
b) The small-scale fisheries and/or mining sectors had to be represented; 
c) Each sector within the case study communities had to incorporate institutional 
arrangements for access, use and benefit-sharing from the resources; and 
d) Case study sites had to be selected from the two different provinces in order to 
















1.7 Structure of dissertation 
This first chapter has provided an introduction to the study, a brief background and context of 
the study and case study sites, and has introduced the aims and objectives of the research. 
Chapter Two describes the methods used to collect and analyze the data. Chapter Three 
presents a literature review and provides the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that 
inform this study. Chapter Four provides the background context for this study, including an 
overview of the history, background and legal frameworks of small-scale fisheries and coastal 
mining in South Africa. Chapters Five and Six describe the findings of this research, which 
are then analyzed and discussed in Chapter Seven. Chapter Eight concludes the study and 







































CHAPTER TWO – METHODOLOGY 
 2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research approach and methods used for data collection and 
analysis in this study. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to collect data. 
Due to the fact that there is limited information on access and benefit-sharing of coastal 
resources, particularly in South Africa, this research utilized a grounded theory approach.  
This draws on the experiences and perceptions of the people that were studied as a 
fundamental basis for understanding access and benefit-sharing patterns, rather than drawing 
solely on the literature and other documented evidence (Kelly and Terre Blanche, 1999). In 
addition, household surveys, focus group discussions and key informant interviews were 
conducted in order to elicit that informed the findings of this study. 
2.2 Research approach 
Grounded theory research was first introduced in 1967, and the theory in this research is 
derived inductively from researching a particular phenomenon and is then developed and 
verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data about the phenomenon being 
studied (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The general aim of this type of research is to create 
theories that inform the understanding of phenomena. It is thus used to generate, elaborate and 
validate social science theory (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Haig, 1995). Data for grounded 
theory research can come from various sources, including interviews, observations, 
government departments and books. The grounded theory procedures are designed to generate 
thorough observation, generalizability, reproducibility, precision and verification of social 
phenomena studied; hence the theory generated from grounded theory research comes from 
the data itself (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Through grounded theory, interpretive methods are 
used to understand the data collected as it is the experiences of people rather than prescribed 
theory that inform the research (Kelly and Terre Blanche, 1999).  
 
This Masters formed a component of a wider project, and data collection for my research was 
dovetailed with that of the wider project. The data that informed this study was based on case 
studies, household surveys, focus group discussions, interviews, observations and 
documentary evidence. The household survey, focus group and key informant interview 
questions, as well as focus group methodologies were developed by myself and the research 
team involved in the wider WIOMSA project for South Africa and Mozambique (see 















needed to be conducted, there was some standardisation of data collection approaches 
between the different researchers involved on the project. Hence, the questionnaire was 
developed by the project leaders, along witn inputs from myself and other team members. 
However, I was almost entirely responsible for determining the sampling methods used to 
implement the questionnaire. Moreover, I played a central role in formulating the qualitative 
data collection methods and in leading the process for developing the methodology template 
that was adopted for the Mozambique case studies. I also led the design of the focus groups 
and key informant interviews, with input from the project team. 
 
Field assistants from each community were employed and trained in order to assist with the 
data collection process for this research, particularly for the household surveys and key 
informant interviews. This was done both to benefit the communities from the research and in 
order to obtain a deeper insight into the different dynamics of the communities by obtaining 
the assistance of people who reside there. In order to gain the richness of knowledge that a 
grounded theory research approach offers, I was based in the three communities, Sokhulu, 
Mbonambi and Mankosi, between the periods of 2009 and 2010 for approximately six months 
during 2009 and 2010. During this time, I was accommodated in one of the villages within the 
communities, and obtained permission from the Tribal Councils in each of the communities to 
conduct the research. As a result, in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, I lived with families from the 
communities, partaking in their everyday activities. In Mankosi, I lived at a backpacker lodge 
facility which was community based and located in the vicinity of one of the villages in the 
community. During my stay within each community, I developed a relationship with 
community members and conducted observations of the behaviors and livelihoods of the 
communities. Due to the fact that I am fluent in isiZulu and isiXhosa, it was easy for me to 
develop trust and rapport with community members, as these were the languages that were 
spoken in the different case study communities. This enabled me to obtain a rich 
understanding of the people in these communities and their livelihoods.  
 
Before and during the commencement of the household surveys in each community, I 
conducted several informal interviews with community members and coastal resource users, 
in order to understand how they used the resources and their perceptions about resource 
access, use and management. The local field assistants that I had trained and the families that 
















Since the use of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods congruently may allow 
for cross validation and comparison of data, the qualitative and quantitative data generated in 
this study was triangulated in order to understand and interpret the information contained in 
the data (Jick, 1979). Triangulation can be defined as “the combination of methodologies in 
the study of the same phenomenon” (Denzin, 1978:291). The major strength of this analysis 
method is that it is able to capture a holistic portrayal of the phenomena being studied and it 
also enables for the weaknesses of each method used by the researcher to be countered by the 
strengths of the other methods, giving the researcher more confidence about their findings 
(Jick, 1979). Hence the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods in grounded theory 
research is encouraged.  
2.3 Data collection and sampling   
2.3.1 Household2 survey sampling 
A household questionnaire was drawn up for quantitative data collection for this study by the 
WIOMSA project team, including myself. My supervisors, who are the principal investigators 
in the bigger WIOMSA project, led the questionnaire design process, and the WIOMSA 
research team, including myself, collectively determined the questions that are contained in 
the questionnaire. The questionnaire comprises questions about socio-economic background, 
use of coastal resources, benefits from the resources, as well as questions relating to people‟s 
perceptions about institutions and institutional arrangements responsible for distributing 
benefits. Questions were also asked about the perception of rules governing resources use and 
about benefits incurred by peopl  due to various benefit-sharing mechanisms (Appendix 1).  
The analysis of the questionnaire was conducted by myself, with inputs from my supervisors 
and the WIOMSA research team.  
 
Simple and stratified random sampling was used to produce an unbiased sample 
representative of the communities that were surveyed (Eckhardt and Ermann, 1977; Churchill 
and Lacobucci, 2005). Simple random sampling is used when the researcher seeks to give 
every population member an equal chance to be selected as part of the sample (Yamane, 
1967). This sampling methodology was used in this study to determine the sample for the 
household surveys in the Mankosi area because the homesteads in Mankosi were all part of 
one geographical unit, the Mankosi Traditional Authority (TA). On the other hand, stratified 
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random sampling was used to sample households in Sokhulu and Mbonambi areas. 
Stratification is used when the studied population falls into natural or homogeneous groupings 
such as districts, villages or gender, etc (Eckhardt and Ermann, 1977). Stratified random 
sampling was used to sample homesteads in Sokhulu and Mbonambi because the two 
communities were adjacent to each other, and there were thus overlaps in the location of some 
villages belonging to each of these communities. For instance, two Sokhulu villages occur 
within the geographical boundaries of the Mbonambi Municipal Ward. In addition to this, 
both Sokhulu and Mbonambi fell into more than one Municipal Ward within the Mfolozi 
Local Municipality. Ward 1 of Sokhulu and Ward 3 of Mbonambi were the Municipal Wards 
where most of the people in these communities were involved in coastal sectors such as 
fisheries, mining and forestry. As a result, the villages in Wards 1 and 3 of Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi were used as the primary sampling units for each community. Primary sampling 
units (PSUs) are units selected at the first stage of stratified random sampling after the strata 
are identified (United Nations, 2005). The Sokhulu community in Wards 1 and 3 has 16 
villages while the Mbonambi community has 16 villages in Ward 3. In the Mankosi 
community, PSUs were made up of the 12 villages, which together make up the Mankosi 
community. The second-stage units that were sampled were the households within each PSU 
(i.e. village). Ward 1 (Sokhulu) and Ward 3 (Mbonambi) were the coastal wards used for data 
collection for this study.  
 
In order to determine the size of the sample representative of the communities, stratified 
random sampling for proportions was used to sample households at Sokhulu and Mbonambi, 
while simple random sampling was used to determine the sample size for Mankosi. Statistical 
assistance was obtained from the Department of Statistical Sciences at the University of Cape 
Town in order to determine the appropriate sample sizes for household surveys for each of the 
case study sites. Various steps were undertaken in order to finalize sample sizes in each case 
study. Yamane‟s (1967) simple random sampling for determining sample size and precision, 
as well as stratified random sampling for proportion formulas were used to determine the 
sample sizes of homesteads for the household surveys in each case study site (Appendix 2).   
 
The case study communities that were chosen for this study are rural and marginalized and as 
a result, the relevant government departments and institutions have little information about the 
households found in these communities. This lack of information created difficulties in 















Systems (GIS) and Google Earth satellite imagery of the case study areas were used to assist 
with the sampling strategy. Geographical Information Systems data on the different case study 
areas was used to identify the geographic boundaries of each case study site, and shape files 
of landmarks and geographical boundaries were obtained from local municipalities and the 
Geomatics Department at the University of Cape Town. All the homesteads within the 
boundaries of each case study area were marked and given a label using Google Earth 
imagery. Once all the homesteads identified in the Google Earth imagery were marked and 
labeled, their labels were entered into a Microsoft Excel sheet. Microsoft Excel was used as a 
tool for generating a random sample of the homesteads to be used for the study based on the 
predetermined sample size for each case study area. Table 2.1 shows the sample sizes for 
household surveys in Sokhulu, Mbonambi and Mankosi. 
 
Table 2.1: Household survey sample sizes in the three case study sites 
 Sokhulu Mbonambi Mankosi 
Estimated number 
of homesteads 
540 2494 800 
Sample size 48  142 80 
 
2.3.2 Focus group discussions 
Focus groups, also known as discussion groups, are a key interview method for qualitative 
enquiry (Cloke et al, 2004). Focus groups are defined as a carefully selected group of people 
who discuss particular questions raised by the moderator. Focus group discussions were vital 
for this research as they provided an in-depth understanding of the more difficult issues 
relating to how people define benefits and the institutional arrangements currently in place for 
distributing benefits. These were conducted with community members involved in the various 
sectors. The focus group methods and settings were designed by me with the approval of and 
inputs from my supervisors and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) literature. In the field, I 
used the assistance of my local field assistants to identify the appropriate participants for each 
focus group. Participants were identified through purposive sampling. Purposive sampling is a 
non-random sampling technique used to identify informants who have particular knowledge 
about key aspects of the research, and the researcher uses their judgment to determine who 
can be part of the sample based on certain characteristics (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques were used to conduct the focus groups in all 















limited education. Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate the focus groups that were conducted in 
the case study communities.  
 
Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques encourage participants from the community to 
actively raise views about the issue in question (Driyamedia, 1996). Conducting research 
using PRA techniques requires that the researcher fully engages in listening and 
understanding people‟s opinions, life experiences and traditional knowledge. This is pertinent 
as the community is the primary source of information about their conditions, livelihoods, 
needs and attitudes. The specific PRA techniques that were used in the focus groups included 
timelines, ranking and Venn diagrams.  
 
Table 2.2: Sokhulu focus group schedule
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DATE FOCUS GROUP CODE PARTICIPANTS 
08 February 
2010 
Sokhulu fisheries focus group 1 
 – mussel committee  
 
SFFG 1 
11 members (including committee 
chairperson, treasurer and monitors) 
08 February 
2010 
Sokhulu fisheries focus group 2  
– line fish committee 
 
SFFG 2 
8 members (including committee 




Sokhulu fisheries focus group 3 
 – mussel harvesters 
 
SFFG3 
13 mussel harvesters 
09 February 
2010 
Sokhulu fisheries focus group 4  






Sokhulu mining focus group 1   




7 members (including chairperson, 









Sokhulu mining focus group 2    
- Sokhulu mining employees 
 
SMFG 2 
7 mining workers (3 work at RBM, 4 
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Table 2.3: Mbonambi focus group schedule
4 
DATE FOCUS GROUP CODE PARTICIPANTS 
12 February 
2010 
Mbonambi Community Trust  
MMFG 1 
3 members (i.e. chairperson, 
treasurer and co-ordinator) 
16 February 
2010 
Mbonambi fisheries focus group 1 




7 members (including committee 




Mbonambi fisheries focus group 2  







Mbonambi fisheries focus group 3 




51 mussel collectors/farmers 
19 February 
2010 
Mbonambi traditional healers  
MHFG 




Mbonambi mining focus group 2 
 - Mbonambi mining employees 
 
MMFG 2 
5 mining workers  
 
Table 2.4: Mankosi focus group schedule
5 
DATE FOCUS GROUP CODE PARTICIPANTS 
17 November 
2009 
Mankosi fisheries focus group 1 
 – line fish committee 
 
MFFG 1 
10 members (including chairperson, 
treasurer, secretary and monitors) 
17 November 
2009 
Mankosi fisheries focus group 2 
 – Female fishers 
 
MFFG 2 









Mankosi tourism focus group  






Mankosi Community Trust  
MCTFG 
4 members (i.e. secretary, deputy 




Mankosi fisheries focus group 3 
 – male fishers  
 
MFFG 3 
10 fishermen and divers 
 
a) Timelines and ranking 
Timelines were an important tool used in the focus groups to understand the history of the 
communities and their use of resources, and the way in which they have benefited or incurred 
losses from resource use has changed over time. Timelines may be used to reveal important 
community events that occurred in the past, such as droughts, floods, forest felling, and so on. 
(Asia Forest Network, 2002). This helps researchers understand the present conditions and 
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behaviors of the community by acknowledging the past. Timelines may be used to collect 
information on trends of natural resource use by the community as well as changes in land 
ownership. Elders in the community are usually crucial for providing historical information in 
timelines. Ranking exercises were used simultaneously with the timeline exercises in the 
focus groups and participants were asked to rank benefits associated with each event on the 
timeline in order to indicate the extent of the impact of that particular event on their lives. 
Smiley face icons () and frowning face icons () were used to rank the benefits, losses or 
negative impacts associated with the events on the timeline.   
 
Figure 2.1 and Box 2.1 illustrate examples of a timeline and the ranking exercises that were 
conducted in the focus group discussions. 
 






Mining operations by RBM began at Mbonambi
Conservation of fisheries  resources and indigenous forests 
started at Maphelane Nature Reserve - illegal harvesting 
arrests for non-permit holders began
Mussel harvesting co-management started at Sokhulu
Subsistence harvesting legalised; Line fish co-management 
started at Mbonambi
RBM mining operations started at Sokhulu
TIMELINE
2001 Subsistence fishing permits issued for the first time
2006 Sokhulu line fish committee  formalized
 
 Figure 2.1: Example of a timeline of key events that have influenced the use of coastal resources in 
























Box 2.1: Example of ranking of benefits and losses associated with interventions of events on 
the timelines in Sokhulu 
Benefits from fisheries resources 
 Food/subsistence  
 Permits from co-management  
 Jobs for monitors  
 Jobs for Coast Care workers for poor and unemployed people in the community (but 
the project has been terminated and we don‟t know why  
 EKZNW has built a parking lot at Nhlabane beach for safety of fishermen‟s cars – 
plan is to have a boom gate where people with cars will pay and the money will go to 
the community – committee did this with EKZNW but no benefits to committee  
Losses from the fisheries sector 
 Loss of free access to mussels as a source of protein  
 RBM bridge at lake Nhlabane decreased fish stock at the lake  





b) Venn diagrams 
Venn diagrams were another PRA technique used in the focus group discussions conducted in 
this study. Venn diagrams are used to understand the significance of actors in a given network 
and to depict the relationships that exist among those actors (Asia Forest Network, 2002). 
Figure 2.3 illustrates an example of a Venn diagram that was conducted in a focus group 
discussion. The circle sizes in the diagram depict the amount of decision-making power 
attributed to each actor, i.e. the bigger the circle, the bigger the decision-making powers of an 
actor. The proximity of circles to and from each other depicts the relationship between the 
actors represented in each circle, i.e. the closer the circles to each other, the stronger the 
relationship represented, the further the circles from each other, the weaker the relationship 























Figure 2.2: An example of a Venn diagram that was conducted with coastal resource users in 
 Mbonambi 
 
2.3.3 Key informant interviews 
 Key informant interviews were used to collect primary data and as a tool to develop a rapport 
with the respondents in order to ensure that the data obtained was accurate and 
comprehensive. Key informant interviews were conducted with some of the key institutional 
stakeholders from the various sectors in order to understand the influence of institutions in 
controlling access to and benefit-sharing of resources and the mechanisms used by institutions 
for that purpose.  
 
Purposive sampling was used to sample the respondents of the key informant interviews 
conducted in this study. This sampling strategy is adopted when the researcher uses subjective 
judgment about which stakeholders they want to be part of the sample that is researched, 
based on a prior assessment of the appropriateness of each stakeholder‟s characteristics for the 
research (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). For this study, the key informants were predetermined 















such as government departments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and traditional 
authorities. Triangulation was used to verify the data collected from the different key 
informants in order to provide a robust interpretation of the data. 
 
In KwaZulu-Natal, including Sokhulu and Mbonambi, 17 key informant interviews were 
conducted for this study. In the Eastern Cape, including Mankosi, 13 key informant 
interviews were conducted for this study. 
 
Table 2.5: KwaZulu-Natal key informant interview schedule 
DATE KEY INFORMANT CODE INSTITUTION/ORGANIZATION 
11 February 2010 RBM representative 1 RBM 1 RBM 
25 February 2010 RBM representative 2 RBM 2 RBM 
25 February 2010 RBM representative 3 RBM 3 RBM 
26 February 2010 KZN Regional Forestry 
representative  
DWAF 1 DWAF 
26 February 2010 KZN Regional Land Claims 
Commission representative 
LCCKI DRDLR 
23 February 2010 EKZN Wildlife 
representative 1 
EKZNW 1 EKZN Wildlife 
25 February 2010 EKZN Wildlife 
representative 2 
EKZNW 2 EKZN Wildlife 
26 February 2010 EKZN Wildlife 
representative 3 
EKZNW 3 EKZN Wildlife 
31 October 2009 EKZN Wildlife 
representative 4 
EKZNW 4 EKZN Wildlife 
25 February 2010 Mbonambi Ward 3 
Councillor 
MKI 1 Mfolozi Local Municipality 
01 March 2010 Sokhulu Ward 1 Councillor SKI 1 Mfolozi Local Municipality 
24 February 2010 Mbonambi Traditional 
Authority representative 
MKI 2 Mbonambi Traditional Authority 
27 February 2010 Sokhulu Traditional 
Authority representative 
SKI 2 Sokhulu Traditional Authority 
03 March 2010 Mfolozi Local Municipality 
representative 
MLM Mfolozi Local Municipality 
02 June 2010 ASCLME Tourism 
representative 
TKI ASCLME 
03 June 2010 EKZN Wildlife 
representative 
EKZNW 5 EKZN Wildlife 
04 June 2010 iSimangaliso Authority 
representative 


















Table 2.6: Eastern Cape key informant interview schedule 
DATE KEY INFORMANT CODE INSTITUTION/ORGANIZATION 
27 May 2010 DEDEA representative  ECKI 1 DEDEA 
27 May 2010 Eastern Cape Tourism Board 
representative 
ECKI 2 Eastern Cape Tourism Board 
28 May 2010 DRDLR representative ECKI 3 DRDLR 




O.R. Tambo District Municipality 
28 May 2010 Nyandeni Local Mnicipality 
representative 
NLMKI Nyandeni Local Municipality 
22 May 2010 Nyandeni Ward 26 Councillor MKI 1 Nyandeni Local Municipality 
21 May 2010 Mankosi traditional authority 
representative 
MKI 2 Mankosi Traditional Authority 
21 May 2010 Mankosi Community Trust 
representative 
MKI 3 Mankosi Community Trust 
21 May 2010 TransCape and Nyandeni Local 
Tourism Board reprentative 
MKI 4 TransCape  
22 May 2010 Anchorage Hotel representative  MKI 5 Anchorage Hotel 
23 May 2010 Ex- MCM monitor in Mankosi MKI 6 - 
26 May 2010 Coffee Bay mussel project 
representative 
CBMP - 
25 May 2010 Commercial lobster buyer CLB Phumalali seafood 
 
2.4 Data analysis       
2.4.1 Analysis of quantitative data  
Microsoft Access and Microsoft Excel software were used to analyze the quantitative data 
contained in the household surveys. The household survey data collected were entered into a 
Microsoft Access database which was useful for storing the data systematically. An Access 
database was developed for questionnaire data from each case study site. Once all the data 
had been entered into an Access database, pivot tables were created using Microsoft Access 
and Excel in order to represent the data in graphs and tables showing frequencies and trends 
from the dataset about livelihoods, resource use, as well as perceptions of people about 
institutions and rules pertaining resource use. Various queries exploring resource use patterns, 
as well as perceptions on benefits and losses from the household survey data were run using 
this software. The queries explored relationships between variables in the database and were 
used to profile marine resource users in the case study sites, i.e. their average age, education 
level, monthly income, employment status household sizes and coastal resources they used to 
support their families. The queries were also used to provide statistics on community 
perceptions about institutions, committees and rules regulating resource use. The quantitative 















data from the focus groups and the key informant interviews when triangulating the data.  The 
queries were also discussed by the research team to ensure uniformity across case studies and 
countries. 
2.4.2 Analysis of qualitative data  
Data collection and analysis in grounded theory research are interrelated processes, as 
analysis starts as soon as the data collection commences (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Similar 
phenomena were grouped into categories in order to highlight similarities and differences and 
coded. Open coding was used to compare and triangulate the quantitative data from household 
surveys, with the qualitative data from the focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews.  
 
Open coding is defined by Corbin and Strauss (1990:12) as “the interpretive process by which 
data are broken down analytically”. This method involves thorough examination and 
categorization of data, as well as comparison and triangulation of the data for similarities or 
differences. Comparisons of events/phenomena for similarities and differences gives 
researchers new insights and creative ways of interpreting phenomena contained in the data. 
According to Corbin and Strauss (1990), the advantage of open coding is that, through 
constant systematic comparisons and analysis of data, researchers are able to avoid bias and 
subjectivity.  
 
To analyze the relationships and power dynamics among the various stakeholders, this 
research drew on the Social Network Analysis (SNA). Full SNA was not used but rather 
elementary SNA was utilized to understand the influence of networks between actors and the 
relationships among stakeholders involved in fisheries and mining in the three case study 
sites. The SNA method is useful in social and behavioral sciences as it focuses on 
relationships among social entities being studied, and on the patterns and implications of these 
relationships (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). It is based on an assumption of the importance of 
relationships among interacting units, hence, the understanding of these relationships is 
significant because communities are defined not just by a single group of local stakeholders, 
but by complex interactions of multiple stakeholders with different interests, perceptions, and 
















The principles of Social Network Analysis, according to Wasserman and Faust (1994), are as 
follows: 
a) Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather than dependent 
autonomous units; 
b) Relational ties between actors are channels for flow of resources (i.e. material or non-
material resources); 
c) Network models focusing on individuals view the network structural environment as 
providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action; and 
d) Network models conceptualize structure (social, economic, political, etc.) as lasting 
patterns of relations among actors. 
 
Actors involved in each sector were asked to name/list all the people or institutions that they 
had a working relation with or actors/institutions that they associated with within that sector 
in terms of resource use or decision-making. Key actors whose names were mentioned in this 
exercise by individual actors were then visited and asked the same question to discover the 
common actors whom most of the actors in the network associate with. After that, each actor 
was asked to rank all the actors/institutions they had named according to who they thought 
had the most decision-making power. The actor ranked by most of the respondents as having 
the most decision-making power is at the centre of the network. The data collected in the 
interviews using SNA were used to determine which stakeholders were the key players within 
the small-scale fisheries and mining sectors in the case study communities. 
2.5 Research ethics 
Due to the fact that the case study communities involved in this research are rural and under 
the authority of traditional leadership, I had to be introduced to the tribal authority at the tribal 
council meetings in the respective communities. This was done in order to gain the consent of 
the traditional leaders and the community structures to undertake the research in each area. 
However, some of the household surveys were conducted during the national election period 
in the Sokhulu area, and due to the high political contestations in this area, some of the 
community members thought that the research was government led. They were therefore 
initially skeptical about answering some of the questions about power in the local context. In 
addition, there were various power dynamics that were detected between traditional 
authorities and community members, as well as between the different stakeholders 















authorities, as well as other key groups in the communities. As a result, some of the 
community members expressed fear of answering certain questions about traditional 
authorities and other stakeholders. In order to overcome these challenges, I had to maintain a 
neutral view and approach in the way that I communicated with the community leaders, 
different stakeholders as well as the wider communities; so that people would not presume 
that I was advocating for any sides through conducting the research. Furthermore, it was to 
my advantage that the assistants I had chosen to work with were not involved in community 
politics and were normal members of the communities. Also, the assistants were well known 
by many in the communities and therefore it was easy for me to build a relationship with the 
people and to explain to them that I was not from government but that I was conducting 
independent research that would make recommendations to inform government policy. Thus I 
encouraged people to be frank about their responses and assured them that all the information 
they gave was confidential. Once I had explained this, people understood and were willing to 
cooperate.  
 
 The research was conducted in a way that tried to ensure that the communities benefited from 
the research. Local community assistants were paid to assist with the household surveys and I 
also paid community members that accommodated me in order to give back to the community 
and to gain their trust by being close to them. The results and findings of this research have 
also been fed back to the community when the study when the study was completed so that 
local organizations, and the broade  community, may gain a better understanding about issues 
relating to benefit-sharing of coastal resources in the respective areas. This is particularly 
crucial as people in Sokhulu and Mankosi complained that they were tired of giving 
information to researchers, as they never return to inform them about the findings of their 
research and how they could benefit the communities. Therefore, people in the communities 
appreciated that I returned to the communities and presented the findings of this research and 
the recommendations made with the aim to improve policy practices.   
2.6 Study limitations 
Certain limitations were identified in this research. First, limited literature on access and 
benefit-sharing of natural and biological resources is available, due to the fact that much of 
the discourse around benefit-sharing has been within the biodiversity sector, focused on 
genetic resources. Second, there were translation constraints as the terms „benefits‟, „losses‟ 















isiXhosa. However, this was countered by the fact that I had extensive knowledge of these 
languages. Third, since the case study communities involved in this research are rural, there 
were difficulties in obtaining information about households and population demographics of 
the area, making it hard to determine the sample sizes. These posed major (but not 
insurmountable) constraints for sampling households.  
 
Another potential limitation was use of case studies. This approach is criticized for posing 
limitations with regards to the validity and replicability of the data collected (Lindegger, 
1999). It has been argued that this approach is too reliant on observation and people‟s 
experiences in order to explain and understand why things are the way they are. The problem 
with this may be the fact that people‟s observations and experiences are not constant but 
change from time to time, making it hard to replicate or verify the research findings. 
Denscombe (2007) also argues that the researcher is likely to encounter doubts about the 
research findings when doing case study research because the extent to which the results can 
be generalized rests on the similarity of the case studies to other areas of comparison. 
Therefore, it becomes crucial for the researcher to identify how the chosen case studies 
compare with other areas for which the findings will be generalized (Lindegger, 1999; 
Denscombe, 2007).   
2.7 Conclusion        
This study has utilized qualitative and quantitative data collection methods in order to obtain 
an in-depth and broad understanding of how people in Sokhulu, Mbonambi and Mankosi 
access, use and benefit from coastal resources in the fisheries and mining sectors. Household 
surveys were conducted in Sokhulu, Mbonambi and Mankosi in order to collect qualitative 
and descriptive information about the communities and their coastal resources uses, benefits 
and losses. Focus group discussions which applied PRA techniques, as well as key informant 
interviews with key stakeholders provided an in-depth understanding of benefit-sharing 
dynamics within fisheries and mining in the respective communities. The use of PRA 
techniques in collecting data from the communities was useful in eliciting information about 
the influence and effectiveness of institutional arrangements in benefit-sharing processes, as 
well as issues around control and power related benefit distribution. The collected data was 
analyzed using coding and thematic analysis techniques, as well as through elementary Social 
Network Analysis. Data from different sources was triangulated during the analysis in order 















institutional arrangements influence benefit-sharing within fisheries and mining. The next 













































CHAPTER THREE – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of theories relating to access to and benefit-sharing of 
resources. Although the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) asserts that benefits 
derived from the use of genetic resources must be fairly and equitably shared, there are 
various debates within the genetic resource use literature as to what „sharing‟ actually means 
(Byström et al, 1999; UNEP, 2003). According to Byström et al (1999:17), fair and equitable 
benefit-sharing is “something that should result from the totality of legal, economic, political 
and other factors which decide, in combination, how benefits are divided”. This definition of 
benefit-sharing frames the understanding of the term within the context of this study. Ostrom 
(2005) asserts that when one seeks to understand institutions, it is significa t to understand 
what they are and how they are crafted in order to determine the influence they have in 
various situations. In this study, Ribot and Peluso‟s (2003) theory of access is thus used to 
understand how people gain access and control of benefits, and the various ways in which 
institutions and institutional arrangements influence the manner in which benefits from access 
and use of resources are distributed. In addition, literature on property rights and 
decentralization of decision-making power in natural resource management also provides a 
deeper understanding of the institutional underpinnings that influence benefit-sharing of 
resources. Literature on distributive and procedural justice, exploring the inclusiveness of 
decision-making processes and the distribution of power in these processes is also reviewed. 
3.2 Access, rights and benefits  
Ribot and Peluso‟s (2003) theory of access is about how people relate to each other and how 
they derive, transfer or distribute benefits from resources. Within this theory, access is defined 
as “the ability to benefit from things; including material objects, persons, institutions, and 
symbols” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003:1). The term „use‟ in natural resource use directly refers to 
the ability to derive and enjoy benefits from resources (Berkes, 2003). Benefits derived from 
coastal resources may be direct (e.g. monetary, consumptive use) and indirect (e.g. ecological 
goods and services such as clean air and carbon sequestration). The tourism sector, for 
example, is a major provider of monetary benefits to coastal areas through foreign exchange, 
while sectors such as subsistence agriculture and small-scale fisheries provide direct non-
monetary benefits such as food that coastal communities can use to support their livelihoods 















Access control (i.e. the ability and power to control the access of others to resources) and 
access maintenance (i.e. using resources or power to maintain the status quo regarding access 
to resources) form part of the political-economic aspect of the concept of access (Ribot and 
Peluso, 2003). These concepts explain how resources are harvested, used and managed, and 
the relations between those who control and maintain access to resources. The term 
„mechanisms‟ may be used to refer to the various processes and relations that influence how 
stakeholders gain, control and maintain access to resources, how benefits derived from 
resources are distributed and why they are distributed in that manner (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; 
Langridge et al, 2006). According to Ribot and Peluso (2003), access mechanisms include 
rights based access as well as structural and relational mechanisms of access. These 
mechanisms are defined below. 
 
Rights-based access may include legal, illegal and customary means of access to land and 
natural resources. Legal access is granted by government or other stakeholders through 
permits, title deeds or licenses, also referred to as property rights. The term „property‟ is 
defined by MacPherson (1978:17) as “a right in the sense of an enforceable claim to some use 
or benefit of something”. Property rights theory focuses on „rights‟ enforced by custom or law 
as a fundamental basis for acquiring benefits from things. Property rights afford those who 
hold them the enjoyment of power and benefits that are more secure than those who do not. If 
resource users hold a right of access to a resource, they have power to use the resource and 
benefit from using it (Schangler and Ostrom, 1992). Four property rights regimes have been 
characterized by Schangler and Ostrom (1992). These include open access rights (i.e. where 
there is free and open access to a resource due to a lack of explicit property rights), private 
property rights (which are used to limit the use of a resource to those vested with the power to 
do so), communal property rights (held by a definable community which has the right to use 
resources in a defined area and exclude outsiders from using the resource), and state property 
rights (held by the state which makes decisions about resource access and exploitation) 
(Schangler and Ostrom, 1992). 
 
In contrast to the property rights theory, Ribot and Peluso (2003) emphasize „ability‟ (or 
power) as a means of understanding how benefits to things are acquired. The emphasis on 
„ability‟ instead of  only „rights‟ when seeking to understand factors that enable or hinder 
people from benefiting from resources, is the key distinction between access and property 















influence how people benefit from resources (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Langridge et al, 2006).  
 
Illegal access may refer to the enjoyment of benefits from natural resources in ways that may 
not necessarily be acceptable by law, but that may be acceptable within a local social context 
(Schangler and Ostrom, 1992). This arises in cases where communities consider it their 
indigenous „right‟ to access natural resources. In the fisheries sector in South Africa for 
instance, conflicts have resulted between fishers who have been denied their traditional right 
to harvest marine resources, as the state declares harvesting without permits as illegal and not 
recognised by law (Hauck, 2008).  This indicates that defining legal and illegal access to 
natural resources is an issue of power between stakeholders that use or manage the resources. 
 
Under customary law, in most rural communities in Africa where land is communally owned, 
usufruct rights over communal land for residential, agriculture or other uses are allocated by 
traditional authorities (Devereux, 1996; Maxted, 2002). However, the allocation of rights to 
access land and resources through traditional institutions does not guarantee that the 
allocation process will be free from inequity and patriarchy, as traditional customs pertaining 
to decision making in rural communities are highly influenced by power and gender 
(Devereux, 1996; Maxted, 2002). In most rural communities in Africa, for instance, gender 
relations mostly regulate how usufruct rights are issued, as customary laws for allocating 
usufruct rights to land mostly favor men as they are perceived to be more productive, while 
women usually secure access to land through association with a male counterpart, either 
through marriage or family relation (Maxted, 2002).  
 
Structural and relational mechanisms of access portray how the ability to benefit from 
resources may be limited by certain cultural and political-economic spheres within which 
access to benefits from resources occurs (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Authority, social status, 
knowledge, capital and power are examples of structural and relational mechanisms that 
determine who has the power or ability to benefit more from natural resources than others 
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003). For example, a company mining sand dunes along the coast can use 
financial capital to facilitate its ability to gain, control and maintain access to the resource by 
leasing out the portion of land where the mining will take place or by obtaining legal mining 
rights from the state which will enable them gain control over how that portion of mining land 
















Framing access within a wider political-economic lens is thus crucial in understanding how 
people benefit from natural resources and why benefit flows occur in a certain manner within 
a given context. Indeed, as confirmed by Ribot and Peluso (2003), the distribution of benefits 
occurs in a manner that is unique to a certain context and there is no prescribed or generic 
approach for determining access mechanisms within a specific political-economic context. 
Therefore, once the benefits from resources are known, access analysis is necessary to 
identify mechanisms driving benefit flows and distribution, as well as to empirically 
determine and map how access to those benefits is gained, maintained and controlled within a 
study context (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). This notion forms the central focus of this 
dissertation. 
 
Understanding how people benefit from the ability to access natural resources is important as 
people, institutions and societies rely on, strive for, and compete over benefits from natural 
resources (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). The theory of access is pivotal in that it utilizes a 
grounded and pragmatic approach to analyzing who benefits from resources, what resources 
they benefit from, in what circumstances they benefit, how they benefit from natural resources 
and why they benefit in that manner (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). The theory of access also 
enables an understanding of why certain people and (or) institutions benefit from natural 
resources in the way they do. This theory provides a more comprehensive understanding of 
the multiple ways in which people benefit from natural resources, with property rights being 
one of them (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). This is because theory of access encompasses all 
social, institutional, political-economic and discursive factors that influence the ways in which 
benefits from resources flow and are distributed (Ribot and Peluso, 2003).  
      
3.3 Institutional factors relating to benefit-sharing  
Due to the fact that the „ability‟ to access resources relates to power, the concept of access is 
also akin to decision-making (McDermott, 2009). Access to natural resources and decision-
making indicates and explains the ways in which benefit flows take place. The degree to 
which decision makers involve resource users in deciding how benefits are shared determines 
the power relations between institutions and resource users (McDermott, 2009). Institutions 
can be defined as systems for enforcing established rules and norms that structure society, 
while organizations are structures (such as industries and companies) made up of different 
actors with common or conflicting objectives (North 1990; North 1994; Hodgson 2006). 















organizations managing natural resource use and access. According to Umali (2009:5), formal 
and informal institutions exist as “distinct frameworks of rules for doing things”, implemented 
through organizations to produce, reproduce and reinforce social relations. For example, 
while fisheries authorities may develop and enforce rules for natural resource use through 
allocating permits and licenses, local people in a given area can also define their socially 
acceptable rules for using the resources, separate from legal rules. (ICLARM, 1998). 
Understanding the mediating role of institutions in marginalized people‟s access to natural 
resources is pivotal when seeking to understand how benefits from natural resources are 
distributed among stakeholders (Mearns, 1995; Ribot and Peluso, 2003). 
 
In natural resource management, institutions are responsible for making operational rules (i.e. 
rules that constrain or enable individuals‟ choices or actions) and collective choice rules (i.e. 
rules made collectively by a group that shape collective choices) (Acheson, 2006). 
Institutional rules can also create entitlements to authorized resource use and shape decision-
making and public participation in natural resource governance (Acheson, 2006; Paavola, 
2007). The institutional rules that enable this include: a) entitlement rules (which are 
significant in influencing the distribution of benefits from resource use); b) monitoring rules 
(which determine who and what is being monitored); and c) decision-making rules (which 
largely determine the extent of procedural justice in resource governance as they are used to 
determine who can participate in decision-making processes and whose concerns are 
recognized in decision-making procedures) (Paavola, 2007). The formulation of these rules 
has profound implications for distributive and procedural justice, and for judging the 
legitimacy of institutions.  
 
Establishing rules is critical for managing common property resources and ensuring their long 
term sustainability (Acheson, 2006). Coastal resources (such as intertidal resources, line fish, 
and estuarine resources) are often classified as common-pool or common property resources. 
The term „common-pool‟ was first adopted from Hardin‟s (1968) publication “The Tragedy of 
the Commons”. This means that the resources can be used by large numbers of people and 
usually become exploited when more and more people use them (Acheson, 2006). The 
governance functions of institutional arrangements in common property resource management 
are generally to exclude unauthorized resource users, to regulate authorized resource use and 
the distribution of benefits from resource use, to monitor, to enforce, to resolve conflicts and, 















different institutional arrangements. In cases where customary common property rights 
prevail, such as in rural areas, local institutional arrangements such as a community fisher 
association may make, enforce and be involved in decision-making procedures relating to the 
resource (Paavola, 2007). In addition, resource users or community members may themselves 
take part in governance functions by monitoring compliance with resource use rules. 
 
The challenge of managing common property resources is referred to as a collective-action 
problem and there is no one institutional arrangement that can be used to solve it (Acheson, 
2006). Ribot et al (2008) state that institutions enforced through rules or authorities are not 
merely organically occurring solutions to collective action problems, but are created by 
powerful interests. In recent decades, many institutions have been created for increasing 
public participation and empowerment in decision-making processes. Historical and 
contemporary studies on common property resources indicate that institutional arrangements 
and resource management mechanisms are perceived by resource users as the key enablers of 
the distribution of benefits derived from natural resources (Agrawal, 2001). Furthermore, due 
researchers and proponents of democracy around the world have been promoting greater 
public participation of local people in decision-making processes, and the discourse of 
decentralization in natural resource management has, since the 1980s, influenced some 
governments in developing countries to transfer decision-making powers and responsibilities 
to local level institutions (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2003).  
 
Decentralization is a mode of governance that is defined as the transfer or devolution of 
decision-making power and authority for public functions from central government to 
subordinate governments, through enabling lower-level actors to exercise some level of 
autonomy in decision-making processes (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; von Braun and Grote, 
2000; Ntsebeza, 2002). Decentralization is intended to increase public participation in local 
decision-making processes in order to promote more equitable and efficient local management 
forms (Ntsebeza, 2002; Ribot, 2003). Political or democratic decentralization is a type of 
decentralization whereby decision-making powers are transferred to authorities that are 
accountable to and represent local citizens (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; von Braun and Grote, 
2000; Ntsebeza, 2002). Institutional structures with real powers that are downwardly 
accountable to local people on the ground arguably produce decentralization leading to local 
efficiency and equity (Ntsebeza, 2002; Ribot, 2003). An understanding of the powers of the 















are accountable are important prerequisites to determine whether meaningful decentralization 
has taken place (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999).  
 
Understanding how institutions are designed to influence the ways in which people use and 
benefit from natural resources is important because of the deeper socio-political processes that 
shape both these institutions and the communities within which they exist (Blair, 2000; 
Cleaver; 2002). Power is a significant factor impacting on the ability of people to benefit from 
natural resources and is manifested in the ability of certain stakeholders or institutions to 
influence how others benefit from a resource (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Power is constituted 
in different mechanisms, processes and social relations and is held by certain people and 
institutions who control and (or) maintain access to natural resources (Ribot and Peluso, 
2003). Agrawal and Ribot (1999) assert that there are four broad types of powers that are 
significant in understanding decentralization in natural resource management. These include 
the power to create rules and to adjust old ones, the power to make decisions about how a 
particular resource or opportunity is to be used, the power to implement and ensure 
compliance to new and modified rules; and the power to judge disputes arising in efforts to 
create new rules and ensure compliance (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Successful 
decentralization of power occurs in part where there is transparency between institutions 
responsible for the governance of natural resources and local communities, as this allows for 
the transfer of power to take place.  
 
Ostrom (2005) highlights eight key principles determining the robustness of institutions for 
sustainably managing resources. Some of these principles are: clearly defined resource 
boundaries and rights of resource users, ensured proportional equivalence between benefits 
and costs, the enforcement of collective-choice arrangements, as well as local monitoring of 
resources and resource use by locally accountable institutional arrangements. Ostrom (2005) 
notes that it is important that the rights of resource users are well defined and that resource 
users are included in decision-making about resource use. This makes resource users more 
willing to comply with resource use rules. Furthermore, if benefits and costs from resource 
use are equitably distributed by institutions, fairness is enhanced and resource users are more 
willing to abide to rules (Ostrom, 2005). Failure of institutions to take into account the 
abovementioned principles may negatively implicate on the robustness of institutional 
arrangements and may make benefit distribution processes to be susceptible to corruption, 















3.4 Justice and equity  
Literature on distributive and procedural justice, exploring the inclusiveness of decision-
making processes and the distribution of power in these processes, provides a deeper insight 
on equity in benefit-sharing processes. Historically, natural resource decision-making was 
founded purely on scientific or technical evidence, disregarding the potential role of public 
participation as significant in influencing natural resource management. As a result, there has 
been inadequate literature addressing justice issues in relation to public involvement in 
decision-making processes relating to natural resource use (Lawrence et al, 1997). However, 
in the second half of the 20
th
 century, there has been a strong recognition for including public 
participation and justice elements into natural resource decision-making.  
 
Historically, justice research used to focus mostly on distributive justice, i.e. the perception 
that “people‟s feelings and behaviors in social interactions flow from their assessments of the 
fairness of their outcomes when dealing with others” (Tyler and Blader, 2003:350). 
Distributive justice focused on equity (i.e. people should be rewarded according to their 
efforts), need (i.e. people should receive benefits according to their needs) and equality (i.e. 
everyone must benefit equally, irrespective of efforts or costs) (Smith and McDonough, 
2001). However, the focus on distributive justice shifted in the 1980s and early 1990s, as 
researchers shifted towards a stronger focus on procedural justice. According to Lawrence et 
al, (1997:579), procedural justice is based on the assumption that people involved in decision-
making processes and procedures used to arrive at decisions “are significant determinants of 
satisfaction separate from the effect of outcomes”. This means that if participants view a 
procedure as fair, dissatisfaction will be low and if the participants view the procedure as 
unfair, dissatisfaction results. Procedural justice is primarily concerned with who is 
recognized and can participate in decision-making processes and with how power can be 
effectively distributed  (Paavola, 2007). 
 
According to Laventhal (1980), there are six rules that determine the fairness of a procedure, 
i.e. consistency of decisions, limited bias of decision makers, accurate and informed decision-
making, modifiability of errors, strong representation of affected individuals in decision-
making processes and, consideration for prevailing ethical and moral standards. Lawrence et 
al (1997) also add that the perceptions of procedural justice are linked to acceptance and 
levels of compliance with decisions by participants, as well as the confidence of people in 
















Thibaut and Walker (1975), who were the pioneers of procedural justice in the early 1970s, 
saw procedural justice as focused on decision-making mechanisms (i.e. formal procedures) 
and about allocating decisions outcomes (Lawrence et al, 1997; Tyler and Blader, 2003). In 
addition to this the value in procedural justice lies in its ability to assist decision makers in 
making equitable decisions and judgments. However, over the years, the focus of procedural 
justice has shifted away from focusing only on decision-making towards focusing also on the 
agents of decisions, i.e. the quality of interpersonal treatment, as people interact with one 
another in procedures. Later research strengthened this notion by revealing that people tended 
to find a procedure to be fair and equitable if they felt that authorities took their arguments 
into account or if they were given an opportunity to have a voice in a procedure, even if what 
they had to say had little influence (Tyler, 1987; Lawrence, et al., 1997; Tyler and Blader, 
2003). Therefore, it is argued that public participation and accountability of representatives 
are essential for efficient and equitable distribution of benefits from resource use (Agrawal 
and Ribot, 1999). Hence, people tend to have a strong regard for whether or not the decision-
maker treats their argument with respect. This, together with the provision of feedback to 
participants on decisions by decision makers and the quality of how decisions are justified, are 
said to be the key defining elements of fair procedures (Lawrence et al, 1997; Tyler and 
Blader, 2003).  
 
The conclusion reached from this discussion is that although public involvement has the 
ability to influence decision-making processes and outcomes, the opportunity to have a voice 
or to speak out ones thoughts in a procedure has a more paramount value to people (Tyler and 
Blader, 2003). Overtime, it has became apparent that procedural justice and distributive 
justice are interrelated in practice especially in natural resource decision-making, as natural 
resources are usually limited and therefore difficult to be equally distributed to everyone 
(Paavola, 2007). Smith and McDonough (2001) argue that because natural resource decision 
makers are faced with the task of allocating benefits (and costs), high procedural fairness and 
high distributive fairness of decisions and outcomes are significant as they increase the level 
of trust that people have in decision makers and the policies they make. Research conducted 
both on distributive justice and procedural justice judgments in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
revealed that procedural justice has a greater impact in influencing people‟s reactions and 
personal experiences because people find more value in being able to express their judgments 















Hence, the reflection of both distributive justice and procedural justice concerns forms the 
basis for legitimate decision-making in natural resource management.  
3.5 Conclusion  
Since the meaning of benefit-sharing is still contested, this study has drawn extensively on 
Ribot and Peluso‟s (2003) theory of access, as it provides insight on how people benefit from 
„things‟, which may include natural resources. Due to the complex nature of common pool 
resources, theory of access provides a useful theoretical approach for framing the 
underpinnings of this study by focusing on who benefits from resources, what resources they 
benefit from, in what circumstances they benefit, how they benefit from natural resources and 
why they benefit in that manner (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Furthermore, complementing the 
theory of access with elements of procedural justice enables an in-depth understanding of the 
equity of decision-making processes by institutions with regards to benefit-sharing processes, 
and facilitates enquiry into why certain people and (or) institutions benefit from natural 

































CHAPTER FOUR – BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF STUDY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Coastal resources play a significant role in supplementing the lives of rural coastal 
communities in South Africa, as a significant number of poor households living along the 
coast harvest fish, forest products, and agricultural resources for subsistence and commercial 
use (Glavovic, 2000). Understanding the context of governing institutions in rural areas in 
South Africa is significant, as institutions impact on the manner in which rural people access 
and benefit from resources (Ntsebeza, 2002). Institutional arrangements for benefit 
distribution within coastal resource use sectors impact on opportunities for coastal 
communities to benefit from resources, either by enhancing or hindering benefit-sharing 
(Glavovic and Boonzaier, 2007). Post-apartheid coastal zone policy and legislation in South 
Africa has been geared towards a pro-poor integrated coastal management approach in order 
to promote the sustainable use of coastal resources (Glavovic and Boonzaier, 2007). Since 
1994, natural resource governance has been going through a unique form of decentralization 
in various areas in South Africa (Ntsebeza, 2004). The reform to governance introduced by 
decentralization is re-shaping institutions managing natural resources, by increasing the 
participation of local communities in determining who can access, manage and benefit from 
natural resources (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). This chapter provides an overview of the role of 
traditional institutions in rural coastal communities in South Africa as overarching governing 
institutions. It also reviews the role of small-scale fisheries and coastal mining sectors in these 
communities.  
4.2 Governing institutions in rural areas of South Africa 
The case study sites in this study were selected in part to understand the influence of 
institutional arrangements on access and benefit-sharing of coastal resources. They all 
represent rural and marginalized coastal communities residing on communal land under 
Traditional Authority (TA) leadership. The TAs, established by the former apartheid 
government, have had a significant institutional impact in former Bantustans or homeland 
areas in South Africa. (Koelble, 2005). Although traditional authorities are not directly 
involved in the management of coastal resources in these communities, South Africa‟s 
historical context needs to be taken into account in order to understand the role of TAs as 















Traditional institutions in South Africa are found mostly in the provinces with former 
Bantustans or homeland areas, i.e. KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Free-State, Limpopo and 
Mpumalanga (Koelble, 2005). Proponents of traditional leadership institutions (also known as 
traditionalists) argue that the institution of traditional leadership in South Africa has had a 
stabilizing influence in rural areas, helping to  provide continuity of governance during the 
transition to democracy, as the South African post-apartheid government played an 
inadequate role at the local level during this time (Beall, 2005). However, those opposed to 
traditional leadership (i.e. modernists) argue that the re-assertion of TA powers in rural areas 
is a threat to democratic decentralization efforts made by the post-apartheid South African 
government. Both traditionalists and modernists agree that TAs and elected government 
leaders in rural areas are competitors for political power and legitimacy (Logan, 2008).   
 
During the apartheid era, TAs in South Africa were given land administration roles and had 
uncontested powers in rural areas, but were unaccountable and undemocratic (Ntsebeza, 
2002). Although TAs are re-asserting their power in rural areas at institutional and informal 
levels, the type of power and authority that they exert is not the same throughout South 
Africa, varying greatly according to context (Koelble, 2005). The democratic South African 
government has made efforts to decentralize local government, land ownership and 
administrative powers to local level institutions that are accountable to the public. The 
Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) and the Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000) were 
developed by the post-apartheid government in order to dissolve TA powers in rural areas in 
the democratic dispensation (Koelble, 2005). Although these laws have been critical in 
promoting democratic decentralization in rural South Africa, the government has gone against 
its own efforts by simultaneously uplifting TA power instead of weakening it, through the 
Communal Land Rights Act (11 of 2004) and the National House of Traditional Leaders Act 
(22 of 2009), which give traditional leaders administrative powers both at provincial and local 
levels (Ntsebeza, 2002; Koeble, 2005). This is because the democratic South African 
government has recognized TAs as being prime customary institutions in rural areas, and has 
displayed ambiguity in clarifying the roles, functions and powers of TAs in the local 
government sphere. This is also partly due to the fact that in the negotiations that led to 
democracy, the role of TAs in rural areas was never settled (Ntsebeza, 2002).  
 
Although both the institutions of TAs and democratically elected local authorities (such as 















and conflicts between them and elected authorities in rural areas, affecting the implementation 
of development policies and laws (Ntsebeza, 2006; Glavovic and Boonzaier, 2007). There 
remains a challenge in reconciling hereditary traditional leadership and democratic 
government leadership. Where land tenure reform is concerned, for example, TAs in South 
Africa seek to own all common property land in rural areas. The dual governance dilemma in 
rural South Africa between TAs and local government structures was exacerbated by the 
White Paper on Local Government issued by the government in 1998, as it stated that the 
institutions of traditional leadership should play a role that is close to the people, linking 
government departments to local communities (Ntsebeza, 2002). This opposed the objectives 
stated in the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) that gave this mandate to 
elected local government structures (Ntsebeza, 2002). 
 
Consequently, TAs, especially in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, are opposed to most notions 
of democracy and decentralization in rural areas introduced by the African National Congress 
(ANC)
6
-led democratic government, as they feel that this will threaten their jurisdiction. In 
addition, TAs are opposed to other forms of alternative, potentially competitive, local 
institutional arrangements as they would potentially compete. Hence, Ntsebeza (2002) asserts 
that TAs would prefer power to be concentrated in their hands, as during the apartheid era. 
The institution of traditional leadership has been criticized for being both anti-democratic and 
non-democratic as it places individual interests ahead of community interests, and thus 
impedes the development of a democratic and just society (Logan, 2008).  
 
The prevalence of TAs can therefore be regarded as one of the main blockages to democratic 
decentralization in rural South Africa (Ntsebeza, 2002). The inability of the South African 
government to make clear the roles, powers and functions of TAs in local government has 
negative implications for decentralization. The promulgation of the Traditional Leadership 
and Governance Framework and the Communal Land Rights Acts of 2004 saw the South 
African government resort to partnering with traditional leaders in development by 
formalizing the status of TAs. This was done by giving TAs  and local government dual 
responsibilities for administration and land allocation within rural areas (United Nations 
Economic Commission for South Africa, 2007). This, however, has left rural coastal 
communities in most of South Africa confused about the roles, responsibilities and mandates 
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of TAs, local municipalities, local councilors, and sometimes NGOs. These functions are also 
often poorly defined and communicated. This problem is argued by Ntsebeza (2006) to be the 
source of confusion and tensions in the governance of rural communities. The lack of support 
by the South African government to elected local councilors in rural areas, as well as the 
indecisiveness of government regarding the TAs role within the democratic dispensation 
leaves the situation of institutional governance in rural areas in a state of confusion and 
consequently leads to compromised democratic decentralization (Ntsebeza, 2004). As a result, 
the ability of people residing in rural areas to choose their own leaders and representatives is 
paralyzed.  Koelble (2005:9) thus argues that, “the failure of the state to touch the lives of 
rural citizens and the concomitant failure of the democratically elected but ineffective local 
authorities has opened up several spaces for traditional leaders to re-affirm their cultural, 
social, economic and ultimately political power in all sorts of manners”.  
  
Understanding the context of governing  institutions for rural areas in South Africa is 
significant, as the presence of traditional authorities in parall l to government and private 
sector structures has a profound impact on the manner in which rural people access and 
benefit from resources (Ntsebeza, 2002). In coastal areas where common pool resources occur 
and several activities involving the use of these resources take place, i.e. fishing, and mining, 
the inability of the South African government to clarify the roles of TAs, in the midst of other 
government and private sector institutions responsible for using or managing the resources, 
may lead to conflicting jurisdictions which may negatively impact on access to resources and 
the equitable distribution of benefits. The following sections focus on the small-scale fisheries 
and mining sectors in South Africa, as these are coastal sectors that are managed by 
government and private sector structures, in parallel with traditional institutions in the case 
study communities.  
4.3 Overview of the small-scale fisheries sector 
4.3.1 Introduction 
There is no universal definition for small scale fisheries. However, according to the FAO 
(2005:4), small scale fisheries are defined as:  
a dynamic and evolving sector employing labor intensive 
harvesting, processing and distribution technologies to exploit 
marine and inland fishery resources. The activities of this 
subsector, conducted full or part-time, or just occasionally, are 
often targeted at supplying fish and fishery products to local 















The small-scale fisheries sector has not only influenced policies and discourses on 
biodiversity conservation, and environmental and resource sustainability, but it has also 
influenced those focused on rural planning, poverty alleviation, food security, trade and 
sustainable livelihoods (Dey and Kanagaratnam, 2008). As a result of this, fisheries 
discourses have evolved from just focusing on international fishery production and trade, to 
recognizing small-scale fisheries as a key sector in contributing to poverty alleviation and 
food security in developing countries (Béné, 2006).  
Although there is limited knowledge about the actual contribution of small scale fisheries in 
benefiting the economies of poor coastal communities in developing countries, it has been 
argued that small scale fisheries act as a „safety net‟ for rural fishing communities in 
developing countries in times of economic adversity, harvest failure and other circumstances 
that lead to vulnerability (Allison and Ellis, 2001; FAO, 2005). Poverty reduction and food 
security in small-scale fishing communities are highly dependent not only on the benefits the 
fishers obtain from the resources, but also on other alternative basic services provided to 
supplement the livelihoods of the fishers (Jentoft et al., 2010). Fisheries institutions, which 
aim to enhance benefits from marine resources, are shifting towards decentralized and 
context- specific management practices, such as co-management, in order to facilitate the 
implementation of management policies and to account for issues of poverty and food security 
(Jentoft et al., 2010).  The prominence of the sustainable development discourse in the late 
20
th
 century internationally and locally has also triggered a shift towards the appraisal of the 
socio-economic role played by small-scale fisheries in supplementing people‟s livelihoods.  
In the South African context, the human dimension of the fishery system in small-scale 
fishing communities is not well understood because historically, fisheries management largely 
focused on ecological and economic goals, with little regard for people‟s livelihoods (Hauck 
and Sowman, 2003; Glavovic and Boonzaier, 2007; Hauck, 2008).  This section provides an 
in-depth account of the small-scale fisheries sector in South Africa, including the policies and 
laws governing resource use, as well as benefits and losses incurred by resource users within 
this sector.  
4.3.2 Fisheries policy and legal reform in post-apartheid South Africa 
According to Sowman (2006), the term „small-scale‟ is widely accepted in South Africa for 
describing low technology and labor intensive fishing practices. Many small-scale fishers 
utilize simple fishing technologies with low capital inputs, mostly because they lack access to 
infrastructure and resources. The colonial and apartheid eras in South Africa were marked by 















black citizens) access to, use of, and ownership of natural resources along the coast (Hauck 
and Sowman, 2001; Harris et al, 2007).  For decades under the apartheid government, 
fisheries policy and legislation in South Africa focused only on the recreational and/or large 
scale commercial fisheries sector. Black fishers were excluded from participating in 
commercial fishing as they had neither capital nor equipment to fish commercially, and 
consequently a few large companies, owned by the wealthy white businesses, dominated the 
quota distribution of Total Allowable Catch (TAC). The exclusion of small-scale fishers from 
accessing formal fishing rights marginalized the small-scale fisheries sector, forcing many of 
these fishers to resort to „poaching‟ in order to sustain their livelihoods (Hauck et al, 2002; 
Harris et al, 2007).  
 
The Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) 18 of 1998 was formulated in order to redistribute 
fishing rights to previously disadvantaged communities, as a response to the severe social and 
economic issues facing these fishing communities (Witbooi, 2006). The post-apartheid 
government sought to respond to the frustrations that were increasingly becoming expressed 
by many poor coastal communities against the past inequities they had suffered under the 
apartheid government. A suite of new fisheries and coastal zone policies were thus developed, 
intended to uplift communities by providing them better access to coastal resources (Hauck 
and Sowman, 2003; Sowman, 2006). The rights discourse in the fisheries sector was enforced 
by the new Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) and the Bill of Rights, introducing 
a new human rights-based dispensation in order to promote equitable access to natural 
resources and public involvement in decision-making processes (Hauck and Sowman, 2001; 
Witbooi, 2006).  
 
In 1998, the MLRA recognized „subsistence‟ fisheries as a formal sector for the first time, 
enabling fishers to formally (i.e. legally) harvest marine resources. Fisheries policy and 
decision-making processes had previously overlooked the rights of small-scale fishers as bona 
fide fishers (Isaacs, 2006). Thus, the role of the South African fisheries authority under the 
MLRA was to ensure that the principles of equity and sustainability enshrined in the MLRA 
were realized (Isaacs, 2006; Witbooi, 2006). 
In order to allow for the inclusion of small-scale fishers in the formal fishing sector, the 
designated fisheries authority at the time, Marine and Coastal Management (MCM)
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a Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) to produce guidelines to assist in the management 
of subsistence fisheries. Co-management was highly recommended by the SFTG as a 
mechanism that would enable the re-incorporation of subsistence fishers into the formal 
sector, and was thus promoted by the national fishing authority to be implemented as a small-
scale fisheries management approach (Branch et al., 2002; Sowman, 2006). Co-management 
is an approach that has been implemented worldwide and is defined as a partnership between 
government, resources users and other relevant stakeholders (Hauck and Sowman, 2001; 
Hauck and Sowman, 2003  
In South Africa, various forms of rights have been implemented in coastal communities for 
small-scale fishers to gain access to resources.  This includes rights such as subsistence 
permits, exemption permits, and in the Western and Southern Cape provinces, „interim‟ 
permits.  A variety of „tools‟ that have been used to allocate rights, and co-management has 
been rarely used as mechanism to distribute rights, except in KwaZulu-Natal, as it is the only 
province where co-management has been robust enough to establish criteria for rights and 
then implement permits. Permits are a tool for distributing benefits from the fishery, and co-
management arrangements are the enabling mechanism for this. Co-management and community 
based approaches to small-scale fisheries management have been promoted worldwide to maximize benefits 
from small-scale fisheries to poor fishing communities through developing management strategies that 
are context specific and that can meet the needs that are specific to the community in question 
(Dey and Kanagaratnam, 2008). It involves collaboration and power sharing between 
government and local communities in efforts to enhance benefits from the fisheries sector 
through improved access to and the sustainability of the resource attained through 
participatory management (Jentoft, 2000; Hauck, 2001; Harris et al., 2003). Where co-
management is successfully implemented, it results in benefits such as participatory 
democracy, efficient resource management, as well as improved resource availability and 
sustainability (Hauck and Sowman, 2003).  
Marine resources are a national competence under the Constitution of South Africa. In 
KwaZulu-Natal, the nature conservation authority, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (EKZN Wildlife), 
was mandated by national government to implement co-management in small-scale fishing 
communities through forming co-management committees with local fishers to manage 
fisheries resources. In the Eastern Cape Province, committees were established through the 
Subsistence Fisheries Management Unit (SFMU) established by MCM to carry out co-
management, and set up co-management structures within the locally identified fishing 















traditional fishing communities in the Eastern Cape coast and to assist with the 
implementation of the subsistence fisheries program. The SMFU also appointed 
environmental officers within regions to assist the extension officers with distributing permits 
to identified fishers in the fishing communities (Raemaekers, 2009). However, co-
management of small-scale fisheries resources in the Eastern Cape did not materialize as in 
KwaZulu-Natal. This was because in KwaZulu-Natal there was devolution of power by 
national government as co-management was institutionalized within EKZN Wildlife, and the 
policy was developed to guide the implementation of co-management.  This did not 
materialize in Eastern Cape, and therefore, co-management has never been effectively 
implemented.  
 
However, it is argued that many small-scale fishers continued to be marginalized even after 
the MLRA was promulgated as they did not necessarily fit neatly into the commercial, 
recreational or subsistence sectors outlined in law as  they harvested mainly to sell, but at a 
small-scale that did not fall into the „commercial‟ category (Sowman, 2006; Raemaekers, 
2009). This meant that there was no recognition by the law that these small-scale fishers that 
did not solely fish for consumption, but also sold their catch on a small-scale commercial 
basis as well. Another loophole in the MLRA was that small-scale fishers that were involved 
in small-scale commercial fishing such as in the Eastern Cape, were issued with individual 
„exemption‟ permits that enabled individual fishers to harvest a specific type of resource. This 
did not take into account the fact that these fishers harvested a „basket‟ of resources for 
commercial purposes (Raemaekers, 2009). The MLRA thus still failed to recognize their 
special needs as a „distinct class of fishers‟ (Raemaekers, 2009).  
 
In order to redress these and other imbalances, the national fisheries authority facilitated a 
process of drafting a new small-scale fisheries policy. The Policy was formulated as a 
response to pressures from small-scale fishers in the Eastern, Western and Northern Cape to 
be allocated with formal fishing rights in order to redress the inefficiencies of the existing 
permit system (Pederson et al., 2008; Raemaekers, 2009). While the process was initiated in 
2004, to date the policy has not been finalized. 
 
4.3.3 Benefits and losses from small-scale fisheries  
Fisheries resources, especially in the small-scale fisheries sector, are known to be a source of 















world, hence fish is often referred to as „rich food for poor people‟ (FAO, 2005; Walmsley et 
al, 2006; WorldFish Centre, 2005). For most small-scale fishing communities, the act of 
fishing is not just about harvesting resources, but also about the economic, social and cultural 
connotations attached to fishing, such as employment, use of fisheries resources for spiritual 
customs and for medicinal purposes (Sunde and Raemaekers, 2010). Throughout the coast of 
Africa, fish is a staple meal for many households in rural communities, and is a main source 
of protein and important fatty acids (FAO, 2005). Furthermore, in most of West and Southern 
Africa in particular, women who are household heads dominate the small-scale fisheries 
sector and rely on processing, retailing and local trading of small-scale fisheries resources to 
support their households (WorldFish Centre, 2005). Most of these women are illiterate and 
uneducated, and, fish is the main or only income source to support themselves and their 
children (FAO, 2005).  
Small-scale fishing communities are characterized by local political competition for access to and control of 
resources, as well as a myriad of collective action, power relations, social redistribution and decision-making 
processes and mechanisms related to marine resources (Béné, 2003). These factors are at the core of 
contemporary research aimed at enhancing benefits to local communities (Béné, 2003).  In South Africa, co-
management of small-scale fisheries has been instrumental in enhancing benefits to small-
scale fishers in KwaZulu-Natal (Harris et al, 2003). Small-scale fishers in this province have 
benefited from equal participation and voting powers with the provincial fisheries authority, 
EKZN Wildlife, in decision-making processes about the management of the resources (Berkes 
et al, 2001; Harris et al, 2003).  
However, co-management of fisheries resources is not always successful (Hara, 2003). 
Globally, benefits from fisheries co-management in the small-scale fisheries sector are 
constrained by the fact that the sector is economically, socially and politically undermined, 
and this inhibits the ability of small-scale fisheries to reduce poverty levels in poor and 
vulnerable fishing communities (Tandavanitj, 2007).  Inadequate fisheries management 
strategies, insecure fishing rights, weak institutional structures and inadequate alternative 
livelihood strategies are among the key factors that create negative impacts for communities 
participating in small scale fisheries, preventing them from realizing full benefits from this 
sector (FAO, 2009). Sowman (2006) thus asserts that if the co-management of small-scale 
fisheries in South Africa is to be successful, an integrated livelihoods approach should be 
adopted. Sufficient devolution of decision-making power, human resources, money and time 
















Other blockages to benefit-sharing include the gap that exists between fisheries policy and 
law, practical implementation of fisheries management objectives, as well as academic 
research within the fisheries sector (Evans and Andrew, 2009). Moreover, the lack of human 
and physical resources in the national fisheries authority has been a major blockage to the 
implementation of efficient fisheries co-management strategies in marginalized areas like the 
Eastern Cape (Harris et al, 2007). One of the challenges in the small-scale fisheries sector in 
South Africa is that fisheries management is struggling to simultaneously conserve fisheries 
resources at the same time as provide equitable access to resources (Hauck, 2009). In 
addition, there appears to be a gap in, and a lack of understanding of, the complexity of  
livelihoods of small-scale fishers by the fisheries authorities.Thus, the new policy for 
managing small-scale fisheries in South Africa is seen as essential for bridging poverty, food 
insecurity and sustainability gaps within small-scale fisheries, and encouraging a participatory 
and human rights based approach to management (Sunde and Raemaekers, 2010).  
 
4.4 Overview of the coastal mining sector 
4.4.1 Global overview: trends towards Corporate Social Responsibility 
Mining is among the major activities taking place adjacent to marginalized communities in 
many developing countries such as South Africa, Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia and Papua New 
Guinea, to name a few (Hilson, 2002; Kapelus, 2002). Over the past two decades, the 
reputation of mining with regards to its impacts on local communities has been questioned, 
particularly in developing countries (Veiga et al, 2001; Kapelus, 2002; Hilson, 2002). Many 
mining communities in developing countries occur in remote regions with poor livelihood 
diversification alternatives; hence mining companies are encouraged to practice sustainable 
mining practices including ecological sustainability, social equity and economic viability 
(Veiga et al, 2001). Mining communities can be defined as those “where the population is 
significantly affected by a nearby mining operation” (Veiga et al, 2001). Globally, mining 
corporations are facing immense pressure for social responsibility from those opposing 
mining activities, i.e. social justice advocates, environmental groups, and others, who are 
increasingly globalizing and teaming up with civil society groups at the local level (Kapelus, 
2002). As a result, mining companies around the world have been pressurized to address the 
social and environmental impacts of their operations.  
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is one approach that has emerged to deal with these 















adhere to sustainable development practices (Kemp, 2009). The CSR strategy has become a 
global trend in businesses and one that is also increasingly dominating the South African 
private sector. Since the 19
th
 century, most mining companies in developing countries have 
historically adopted a „devil may care‟ attitude towards the impacts of their operations on 
adjacent communities (Kemp, 2009). However, mining companies have been recently urged 
to adopt CSR approaches in the interest of development and social justice by human rights 
activists and pressure from shareholders and financial institutions that promote social justice. 
According to Jenkins (2004:24), CSR is a conceptual framework through which mining 
companies can “frame their attitudes and strategies towards, and relationships with 
stakeholders, be they investors, employees or communities”. It is also a tool that is used by 
the mining industry to balance a) the diverse community demands on the mining company in 
question; b) the need to protect the environment; and c) the need to make profits (Jenkins, 
2004). Enforcing CSR strategies enhances the image of mining corporations with regards to 
their business ethic. However, it is not certain as to whether CSR strategies effectively 
address the developmental issues faced by most communities in developing countries where 
mining operations take place (Hamann, 2004). 
 
Indigenous communities have benefited immensely from increased opposition to mining 
Trans National Corporations (TNCs) by civil society groups, and these communities are now 
challenging mining corporations on issues such as benefit flows, participation in decision-
making, representation in the companies‟ activities, mining rights, compensation measures, 
land claims, and others (Kapelus, 2002). Organizations supporting businesses, such as the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), have made efforts to 
improve the bad reputation of mining companies with regards to social responsibility and  
have developed a global program called „Mining Minerals and Sustainable Development‟ 
(MMSD) to uncover how mining can contribute to sustainable development (Kapelus, 2002). 
The 1992 Rio Earth Summit, coupled with criticisms that mining TNCs fail to maintain or 
enforce minimum standards in developing countries, have also been sources of pressure for 
mining companies to strengthen their CSR strategies (Kapelus, 2002). In the South African 
context, the shift towards CSR began in the late 1980s, as government began to challenge 
businesses to get socially and politically involved with communities to alleviate poverty 
(Kapelus, 2002). Post-apartheid laws have also enforced that affirmative action, Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE), corporate governance and environmental management 















4.4.2 The South African coastal mining sector  
South Africa has some of the world‟s largest gold, platinum and titanium reserves and is the 
world‟s second largest producer of titanium-bearing minerals (Crush et al, 1991; Hamann, 
2004). Mining companies in South Africa have a history of disregarding social impacts of 
mining operations on affected communities. Companies have typically either provided too 
few benefits to local communities, leaving them in a more marginalized and worse off state 
than they were before the mining began, or have implemented ineffective strategies to benefit 
communities adjacent to mining operations (Kapelus, 2002; DMR, 2009).  Pressures from 
affected communities, civil society and government have led to a realization by South African 
mining companies that it is in their best interest to address issues affecting the communities 
on the land in which they mine (Kapelus, 2002). Key institutional changes have taken place in 
the South African mining industry since 1994, including the listing of large mining companies 
in South Africa on international stock exchanges. This has had huge implications for mining 
companies, as they are required to meet the expectations of international (and local) investors. 
hence CSR is promoted by market-based drivers such as the Stock Exchange (Hamann, 2004). 
The following sub-section discusses the policy and legal context for the South African mining 
industry.  
4.4.3 Policy and legal context in South Africa 
All mining activity in South Africa is administered by the Department of Mineral Resources 
(DMR), formerly known as the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), which is the 
major stakeholder in the South African mining sector (Boocock, 2002; Raw Materials Group, 
2010).  The Chamber of Mines, which comprises major mining companies in South Africa, is 
the second largest stakeholder. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), a South African 
trade union, and the African National Congress (ANC), are the third and fourth most 
important actors in South African mining, respectively (Raw Materials Group, 2010).      
The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (28 of 2002) (MPDRA) recognizes 
the South African government as the custodian of all mineral resources, having the 
responsibility to provide previously disadvantaged individuals with equitable access to 
mineral resources as well as socio-economic development (DME, 2008). The MPRDA 
regulates all extraction, rehabilitation, rights, mineral sales, beneficiation and marketing 
activities related to mining (Raw Materials Group, 2010). Company-community relations in 
the mining sector are guided by the principles of the Broad-Based Socio-Economic 















(BEE) deals and joint ventures between mining companies and adjacent have emerged (DME, 
2008). 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa enforces the right of all people to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health and well being and to the protection of the 
environment for the benefit of present and future generations (South African Government 
Gazette, 1998). The Minerals Act (50 of 1991), MPRDA, and the Mine and Safety Act (29 of 
1996) ensure compliance to this. In addition to the mining regulations stipulated by DMR, 
mining is also subject to the regulations of the National Environmental Management Act of 
1998 (Boocock, 2002). The Minerals Act of 1991 stipulates that all active mines should have 
a mining permit from DME, a permit to use water from Department of Water Affairs, and an 
environmental management plan (EMP), including an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA), approved by DME in order to ensure that their activities are in line with environmental 
management principles (Boocock, 2002). The Minerals Act also entrenches rehabilitation of 
the surface after mining and stipulates that mining companies should rehabilitate the surface 
land after mining is done. Rehabilitation takes place in parall l to the mining operation to 
return the land to the state in which it was found before the mining started (Boocock, 2002). 
There is increased pressure by the South African government for mining companies to 
minimize the negative social impacts of mining and promote benefits (Hill, 2005). The Broad 
Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter (BBSEEC) for the Mining Industry and the 
MPRDA have placed stringent requirements on mining companies to assess the social impacts 
of their operations from the beginning of mining to mine closure and beyond, as a 
requirement to secure mining rights. Social and Labor Plans (SLP) are also a legal 
requirement from mining companies to promote socio-economic development in affected 
communities and to combat adverse effects of mining on the communities involved (Hill, 
2005). Social Impact Assessment (SIA) is also used as a tool to identify and mitigate social 
impacts associated with mining activities. The BBSEEC developed by the South African 
government stipulates that mining companies are required to give 26% of their shares to 
affected communities. A BEE scorecard was established to assess the implementation of 
mining companies‟ CSR strategies within local communities (Hamann, 2004).  
Mining companies have been urged to promote sustainable development through partnering 
and aligning with communities and other interested and affected parties at the local level. 
Such efforts are perceived by the South African government to be a catalyst to poverty 
alleviation and community upliftment in poor and marginalized communities. The South 















companies to actively engage in redressing past social inequities through enhancing 
opportunities for previously marginalized persons and communities to participate in the 
mining industry and to benefit from mining activities (Raw Materials Group, 2010).  
Employment equity, beneficiation, as well as rural development, are some of the requirements 
contained in the Charter. Hence, the Mining Charter has championed the process of rights 
transfer by the mining companies adopting the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
approach.  
4.4.4 Identifying benefits, losses and benefit-sharing mechanisms 
The extent to which local communities benefit from mining and the manner in which 
mechanisms are used for benefit distribution within the mining sector is poorly documented in 
the literature (Gibson, 2000; O‟Faircheallaigh, 2002; Ballard and Banks, 2003). Humphreys 
(2000) asserts that calculating precise benefits and losses incurred by local communities due 
to mining is not a straightforward task, hence the success of a mining company in benefiting a 
local community from mining can be measured in terms of what does not happen rather than 
what does (i.e. it is measured more upon the company‟s ability to prevent negative impacts or 
costs to the affected community). Hence, mining operations are regarded as acceptable so 
long as costs to the community are remediated and the socio-economic benefits (i.e. 
employment, capacity building and community development) are enough to sustain the local 
community (Gibson, 2000). 
 
Benefits provided by mining such as compensation for negative impacts incurred, royalties on 
mineral resources, income from mployment, income participation in joint ventures, as well 
as access to infrastructure created due mining operations are significant to communities that 
lack the alternative income opportunities that mining can bring (Ballard and Banks, 2003). 
Although mining activities may be associated with major development changes, the benefits 
mining brings to communities, such as employment opportunities and infrastructure 
development, do not necessarily make up for the adverse effects or costs of mining operations 
normally suffered by communities (Jenkins and Obara, 2008).  
 
Losses or costs incurred by communities due to mining operations include disruption of 
traditional cultures, population displacement, land use conflicts and loss of livelihoods 
(Boocock, 2002). Mining operations adversely affect communities almost by necessity 
through the displacement of local people and the loss of natural resources. In addition, mining 















renewable natural resources (Boocock, 2002). It is, however, argued that although mining 
operations inevitably present various adverse effects on local communities, in some cases, 
mining activity is the only real chance that a poor community has for social development – 
especially where mining benefits are properly redistributed to people in the communities 
(Kemp, 2009). For this reason, and because of inadequate service delivery by the government, 
poor communities fear to act against mining operations in their areas because they feel that 
they depend on mining for a chance at having a better life (Kemp, 2009).  Moreover, if 
mining companies are able to convince those opposed to mining operations that communities 
do benefit from their operations, then the companies are able to protect themselves from civil 
society action, liability costs and disruptions (Kapelus, 2002).  
 
Commentators note that in order to be regarded as sustainable, mining companies‟ CSR 
programs should provide net and equitable benefits, capacity building during the mining 
operation and after mine closure, financial compensation for loss of land, housing and 
livelihoods, infrastructure improvement, health facilities, small local businesses‟ support and 
micro-finance schemes (Jenkins and Obara, 2008; Boocock, 2002). The institutional 
arrangements that are used by mining companies to implement CSR and other projects to 
benefit adjacent communities are mechanisms used in the mining sector to distribute mining 
benefits (DMR, 2010). Apart from the pressure placed by policies and laws on mining 
companies to conduct CSR and community development programs for impacted communities, 
mining companies also implement CSR and community development programs for their own 
benefit. Corporate Social Responsibility and community development strategies help give 
mining companies a competitive edge because they improve the reputation and profit margins 
of the companies, as they are seen by investors as socially and environmentally sustainable. In 
addition, CSR initiatives are a strategy through which mining companies „buy‟ the local 
communities‟ consent to allow the company to mine in their area (Jenkins and Obara, 2008). 
Social investments are also used by mining companies as a tool to deliver „net benefits‟ to the 
communities that are impacted by their operations (Esteves, 2008).  
 
Despite CSR strategies, mining companies have been criticized in terms of how they 
disadvantage communities and create livelihoods losses. Such criticisms are largely attributed 
to the lack of transparency with regards to revenue flows from the company to the 
community, and expenditure in the community (Jenkins and Obara, 2008). Lack of 















communities and this creates tension within and between communities involved. In addition, 
because most affected communities are rural or disadvantaged, most mining companies use 
local committees, giving mining revenues to the local chiefs or „top men‟ to allocate for 
community use (Jenkins and Obara, 2008). However, these funds end up being consumed by 
leading community figures instead of being used for long-term community projects and for 
building social capital. Furthermore, because mining companies have historically ignored 
direct communication with communities due to apartheid policies, it is now difficult for them 
to establish local representative institutions that local communities can identify with.  
Consequently, the efforts made by mining companies to communicate with communities are 
often impeded by local power struggles within the communities-both between the tribal 
authorities and communities, and between the tribal authorities and local government 
structures responsible for service delivery (Hamann, 2004). Due to this, CSR can intentionally 
or unintentionally damage disadvantaged communities as benefits do not always filter down 
to the wider communities (Swift and Zadek, 2002).  
 
It is also argued that there exists a gap between the stated intentions of mining companies in 
their CSR reports and the effectiveness of the actual implementation of the CSR programs on 
the ground. There is also very little research undertaken to assess the impacts of CSR 
programs on local communities and whether or not they are successful (DMR, 2009). It is 
thus argued that in the absence of strong institutions at the local level, mining companies have 
the potential to worsen the situation for the poor communities and to deplete whatever limited 
resources the community had to sustain themselves (Jenkins and Obara, 2008).  
4.5 Conclusion 
Coastal resources provide various ecological, social and economic benefits to rural coastal 
communities in South Africa through the small-scale fisheries and mining sectors. Although 
the post-apartheid government has made efforts to encourage the redistribution of benefits 
from coastal resources to marginalized coastal communities, questions remain about whether 
these communities benefit or lose from resource use within these sectors.  This chapter has 
shown that although benefit-sharing mechanisms exist within the fisheries and mining sectors 
in rural coastal communities, these may result in losses to the livelihoods of coastal resources 
users. The role of TAs in administering activities taking place within rural coastal 















coastal resource use sectors. The next chapter provides detailed results from the fisheries and 




















SOKHULU AND MBONAMBI CASE STUDIES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the face of poor living conditions, high unemployment levels and limited livelihood 
options, people in Sokhulu and Mbonambi have over the years relied on coastal resources 
such as fish, forest products and agriculture, to support themselves and their families. These 
interventions have been associated with various ecological, economic, and social benefits and 
losses, and benefits arising out of these interventions have not always been fair. The 
institutions involved in managing access to and use of coastal resources, and distributing 
benefits arising from resource use, have put in place mechanisms within the communities to 
enhance benefit-sharing. These mechanisms have led to an array of positive and negative 
impacts on the lives of coastal resource users and other community members. This chapter 















communities, and describes the history of their coastal resource use. It also provides an 
overview of community benefits and losses, and discusses the factors that influence benefit-
sharing patterns in the fisheries and mining sectors within Sokhulu and Mbonambi.  
 
5.2 A history of coastal resource use in Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
Historical patterns of coastal resource use in the Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities are not 
well documented in the literature. However, Sokhulu and Mbuyazi (another name for 
Mbonambi) clans were among the original occupants of the coastal land in northern 
KwaZulu-Natal, specifically in what is now known as iSimangaliso Wetland Park, and 
paleontological evidence has shown that the first human occupation of the Park dates as far 
back as the Early Stone Age (UNEP and WCMC, 2008; Gumede, 2009). Various events or 
interventions have taken place over time to influence the manner in which both Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi communities have accessed and used coastal resources. Timeline exercises 
conducted with several coastal resource user groups in both communities were used to elicit 
information about coastal resource access and use. The earliest living memory that the oldest 
interviewees at Sokhulu and Mbonambi had of historical events that impacted their 
livelihoods and resource use dated from 1933 (Figure 5.1). 
 
In 1933, commercial forestry was first introduced by white people in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, 
and conflicts resulted between the communities and forestry authorities. Communities at 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi were forcibly removed from their land for commercial forestry 
purposes by a group known as Government Garage (G.G.) (UNDP et al., 2003; SFFG 1; 
MFFG 1). One of the Ndunas from Sokhulu recalled,  
 
Historically, the beach area was mainly grazing land and 
  beyond the grazing land were people‟s settlements. However,  
 in 1939, a white man called Nkonka came and on his arrival to 
  the area, he said local people should move from the beach land because 
 the sand was being denuded by the wind and it needed to be  
 fenced properly to prevent this. Our local people therefore  
 moved away from the land close to the beach and left their houses 
 and the graveyards of their ancestors there (MFFG1). 
 
 
At Mbonambi, the G.G. reportedly convinced the Inkosi to remove local people along the 















plantations in order to stabilize the sand in the dunes. The G.G. claimed that once the sand 
dunes have stabilized, they would resettle the local people back to their land. 
 






RBM mining  operations by RBM began at Mbonambi
Statutory conservation of fisheries  resources and 
indigenous forests started at Maphelane Nature Reserve -
illegal harvesting arrests for non-permit holders began
Mussel harvesting co-management started at Sokhulu
Subsistence harvesting legalise. Line fish co-management 
started at Mbonambi
RBM mining operations started at Sokhulu
TIMELINE
2001 Subsistence fishing permits issued for the first time
2006 Sokhulu line fish committee  formalized
 Figure 5.1: Timeline of key events that have influenced the use of coastal resources in  
  Sokhulu and Mbonambi over time 
 
People agreed to move and lost access to the land adjacent to the beach area. The G.G. 
planted commercial plantations along the beach and put up fences to inhibit local people from 
accessing this land. Cairns (2000) confirms that in the late 1950s, government officials 
threatened people in Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities with forced removals in order to 
plant commercial plantations to stabilize sand dunes. The communities believed that the 
government wanted to forcibly remove them from their land for its own commercial 
plantations and its own gain, and as a response, the communities negotiated that they would 
plant the trees themselves instead of the government taking over their land (Cairns, 2000). A 
few community members remained on their land and planted the trees themselves, while the 
majority of people in these communities were displaced.  
 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi were not the only communities in northern KwaZulu-Natal that were 
subject to forced removals by the former apartheid government for either commercial forestry 
or conservation. According to Walker (2005), more than 1,000 Zulu speaking households 















forestry purposes along the KwaZulu-Natal coastline, especially between the 1950s and 
1980s. To date, Sokhulu and Mbonambi areas together consist of 4,226 hectares of state 
commercial forests, as well as vast eucalyptus plantation forests owned by forestry giants, 
Mondi and Sappi (DWAF, 2010). Since the 1980s, small-scale forest farmers in Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi have been selling products from their eucalyptus plantations to Mondi and Sappi. 
 
The development of timber plantations in northern KwaZulu-Natal was paralleled by the 
demarcation of certain conservation areas, causing the displacement of rural communities in 
the 1960s, especially near the coast of iSimangaliso Wetland Park (Karumbidza, 2006). The 
history of forced removals was a particularly big problem in the northern KwaZulu-Natal 
region and is still a problem facing the authorities of the Park, as several surrounding 
communities claim to own the areas covered with commercial forests and conservation land in 
this region. For instance, Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities have both lodged land claims 
with the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights over RBM‟s mining lease areas as they 
claimed to have been resettled from their ancestors‟ land because of mining activities 
(Parliament, 2010). Richard Bay Minerals commenced mining at Mbonambi in 1976 and at 
Sokhulu in 2004, and its mining life is expected to last until the year 2041. People in Sokhulu 
and Mbonambi communities were devastated to have lost control over the land mined by 
RBM, as the indigenous forests and their ancestral land were destroyed (SFF1, MFFG1).  
Consequently, the relationship between RBM and the people in Sokhulu and Mbonambi has 
been turbulent over the years.  
 
The establishment of the Maphelane Nature Reserve adjacent to the Sokhulu community in 
1984 also led to turbulence between the community and the conservation authority at the time 
(Natal Parks Board) because the community lost control over the land under the Reserve 
(UNDP et al., 2003). The Maphelane Nature Reserve was established with the intention of 
protecting and conserving the forest and marine biodiversity occurring in this area (UNDP et 
al., 2003). Due to the rich biodiversity and beautiful scenery, the reserve is a tourist attraction, 
particularly for recreational fishers. The protection of the reserve by the nature conservation 
authorities was done without community consultation. Community access was also restricted 
by conservation rules and subsistence fishing methods were deemed illegal in this era. The 
Sokhulu community was unhappy about the establishment of the reserve and the introduction 
of conservation laws because their subsistence needs that the resources in the Reserve used to 















resources along this coastline for years. As a result, people in Sokhulu (and Mbonambi) 
resorted to large-scale poaching of fisheries resources along the coast of Sokhulu and  
Maphelane at night time. Conflicts arose between subsistence fishers and licensed recreational 
fishers and between subsistence fishers and the conservation authorities (Harris et al., 2003).  
 
In an effort to redress these problems, the Sokhulu mussel co-management project was 
initiated by EKZN Wildlife in 1995 to facilitate the inclusion of subsistence fishers in the 
management of the fishery in order to promote the sustainable use of the resources (Harris et 
al., 2003). A joint committee comprising conservation authorities and community harvesters 
was formed in order to implement co-management. Through co-management, legal access to 
the mussel and line fish resources was granted to subsistence fishers at Sokhulu, and later in 
Mbonambi and other subsistence fishing communities along the KwaZulu-Natal coast. At the 
same time, the Sokhulu community also lodged a land claim with the Regional Land Claims 
Commission over the land under the Maphelane Reserve, seeking to repossess the historical 
rights that they claimed to have over the land and resources. This land claim and five others 
on land within the iSimangaliso Wetland Park were settled in 2007, and the communities were 
compensated with money for their loss of land. Co-management arrangements were 
simultaneously formed between the authorities of the Park and the communities in order to 




5.3 The socio-economic status of Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
The Sokhulu and Mbonambi TA areas are located within the Mfolozi Local Municipality, 
formerly known as Mbonambi Local Municipality (Figure 5.2). This municipality is located 
in northern KwaZulu-Natal, within the uThungulu District Municipality. The uThungulu 
District Municipality is located in the north-eastern region of KwaZulu-Natal and consists of 
six local municipalities, i.e. Mfolozi, Umhlathuze, Ntambanana, Umlalazi, Mthonjaneni and 
Nkandla (uThungulu District Municipality, 2005/6).  The Mfolozi Local Municipality is 
adjacent to the towns of Richards Bay and Empangeni, and consists of three primary 
geographic land uses, i.e. Sokhulu-Mbonambi rural areas, Mhlana rural area, as well as 
commercial plantations (uThungulu District Municipality, 2010/11).  The estimated 
population size of the Mfolozi Local Municipality is 106,943, 53% of whom are women. 















local municipality is dominated by mining, commercial timber, subsistence fisheries, small-
scale commercial forestry and subsistence agriculture. These sectors are also present within 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi (Table 5.1). The manufacturing sector, which includes mining by 
RBM and timber production by companies Mondi and Sappi, is the key player in economies 
of both the uThungulu District and the Mfolozi region, contributing approximately 51,4% to 
the entire district‟s Gross Geographic Product (GGP) (Mfolozi IDP Review, 2010/11). 
Sokhulu land uses include mining, commercial forestry, conservation at Maphelane Reserve 
and TA land, consisting of mostly residential areas (villages), agriculture land and small-scale 
forestry plantations. Mbonambi has similar land uses, including commercial forestry, 
rehabilitated mines as well as TA land with villages, agricultural land and small-scale 
plantation forests. Figure 5.2 illustrates the geographic positioning of Sokhulu and Mbonambi 



































  Figure 5.2: The location of Sokhulu and Mbonambi within the Mfolozi Local Municipality.  



























Table 5.1: Sectors utilizing coastal resources at Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
 
 Actors Resources 
use/management 
mandate 








National level: Branch 






management of access 
to and use of marine 
resources 







conservation of marine 
resources 
Co-management committees 




Facilitate and manage 






National level: DME All national 
mineral resources 
Custodian of national 
mineral resources 
Local level: RBM Titanium Possesses mineral rights 
on the coasts of 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
 Local level: CSR 




Distribute benefits from 









National level: DAFF National forests National forestry 
authority 









land in KwaZulu-Natal 


















conservation of coastal 
resources 





Management of all 
activities in areas 




















Table 5.2: Profile of Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities 
 Sokhulu Mbonambi 
Municipal Ward 1,2,3 3,5,8 
Size 8,145ha 14,877ha 
Estimated homesteads 540 2,494 
Number of villages studied 8 7 
Household survey sample size 48 142 




% female headed households 23% 31% 
Average no. of people per 
household 
11 9 
Main material for dwelling 
construction 
Walls: brick and block 
Roof: corrugated iron 
 
Main household energy source Firewood Firewood and electricity 
Main drinking water source Water from flowing 
rivers/streams and from 
hand pumps 
Water from mobile 
municipality water truck 
and from piped public 
stand posts 
 
Unemployment levels in Sokhulu and Mbonambi were high, but lower than that of the wider 
Mfolozi Local Municipality. In the Mfolozi Local Municipality region, unemployment levels 
are 59% and 41% economically active population is employed. In Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
unemployment levels were 21% and 37%, respectively (Mfolozi IDP Review, 2010/11; 
Figure 5.4). The higher unemployment levels in Mbonambi can be attributed to the fact that 
37% of the surveyed community members were not originally from Mbonambi, but had 
moved into the community primarily to look for employment
8
. The survey results also 
revealed that only 30% of Mbonambi households are employed by RBM or its contracting 
companies, which is arguably low considering the fact that RBM has mined along the 
community for more than 30 years. However, the percentage of skilled people in the Mfolozi 
                                                 
8
 Richards Bay Minerals and Siyaqhubeka Forestry are two big companies located within Mbonambi that are 















Local Muncipality is low. In the wider Mfolozi Local Municipality, 30% of the population 
has no formal schooling, while only 13% has completed high school education (Mfolozi IDP 
Review, 2010/11). A similar trend was found in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, as only 15% and 
16% of respondents in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, respectively, had complete high school 
education (refer to Figure 5.3).  
 
In Sokhulu, 22% of the respondents were self employed, primarily in fisheries and farming 
activities, while 12% of the respondents in Mbonambi indicated that they were self employed 
in similar activities. The agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors are responsible for 
employing 25% of households in Mfolozi Local Municipality (Mfolozi IDP Review, 
2010/11). Richards Bay, Empangeni and EThekwini (i.e. Durban) are the three main places of 
employment for the few households in the Mfolozi Local Municipality that are employed in 
the formal sector. 
 
Household monthly income ranges in Sokhulu and Mbonambi varied (Figure 5.5). In 
Sokhulu, 52% of households earned a monthly income between R1,001 and R1,700. Only 2% 
of Sokhulu households earned a monthly income more than R7,501. This confirmed the 
vulnerability and constraints of Sokhulu households‟ livelihoods, especially given the average 
household size in Sokhulu of 11 people. In Mbonambi, 58% of households earned between 
R1,001 and R3,000. Only 3% of households earned more than R7,501 per month. 
 
Government pensions and child/disability grants were the largest contributors to monthly 
incomes in Sokhulu and Mbonambi; contributing incomes to 75% of households in Sokhulu 
and 61% in Mbonambi (Figure 5.6). More households earned incomes from employment in 
mining in Mbonambi than in Sokhulu, although households that earned incomes from 
employment in other formal sector activities were low in both communities (21% in Sokhulu 
and 20% in Mbonambi). Such low employment levels in the formal sector could be attributed 
to the fact the Mfolozi Local Municipality as a whole struggles with underdevelopment, lack 
of resources, inadequate infrastructure and a lack of a skills base. (Mfolozi IDP Review, 
2010/11).  
 
Other issues pertaining to lack of basic service delivery (i.e. water, electricity and sanitation) 
are a problem in rural areas within the Mfolozi Local Municipality and there is also a lack of 















facilities (Mfolozi Local Municipality, 2010/11). In Sokhulu, for instance, of the surveyed 
households, none had running water and only 22% had electricity supply. A similar situation 
prevailed in Mbonambi, although 42% households here had electricity supply. In Sokhulu, 
only one clinic that catered for the entire community and road systems were also poor, 
especially in areas not reached by mining operations. 
 
Figure 5.3: Education levels in Sokhulu and Mbonambi (Sokhulu: n=48; Mbonambi: n=142) 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Occupation of survey respondents Sokhulu and Mbonambi (Sokhulu: n=48;  




















Figure 5.5: Monthly household income ranges in Sokhulu and Mbonambi (Sokhulu: n=48; 
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Household monthly income activities in Sokhulu and Mbonambi
 Figure 5.6: Monthly household income contributing activities in Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
















The following section provides the results about the use of and benefits from small-scale 
fisheries resources in Sokhulu and Mbonambi. 
 
5.4 The fisheries sector 
5.4.1 The fisheries sector in Sokhulu and Mbonambi: actors and resources  
People in Sokhulu and Mbonambi claimed to have a long history of harvesting mussel, line 
fish, sea lice, crayfish and crab along their coastline, although they possessed harvesting 
permits for line fish and mussel resources only. The Sokhulu and Mbonambi fisheries are 
currently co-managed by EKZN Wildlife and local fishers in these communities. The 
household survey revealed that 79% and 54% of households in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, 
respectively, benefited from fisheries resources, primarily through consumption, indicating 
that marine resources are an important source of food and protein for themselves and their 
families. Although mussel harvesters in Mbonambi had no formal rights to harvest mussels at 
the time that data was collected for this study, they noted that they did benefit by illegally 
harvesting these resources. Of Sokhulu and Mbonambi fishing households that were surveyed, 
74% and 72%, respectively, did not possess fishing permits (Table 5.3).  
 
In Sokhulu, fishing households had fished for an average of 20 years, and 55% of them fished 
for subsistence. Mbonambi fishing households had fished for 15 years and 64% of the fishers 
fished for subsistence. There were more female than male fisheries resource users both in 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi, and the average age of female fishers was higher than that of male 
fishers in both communities (see Table 5.3). Less than 3% of the surveyed fishers in Sokhulu 
and Mbonambi possessed an education beyond high school, indicating that the fishing 
population in these communities lacked skills to participate in the formal economy. Moreover, 
45% and 33% of the female respondents in the Sokhulu and Mbonambi surveys, respectively, 
who harvested fisheries resources were household heads. However, the findings of this study 
revealed a degree of livelihood insecurity and vulnerability of fishers and their households in 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi, as 29% of Sokhulu and 39% of Mbonambi of respondents were 



















 SOKHULU (n=38) MBONAMBI (n=36) 
Gender breakdown Females: 28 (74%) 
Males: 10 (26%) 
Females: 22 (61%) 
 Males: 14 (39%) 
Permit holders 10 (25%) 10 (28%) 
Average age (in years) Females: 43.4 ± 16.1 
Males: 36.9 ± 17.8 
Females: 44.2 ± 17.8 
Males: 34.5 ± 19.1 
Occupation  Employed 6 (16%) 2 (5%) 
Self-employed 14 (37%) 5 (14%) 
Unemployed 11 (29%) 14 (39%) 
Pensioner 5 (13%) 10 (28%) 
Monthly 
household income 
<R1000 6 (16%) 6 (17%) 
R1001-R1700 21 (55%) 12 (33%) 
R1701-R3000 5 (13%) 11 (30%) 
R3001-R7000 5 (13%) 3 (8%) 
R7500+ 1 (3%) 1 (3%) 
Education level No formal 
education 




13 (34%) 11 (30%) 
Incomplete high 
school educat on 
13 (34%) 14 (39%) 
Complete high 
school education 
6 (16%) 5 (14%) 
Tertiary/College 
education 
1 (3%) 1 (3%) 
Household heads Females: 11 (29%) 
Males: 5 (13%) 
Females: 7 (19%) 


























Figure 5.7: Fishers at Sokhulu nd Mbonambi 
 
5.4.2 Mechanisms and tools for enhancing benefit-sharing in the fisheries sectors in 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi  
The provincial nature conservation authority, EKZN Wildlife, has since 1995 implemented 
co-management arrangements for line fish and intertidal resources, as a way of resolving 
conflicts between themselves and the communities and also as a way of enriching the 
livelihoods of fishers and their households in these communities through enhanced access to 
the resources (Harris et al., 2003). This subsection looks at how the institutional arrangements 
put in place to implement co-management have acted as mechanisms to enhance access to and 
benefits from the fisheries sector for local fishers. 
 
Small-scale fisheries in KwaZulu-Natal are managed at three levels, i.e. national, provincial 
and local (Figure 5.8). The Branch Fisheries department of DAFF (formerly known as MCM) 
is responsible for managing small-scale fisheries at the national level. At the provincial level, 
the implementation and management of small-scale fisheries has been devolved by DAFF to 
EKZN Wildlife, which works closely with the national Subsistence Fisheries Management 
Unit (SFMU) in managing small-scale fisheries in the province (EKZN Wildlife, 2010a). At 















themselves and local subsistence fishing communities, including Sokhulu and Mbonambi, by 
forming committees for managing line fish and intertidal resources (EKZN Wildlife, 2010a).   
 
In Sokhulu, co-management of fisheries resources between EKZN Wildlife and the 
community fishers began in 1995 with the inception of the mussel co-management project 
(Harris et al., 2003). A significant aim of the co-management project was to increase the 
participation of community fishers in the decision-making processes in terms of how the 
resource is to be utilized (UNDP et al, 2003). The election of co-management committees by 
community fishers is a significant democratic mechanism that establishes legitimacy and 
accountability between EKZN Wildlife and the fishers (EKZN Wildlife, 2010a). The term 
„mechanism‟, according to Ribot and Peluso (2003), is used to refer to the various processes 
and relations that influence how stakeholders gain, control and maintain access to resources. 
Hence, in the context of the fisheries sectors in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, co-management 
committees were enabling mechanisms for  the communities to become involved in fisheries 
and to partake in the decision-making processes pertaining to the use of the resources.  
 
The co-management committees formed by EKZN Wildlife consist of Conservation Officers 
and Extension Officers from EKZN Wildlife who work with community members chosen by 
community fishers to represent them (Figure 5.8). The community members in the co-
management committees are responsible for nominating people from the community who are 
deserving of subsistence fishing pe mits, based on agreed criteria. The list is screened once a 
year. Once the people who should get permits are identified, their applications are sent to 
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Figure 5.8: The institutional arrangement for fisheries management at Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
 
At the community level, there were two co-management committees at Sokhulu, i.e. the 
mussel committee and the line fish committee. The mussel committee mainly comprised 
female mussel harvesters who represented all mussel collectors in decision-making processes 
with EKZN Wildlife. The line fish co-management committee was formed in 2004 and  is 
made up of male fishers who represented community fishers in decision-making processes 
and the management of fish resources. The two committees are responsible for appointing 
community monitors who are responsible for monitoring the fishing activities of community 
fishers (EKZN Wildlife, 2010b). Similarly, Mbonambi had a line fish committee that was 
established in 1996 to represent community fishers. Members of the mussel committee
9
 
unofficially existed in Mbonambi during the time this research was undertaken because the 
Mbonambi community had not yet received legal rights to harvest mussels from the national 
fisheries authority. This was due to the fact that there was apparently no proof that the 
community had a history of harvesting the resource, and also because the mussel ledges on 
                                                 
9
 The members of the mussel committee were appointed by Mbonambi fishers when they applied for legal rights 
to harvest mussels. However, when mussel collectors were denied permits to harvest mussels due to concerns 
about resource availability in Mbonambi by conservation authorities, the mussel committee remained inactive, 















the Mbonambi coast were deemed too small to cater for the entire Mbonambi community 
(EKZNW 1; EKZNW 3). Traditional authorities in both communities oversee all activities 
taking place in all sectors within the community, but have no direct involvement in the 
fisheries sector. 
 
Subsistence permits are a tool used to distribute benefits from access and use of the resources 
to small-scale fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi. In turn, through issuing permits to local 
fishers as part of co-management, permits are also a tool to increase compliance for resource 
use and enhance resource sustainability (EKZNW 1). Through the co-management process, 
the fishers were involved in establishing the criteria for permit allocation for local fishers 
(EKZN Wildlife, 2010b). The following are the key criteria to be met by fishers in Sokhulu 
and Mbonambi to qualify for permit allocation: fishers must be South African citizens; they 
must be poor and have no other income sources that can help meet their basic food 
requirements; they must use low technology gear; they should preferably have a long history 
of fishing and fishing should have a cultural or traditional role in their lives that has been 
carried over through at least three generations or 50 years; they must only sell their catch 
within the 20km radius of where it was caught;  and the resources are only to be consumed 
within local boundaries (SFFG1). The DAFF issues permits to successful applicants in small 
scale fishing communities annually, and requires that committees be in place in small-scale 
fishing communities before permits are issued (EKZN Wildlife, 2010b).The local co-
management committees in Sokhulu and Mbonambi receive the permits on the community‟s 
behalf and together with the community determine the number of individual permits that are 
issued, how many times harvesting should occur, and which subsistence zones to focus on 
when harvesting. The co-management committee chairpersons screen community members 
who apply for permits to give preference to those who have no other income sources for 
consideration to get permits (SFFG 1 and SFFG 2). Subsistence permits also stipulate the 
fishing rules for mussel collectors and line fishers at Sokhulu and Mbonambi, i.e. catch sizes 
and harvesting limits. Mussel harvesters at Sokhulu are allowed to harvest once a month with 
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Figure 5.9: Varied perceptions of small scale fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi about the 




Harris et al (2003) assert that benefits from fisheries co-management in Sokhulu outweigh the 
losses. The results of this study revealed that there were five main benefits that fishers in both 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi perceived they obtained from the co-management arrangements with 
EKZN Wildlife. These included: the ecological sustainability of the resources, an improved 
relationship with EKZN Wildlife authorities, inclusion in decision-making processes, food for 
subsistence, formal access rights from permits, and income provided by jobs for monitors 
(Figure 5.9). 
 
Community members of the Sokhulu mussel committee gave the Mussel Co-management 
Project maximum ranking in terms of benefits, noting that the project has had a positive 
impact to their lives: 
 
Because of co-management, mussel resources started to be 
conserved because in other places/communities, mussels are 
depleted. We were taught how to plant the mussels and this 
















The mussel harvesters and mussel committee at Sokhulu stated that when the co-management 
project began in 1995, Jean Harris, a staff member of EKZN Wildlife started a crafting project 
for women who harvested mussels in the community and established a market for them to sell 
their craft. The mussel harvesters remarked that they were very pleased with this initiative 
because it provided them with an alternative livelihood that enabled them to support 
themselves and their families during the times they were not permitted to harvest or when the 
mussel season was closed. Hence, their reliance on the resources was decreased, although this 
changed in 2002 when the particular staff member was no longer directly involved in the 
mussel project with Sokhulu mussel harvesters. Fishers in Mbonambi also noted that they 
benefit from the fact that formal access to the resources has enabled them to obtain a food 
source for themselves and their families, hence they stated, “We see permits as a benefit 
because they gave us freedom to harvest freely but we are still restricted” (MFFG 2).  
b) Losses 
Although the co-management arrangement brought about benefits that had positive impacts 
on the lives of fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, fishers in these communities also incurred 
losses due to permit regulations that governed resource use. These losses included: loss of 
unregulated access to the fishery, loss of income from the potential sale of the resources 
(since permit regulations prohibit sale of resources for small-scale fishers), and a loss of 
traditional fishing rights which fishers believed to be part of their livelihoods. 
Mussel harvesters and line fishers in the Sokhulu focus groups pointed out that although they 
appreciated that subsistence permits gave them legal access to harvest the resources, the major 
loss they incurred from the introduction of permits was increased restrictions on access to 
resources (SFFG 1; SFFG 2). Permits stipulate rules relating to how much can be harvested, 
zones for harvesting and seasons for harvesting. These restrictions were perceived by the 
resource harvesters to result in losses to their livelihoods due to the fact that they believed 
they had a traditional right to harvest the resources. Mussel harvesters in Sokhulu thus stated, 
 We grew up harvesting mussels but now there are 
people bothering us and there are rules that restrict how 
much mussels we can collect – this is not convenient for 
us at all (SFFG 3). 
 
In addition to this, the mussel harvesters at Sokhulu indicated that permit regulations resulted 















which their subsistence permits do not permit them to harvest crayfish and sea lice, mussel 
harvesters in Sokhulu are only allowed to harvest once a month, which is not sufficient food 
for them. As a result, some of the mussel harvesters interviewed at Sokhulu indicated that 
they still harvested crayfish and sea lice illegally. This might explain why the household 
survey data revealed that 74% of fishing households at Sokhulu do not possess a fishing 
permit. In addition to this, 34% of fishing households in Sokhulu indicated that fishing rules 
stipulated in the permits were not fair, while 58% indicated that they did not always comply 
with fishing rules. An EKZN Wildlife official stated that illegal harvesting is still taking place 
along the coast of Sokhulu and it has been confusing for them to determine whether 
subsistence or recreational fishers were responsible (EKZNW 1).  
Mussel poaching in Mbonambi is allegedly problematic. Mussel harvesters in this community 
felt that they had lost out on harvesting the resources when co-management started because 
the Mbonambi community was issued with line fish permits but not mussel permits. This was 
because the mussel harvesters in Mbonambi were overlooked in the granting of permits to 
harvest mussels at the time when Sokhulu mussel harvesters obtained theirs. An EKZN 
Wildlife representative pointed out that there had been no documented history of the 
Mbonambi community‟s use of mussels, and as a result, no mussel resource co-management 
was started there (EKZNW 2). The EKZN Wildlife officials that also remarked that part of 
the reason why the permit application for Mbonambi mussel harvesters had been delayed for 
so long was because of a concern that the mussel stocks at Mbonambi were too small. The 
EKZN Wildlife was concerned about the potential conflicts that could arise with recreational 
users if Mbonambi community members were given access to mussel resources (EKZNW 1; 
EKZNW 2; EKZNW 3). Because mussel harvesters in Mbonambi believed that they had an 
indigenous right to harvest mussels, they resorted to poaching the resource (MFFG 3). This 
had a negative impact on the sustainability of the resource and created ecological losses since 
mussel poachers did not harvest selectively and did not use sustainable harvesting gear. The 
line fish committee confirmed this, stating that the loss of access to mussel resources caused 
resource harvesters to become greedy, leading to depleted mussel stocks (MFFG 1).   
  
Line fishers and mussel harvesters in Sokhulu indicated that in the past, they used to sell the 
resources that they did not consume with their families (SFFG 3; SFFG4). However, because 
permit regulations prohibit the sale of fisheries resources by small-scale fishers (unless they 
sell within the community boundaries, (i.e. within 20km), the mussel harvesters and line 















one may argue that if the communities were allowed to sell the resources, it would not make a 
difference as there is no market for fishers in these communities to sell their catch.  
 
An EKZN Wildlife official stated that at the inception of co-management, the conservation 
authorities had not paid much consideration to the broader socio-economic dynamics within 
the community that may have had a direct or indirect impact on the fishery (EKZNW 3). One 
official noted the following about the mussel project,  
…We hadn‟t realized that one day of mussel harvesting 
caters for one or two meals for the harvesters. We call 
this mussel project food security but it‟s actually 
supplementary food security because harvesting mussels 
for one or two meals is not providing them food 
security… there is no alternative livelihoods funding for 
the community and no funding for employing a social 
science person into the program (EKZNW 3). 
 
The findings of this study indicate that the losses that Sokhulu and Mbonambi fishers and 
mussel harvesters claim to have incurred from the introduction of subsistence permits, 
intended as a benefit-sharing tool, were mostly linked to socio-economic insecurities of 
the livelihoods of fisheries resource users within these communities. It appeared that there 
was a gap between the formulation of subsistence permit regulations and the 
understanding of the socio-economic status of fishers and their households. On the other 
hand, it also appeared that fishers in these communities expected EKZN Wildlife to play a 
developmental role, which is not necessarily the mandate of EKZN Wildlife. This leads to 
perceptions by fishers of losses, attributed to harvesting permits.  
 
5.4.4 Institutional arrangements’ influence on benefit distribution  
This section explores how institutional arrangements influenced: a) how fisheries resource 
users in Sokhulu and Mbonambi benefited (and lost) from the fisheries sector, b) the manner 
in which benefits from fisheries resources have been distributed, and c) why benefits have 
been distributed in the manner that they were. The key themes that will be discussed in this 
section are decision-making (i.e. power and procedural justice), representativeness and 
accountability of the co-management structures, and perceptions of fisheries rules.   
 
Focus group discussions with fisheries resource users in Sokhulu revealed that they believed 
EKZN Wildlife was the most central and powerful decision-making stakeholder in the 















the resources and how benefits are distributed through co-management and subsistence 
permits (SFFG 1; SFFG 2; SFFG 3; SFFG 4).  
 
Figure 5.10 illustrates a network diagram produced from Venn diagrams constructed with the 
mussel and line fish committees at Sokhulu in the focus group meetings, and depicts their 



















Figure 5.10: Network diagram depicting the perception of EKZN Wildlife by Sokhulu  
committees as the most influential stakeholder in decision-making regarding Sokhulu fisheries  
(SFFG 1; SFFG 2). 
 
 
According to the mussel committee at Sokhulu, EKZN Wildlife has the most decision-making 
power about how the resources should be used and how mussel harvesters should use them. 
However, the mussel committee acknowledged that they, together with the Sokhulu 
traditional authority, work closely with EKZN Wildlife. The Sokhulu line fish committee 
asserted that although EKZN Wildlife has the most decision-making power in determining 
how fish is harvested and how benefits are distributed from the fishery, the committee‟s role 
is not acknowledged as it should be by EKZN Wildlife. The line fish committee claimed that 
EKZN Wildlife does not always listen to their inputs and does not financially compensate the 
committee for what they do. As a result, the line fish committee indicated that they do not 
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Figure 5.11: Network diagram depicting the perception of EKZN Wildlife by Sokhulu fishers as 
 the most powerful decision-making stakeholder in Sokhulu mussel and line fish co-management 
(SFFG 3; SFFG 4). 
 
In the focus groups held with Sokhulu line fishers and mussel harvesters, EKZN Wildlife was 
widely regarded as the controller of benefits as they were perceived to have the most decision-
making power in the co-management arrangement. This was similar to the perceptions of the 
committee (Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12).  Both fisheries groups asserted that the co-
management committees and community monitors had equal decision-making powers, but 
smaller than that of EKZN Wildlife. Both the committee and the monitors were perceived to 
have a working relationship with EKZN Wildlife (SFFG 3; SFFG 4). However, Sokhulu 
mussel harvesters and line fishers remarked that they themselves had no say in decision-
making processes in the co-management. Although they felt that the committees and monitors 
involved them in their activities, they believed that EKZN Wildlife rarely included them in 















Both line fishers and the line fish committee in Mbonambi also believed that it was not 
themselves, but EKZN Wildlife that controlled decision-making processes in the co-
management of fishery resources (see Figure 5.12). Similar to Sokhulu, fishers in Mbonambi 
felt that EKZN Wildlife did grant monitors and the line fish committee a certain degree of 
decision-making power, but felt that the fishers themselves were not included in these 
decision-making processes. However, one may argue that this is understandable as 
committees are supposed to represent community members in decision-making processes and 






















Figure 5.12: Network diagram depicting the perception of EKZN Wildlife by the Mbonambi line 
fishers and line fish committee (SFFG 3; SFFG 4). 
 
Co-management committee members from Sokhulu and Mbonambi also expressed 
dissatisfaction that there was no compensation for the work that they did and that they did not 
obtain the recognition that was due to them from EKZN Wildlife (SFFG2; MFFG1).  
In contrast to the perceptions of Sokhulu and Mbonambi fishers and co-management 
committee members, there were mixed responses about who held the most decision-making 















representatives that were interviewed. While one of the officials from EKZN Wildlife ranked 
EKZN Wildlife as the most powerful decision maker in the co-management structure, the 
other officials ranked the co-management committees that included community members as 
the most influential decision-making bodies in the Sokhulu and Mbonambi fisheries sector 
(EKZNW 1; EKZNW 2; EKZNW 3). This indicates that there was a gap between the extent 
to which EKZN Wildlife felt that they had included community fishers in decision-making 
processes, and the extent to which community fishers actually felt included and influential in 
the decision-making processes.  
EKZN Wildlife has acknowledged these concerns, as explained by one official, 
 
People in the committees no longer seem keen for joint 
management and no longer see benefits from it. They no longer 
see access to resources as a benefit anymore – they want more – 
they want bag limits to increase, they want to be paid, monitors 
want salary increases, etc. It has become glaringly evident that 
alternative livelihoods are important because people only fish 
because they are desperate and they can‟t make money  
(EKZNW 3).    
 
 
The findings of this study affirm that there has been increasing pressure on EKZN Wildlife by 
fishers in these communities. EKZN Wildlife is expected not only to be a conservation 
authority, but also to play a role in facilitating development opportunities that would help 
supplement the lives of fishers and their households. When co-management started in 
Sokhulu, the mandate of EKZN Wildlife was work with the communities to enhance the 
sustainability of the resources, but over time, EKZN Wildlife has become more aware of the 
pressures that community fishers place on them to play a developmental role through co-
management.  However, an EKZN Wildlife official explained that there is not much they are 
able to do to assist fishers in this regard because the budget they get from the national 
fisheries department only enables them to facilitate conservation, and not to simultaneously 
play a developmental role in the fishing communities (EKZNW 1). It is therefore evident that 
the mismatch between the co-management objectives and fishing rules and the evolving 
livelihood needs of fishers in the Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities is increasingly 
decreasing the impact and legitimacy of co-management to the fishers. Unless fisheries co-















links to other development institutions within the communities, co-management may 
gradually lose its effect in these communities.   
 
5.5 The mining sector 
5.5.1 The mining sector in Sokhulu and Mbonambi: actors and resources 
Richards Bay Minerals (RBM) is the primary actor in the mining sector in Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi, as it holds rights from the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) to mine the 
land in these coastal areas. Several other actors have a stake in the mining taking place in 
these areas, through either working with RBM in the mining operations, or representing the 
communities on mining related issues. Richards Bay Minerals was established by the 
Industrial Development Corporation, BHP Billiton and a Canadian Company known as 
Queensland Trustees and Investment (QTI) Limited in 1976 to mine 17km of coastal dunes in 
the northern coast of the KwaZulu-Natal province (RBM, 2007). The mining concession areas 
belonging to RBM within Sokhulu and Mbonambi TA areas are indicated in Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.13: RBM mining concession areas within Sokhulu and Mbonambi. 
 
Richards Bay Minerals is a world renowned producer of titanium slag, rutile, zircon and high 
purity pig iron, and started mining the coast of Mbonambi in 1976, and Sokhulu, in 2004. The 















rehabilitation program on mined dunes that involves the plantation of casuarinas and 
indigenous forests to rehabilitate mining land and restore the ecosystems in the areas that have 
been mined (RBM, 2007). The company hires approximately 1,700 permanent staff members 
and 2,000 contractors and is now owned by Rio Tinto (37%), BHP Billiton (37%), RBM 
employees (2%), and a Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) consortium 
made up of the four communities (Sokhulu, Mbonambi, Dube, Mkwanazi), together with 
other investors. This means that the communities now have a stake in the company through 
shareholding (RBM, 2011). Due to the new regulations stipulated in the South African Mining 
Charter to convert old mineral rights to new mineral rights, RBM has sold 24% of its shares to 






































Figure 5.14: RBM mining operations at Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
 
 
5.5.2 Benefits and losses from mining in Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
Since mining began along the coasts of Sokhulu and Mbonambi, there have been various 
social, ecological and economic impacts. These have translated into benefits and 
losses/negative impacts incurred by adjacent communities. This section provides an account 
of the perceived benefits and losses emanating from RBM mining activities, incurred by 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi over the past 30 years.  
 
a) Benefits 
According to RBM (2009), Sokhulu, Mbonambi, Dube and Mkhwanazi communities have 
benefited from the presence of the mining company in these communities through Corporate 
Social Investment (CSI) projects including infrastructure support for schools, Treepreneur 
project (i.e. indigenous tree planting project), rigging training for unemployed youth, and 
annual donations to 24 schools in the host communities. In addition to this, RBM prides itself 
on building clinics as well as roads for mining operations that are now used by the 















perceptions, as many of them did not agree that these benefits have made up for what has 
been lost due to mining in these areas. Various community members and coastal resource user 
groups in Sokhulu and Mbonambi indicated that they have incurred very few or no benefits 
but several losses to their livelihoods due to mining. Although 19% of interviewed Sokhulu 
households indicated in the surveys that employment in mining contributes to their household 
monthly income, 40% of Sokhulu households believed that mining has had negatively 
effected on their livelihoods. Moreover, although the survey results indicated that mining 
contributes to monthly household incomes of 30% of Mbonambi households, 71% of 
Mbonambi households indicated that mining has negatively impacted on their livelihoods. 
Various community groups within Sokhulu and Mbonambi that were interviewed in the focus 
group discussions, including fishers, farmers, and even RBM employees, also indicated that 
the benefits that they have received from mining were outweighed by the losses, especially 
ecological and social impacts. The ecological and social losses outlined by Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi communities are discussed below.  
b) Losses 
Fishers in Mbonambi asserted that RBM mining operations have disturbed the water flow and 
the ecological system of Lake Nhlabane due to the fact that RBM built a bridge at the mouth 
of the lake that blocked water to and from Nhlabane river and the sea (MFFG1, MFFG2). As 
a result, the lake is now closed to water inflow, and the marine life in the lake is perishing. 
Since RBM has been drawing water from the lake for mining operations, the water level of 
the lake has been dropping, especially during low rainfall seasons. Therefore, the people who 
fished in the lake that were interviewed for this study indicated that they have lost access to 
the fisheries resources in the lake, and thus have lost a means of feeding themselves and their 
families (MFFG1; MFFG2). Vivier and Cyprus (1999) confirm that the bridge built by RBM 
in Lake Nhlabane did in fact impact on the lake ecosystem. When RBM resumed mining in 
the Lake Nhlabane area in 1977, they realized that the lake was a natural barrier to mining. 
Therefore, a dredger and concentrator were built by RBM in 1993 across the middle of the 
Nhlabane estuary to allow for physical crossing. Two berm walls crossing the estuary were 
constructed as well. The berm walls were set to be removed after three months, but this ended 
up being delayed to May 1996, resulting in disturbance of fauna species within the estuary. 
This activity caused a rapid decrease in the number and density of zoobenthic species 
resulting from a series of sediment intrusions into the estuary from around the berm walls 















Sedimentation also resulted in long term habitat changes in the estuary. In addition, water 
abstraction from RBM mining activities caused water and salinity levels in the lake to drop as 
the lake could no longer breach itself at the mouth, since it was naturally an open-closed 
system. Due to this, there was no mixing of the marine and lake environments for four years, 
and thus marine organisms were inhibited from entering the estuary. However, RBM did lift 
the berm walls and limited water abstraction from the lake when they were made aware of 
these negative impacts. A RBM official indicated that they have tried to minimize negative 
impacts on the lake by limiting water abstraction and by building a fish ladder for fish to 
move from the lake to the sea (RBM 2). However, the RBM ecologist asserted that mining 
activities are not the only cause of disturbance to the ecosystem, and that the commercial 
plantations (i.e. eucalyptus trees) planted by local people, as well as by SAPPI and Mondi 
companies, also consume a lot of water and cause water levels to drop.  
Other ecological impacts of mining have included the destruction of indigenous coastal forest. 
Traditional healers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi noted that mining has resulted in the 
destruction of indigenous and medicinal tree species that traditional healers have used for 
years to heal local people (SHFG; MHFG). The traditional healers expressed concern that the 
replacement of the indigenous forests in the area by monocultures of casuarinas caused them 
to suffer because they no longer have access to the tree species they used to use, and most of 
the tree species destroyed for mining can never be rehabilitated again, which means that they 
have lost their traditional links to those tree species. The outcome of losing these indigenous 
tree species is that they are no longer able to heal most of the illnesses, and as a result they 
have lost out on clients. Traditional healers in Mbonambi remarked, 
 
Before RBM started mining in 1976, there were abundant indigenous trees 
and forest here at Mbonambi and we used to harvest from it but after 
mining began, we lost access to scarce tree species that were on the sand 
dunes and from then on we had to go to the chemist and buy these when 
we could previously just harvest it here. RBM does not recognize us and 
they have destroyed the forest we rely on and did not give us an alternative 
solution. Because mining has destroyed the forest, we can‟t heal all the 
diseases we used to heal because those trees we used are now extinct – we 
are sometimes even forced to go all the way to Hluhluwe to harvest tree 
species we can no longer find here and that travelling costs us a lot of 
money – now people suffer when they are sick because we can‟t help them 
















In Sokhulu and Mbonambi, respectively, other social losses due to mining were highlighted 
by 40% and 71% of respondents. Fishers in Sokhulu claimed that since mining began at 
Sokhulu in 2004, the access routes to the coast that they had used for years have been 
destroyed due to mining (SFFG 1; SFFG2). Replacement routes to the coast are now too long 
and are controlled by RBM. There was also a common concern among resource user groups 
in Sokhulu and Mbonambi that the indigenous forests, as well as the graves of their 
forefathers have been destroyed by mining. Mining was also said to have resulted in the 
resettlement of some people in Sokhulu whose dwellings were located along the path of the 
mining operations. Mining operations have also posed major threats to community 
agricultural land and livestock because there is now limited land for livestock grazing. 
Further, water draining from mining operations has led to flooding and has destroyed some of 
their agricultural land and dwellings. There were also concerns among the different groups in 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi that mining activities have used up most of the natural water sources 
(i.e. streams and Lake Nhlabane) in the area, as mining operations require large amounts of 
water (SFFG2; MFFG1). Sokhulu farmers stated that this has impacted their livelihoods 
because water supply in the area is now limited, given the fact that 54% of the households 
obtain water from public stand posts, while others use underground water and water from 
rivers or streams. Reports of deaths of livestock were also noted in grazing areas destroyed for 
mining (SFFG3).  
 
In addition to this, mounds of sand that are left over after mining and have not yet been 
rehabilitated are said to have health implications due to the dust being blown by the wind into 
the villages (SFFG 1; SFFG2). Other health impacts from mining pointed out by  Mbonambi 
farmers included underground seepage of chemicals from mining operations contaminated 
underground water, making it unsafe to drink for local people; as well as the fact that clarifier 
sludge (i.e. mineral waste) dumped by RBM adjacent to the Mbonambi community causes air 
and water pollution, putting community lives in danger. An RBM official stated that RBM 




















There have been three key drivers of benefit-sharing from mining between RBM and Sokhulu 
and Mbonambi communities: the Rio Tinto principles, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA) of 2002, and the Broad Based Socio-Economic Empowerment 
Charter for the South African Mining Industry (also known as the Mining Charter). Rio Tinto 
is one of the world‟s largest private mining companies, and has been subject to various 
criticisms over the past few decades concerning environmental, social and labor issues 
(Kapelus, 2002). Rio Tinto, therefore, embarked on developing a global corporate 
responsibility strategy which declares its principles and values and clarifies policy guidelines 
for the implementation of the principles to all its associate firms, subsidiaries and contractors. 
Part of the reason for developing the policy guidelines was to help the company build 
sustainable mutual relationships with host communities and to improve the access of affected 
communities to existing and new opportunities within the firm (Rio Tinto, 1997; Kapelus, 
2002). Richards Bay Minerals has established various CSR projects within the Mbonambi 
community in education, health care and community development. A RBM official confirmed 
this, stating that both Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities currently benefit from RBM‟s 
CSR projects, providing support primarily to schools, clinics and other community projects 
(Kapelus, 2002; RBM 3). The establishment of local committees known as Community 
Development Councils (CDCs) or committees, operating alongside traditional authorities in 
Sokhulu and Mbonmabi, has been facilitated by RBM as a mechanism for enabling the 
communities to benefit from CSR projects. Traditional authorities, the CDCs and RBM are 
involved in the implementation of CSR projects in Sokhulu and Mbonambi.   
 
The Mining Charter and the MPRDA assert that the South African mining industry prioritizes 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), employment equity and rural development to redress 
the historical exclusion of blacks, mining communities and women from participation in the 
mainstream economy (DME, 2010). Therefore, by the end of 2009, RBM had signed binding 
agreements with its BBBEE consortium, including seven lead investor companies, four host 
communities (including Sokhulu and Mbonambi), and an Employee Share Participation 
Scheme (ESPS), for a BBBEE deal of 26% (RBM, 2009). The BBBEE transaction of 26% of 
the company‟s shares to the new partners in the consortium was developed as a mechanism to 
share benefits between RBM, the host communities and the other shareholders.  Richards Bay 
Minerals has put in place institutional arrangements in Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities 



















 in Sokhulu and Mbonambi in order to distribute the benefits of CSR 
projects undertaken by RBM in Sokhulu and Mbonambi (RBM 3). In Sokhulu, this takes the 
form of a Youth Development Committee which represents the community in presenting 
community needs to RBM and advocating for community members to be employed by RBM 
and its contractors. At Mbonambi, a committee called the Job Seekers Committee fulfills a 
similar role, especially in advocating for fair employment opportunities for local people by 
RBM and its contractors. The channel that RBM uses to work with and distribute CSR 
benefits both in Sokhulu and Mbonambi goes via the TAs and the Mfolozi Local 
Municipality, as they both have legal administrative powers over Sokhulu and Mbonambi. 
However, the TAs and the Mfolozi Local Municipality have minimal interactions with each 
other in matters related to community leadership. During the data collection process, it was 
observed that RBM deals primarily with the Tribal Councils in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, in 
matters concerning the sharing of benefits from mining between RBM and the communities.  
 
 
                                                 
10
 The term CDCs was used by RBM to refer to the local committees that they work with within the 
communities. However, for the purposes of this study, the actual names of the committees that were present in 
the communities will be used, i.e. Sokhulu Youth Development Committee and Mbonambi Job Seekers 
Committee. Members of these committees were appointed by community members in consultation with the TAs.  
The committees represent community needs within RBM and promote the employment of local people by RBM 























































The local municipality is involved to a lesser extent as they have limited physical presence in 
these communities. In Mbonambi, the local municipality and the Mbonambi TA did not work 
well together, but the municipality was trying to prevent this from affecting their mandate as 
stipulated in the IDP (MLM 1). Therefore, the Sokhulu Youth Development Committee and 
the Mbonambi Job Seekers Committee, under the guidance of their respective TAs are 
responsible for distributing CSR benefits to their respective communities.  
 
In addition to participating in the RBM BBBEE consortium, Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
communities have two Trusts that were established in partnership with RBM to distribute and 
manage BBBEE benefits for the wider communities (see Figure 5.15). The Community 
Development Trust is responsible for implementing community development strategies in 
each host community, while the Shareholding Trusts are responsible for managing community 
shares (i.e. 2.7%) in the consortium. According to an RBM official, capacity building for 















mining company has also employed independent accountants for 12 to 18 years to administer 
the shareholding of the communities in the consortium (RBM 1). The Community 
Development Trusts and Shareholding Trusts in Sokhulu and Mbonambi work under the 
guidance of the TAs, and the Mfolozi Local Municipality is not involved in the BBBEE deal 
negotiations. The outcomes of these CSR and BBBEE benefit-sharing mechanisms will be 
discussed in the following section. 
 
5.5.4 Outcomes of benefit-sharing mechanisms and institutional arrangements’ influence 
on benefit distribution 
The results of this study revealed that although RBM mining in Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
resulted in some benefits, several factors influenced the effectiveness of benefit-sharing 
mechanisms in the mining sector in these communities. Although respondents in Sokhulu 
and Mbonambi expressed enthusiasm upon hearing that RBM had made the effort to inject 
such a sum of money through the BBBEE deal into the community, they simultaneously 
expressed indifference to this as they expressed doubt that the benefits of this money would 
ever reach the wider community equitably. The DMR (2009) revealed that although mining 
companies in South Africa seemingly comply to implement community upliftment projects 
in mining-affected communities, there is a paucity of evidence that shows that the projects 
that are implemented by these companies match the needs of the affected communities.  This 
is attributed to poor and insufficient collaboration and consultation with the communities, as 
well as a lack of alignment of the community upliftment projects proposed by the mining 
companies with already existing broader Local Economic Development (LED) frameworks 
within the communities (DMR, 2009). Various other factors were perceived by community 
members to block benefits emanating from RBM‟s CSR and BBBEE initiatives. These 
included political patronage of the structures responsible for distributing benefits to the wider 
community; lack of commitment, accountability, representativeness, and procedural justice 
by those responsible for distributing benefits; as well as an uneven relationship between 
RBM and community members. 
 
According to RBM representatives, Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities have benefited 
significantly from CSR and BBBEE initiatives. One RBM official asserted that RBM 
employs 700 permanent employees and 1,000 contractors from the host communities (RBM 
1).  The shareholding of each community held by the Shareholding Trusts in the consortium is 















endowments each to Sokhulu, Mbonambi and the two other host communities for community 
development, in order to uplift and benefit these communities. In addition to this, triple 
dividends of R1,5 million will be paid twice each year after these R17, 5 million endowments 
(RBM 1). Although the communities are not allowed to sell these shares, RBM has projected 
community dividends to increase to between R30 million – R100 million by 2020, so that 
when mine closure takes place in 2034, the communities would have made enough profits for 
intended community development projects.  
 
In Sokhulu, the general community perception of RBM‟s benefit-sharing strategies is that 
they are not satisfactory. Household survey results of this study revealed that 96% of the 
community members were aware of RBM‟s benefit-sharing-mechanisms within the 
community, particularly the CSR projects. However, because at the time this research was 
undertaken, the BBBEE deal between RBM and the community was still new, community 
members both in Sokhulu and Mbonambi were generally not aware of it. People interviewed 
highlighted the losses rather than benefits they have incurred from RBM‟s presence in the 
community, and thus most provided suggestions of what they think RBM should be doing in 
order to benefit the community more. For example, it was suggested that RBM should provide 
more jobs to the people in the community. The survey results revealed that RBM, including 
its contractors, only hired people in 13% of the Sokhulu households, mostly in low skilled 
jobs. 
 
In the focus group discussions held with members of the Sokhulu Youth Development 
Committee and community members employed in mining operations, it was revealed that 
Sokhulu community members were aware of and acknowledged benefiting from RBM 
through renovated schools, employment, roads built by RBM and youth soccer tournaments 
sponsored by RBM. However, these benefits were not seen as adequate by most community 
members. The Sokhulu Youth Development Committee asserted,  
 
They (i.e. RBM) do not build schools in the community – they 
only renovate but they still put the big boards to say it is an 
RBM school. They advertise themselves as though they do a lot 
for the community…for the amount of money they make, they 
do nothing for the community. Local benefits are too little – 
















In contrast, the Sokhulu TA representative interviewed for this study asserted that the Sokhulu 
community was definitely benefiting from RBM‟s benefit-sharing strategies. During the time 
when the data for this study was collected, only the Sokhulu TA, the Sokhulu Councilor, the 
Sokhulu Youth Development Committee, as well as people from the community that were 
employed in the mining sector indicated that they were aware of RBM‟s BBBEE deal that 
involved the community. During conversations with general community members, most noted 
that they were not aware of this deal or the R17,5 million endowment that RBM had just paid 
to the community, while some community members had only read about the payment of the 
endowment from local newspapers. Thus it became apparent that the TAs had not properly 
informed the community about this initiative.  
 
Community members in Sokhulu shared the view that they were unhappy about the fact that 
RBM only has a direct relationship with the TAs and not the wider community. Community 
members were under the impression that no matter what benefits RBM conveyed to the 
community, the TA would control these benefits and decide who in the community could 
access benefits. Sokhulu mining sector employees remarked, 
 
RBM does something wrong by directing all benefits they 
have for the community to the tribal authorities – they should 
address what they are doing to the community as a whole 
because now the benefits never reach the whole community 
and only the people affiliated with the traditional authorities 
end up benefiting…there is a big gap between the benefits 
that RBM gives to the community and the amount of these 
benefits that actually reach the community on the ground 
(SMFG 2). 
 
A common view expressed was that the TA and the community structures affiliated to it were 
a blockage to benefit-sharing between RBM and the wider community. Consequently, the 
community members felt that they were negatively impacted by RBM‟s benefit-sharing 
mechanisms because of the TA, because the TA blocked mining benefits from reaching the 
wider community. The Sokhulu mining sector employees also pointed out that because the 
Sokhulu Youth Development Committee was influenced by the TA, they sometimes 
inequitably decided and showed favoritism with regards to which community members should 
be employed by RBM when RBM mandated them to recruit a certain number of community 















that the Committee members accepted money for bribes from community members in 
exchange for jobs at RBM or RBM contractors.  
 
Kapelus (2002:289) concluded that the Mbonambi community enjoyed “relatively generous 
benefits” from the presence of RBM and the CSR strategies it implemented within the 
Mbonambi TA and states that Mbonambi‟s relationship to RBM made the Mbonambi 
community an “island of development” in the UThungulu District, which he termed “a sea of 
underdevelopment”. However, the results of this study show that there is a gap between 
RBM‟s and Kapelus‟ (2002) perceptions of the benefits from RBM‟s CSR strategy received 
by the community, and the actual benefits perceived by the community members on the 
ground. In Mbonambi, 95% of household survey respondents indicated that they were aware 
of RBM‟s CSR projects (as the BBBEE deal had not yet been signed by Mbonambi at the 
time that the household surveys were undertaken). The mining sector contributed to the 
monthly household incomes of about 30% of Mbonambi households. Mbonambi mining 
sector employees also noted that the Job Seekers Committee had facilitated the benefits of 
local people by RBM because they forced RBM to hire more people from within the 
community. One RBM official confirmed that entrepreneurs within the host communities are 
the ones that benefit mostly from RBM, and that ordinary community members do not get 
many benefits (RBM 1).  
 
Apart from these benefits, there was a general sense from the wider Mbonambi community 
that they were either not benefiting from RBM‟s benefit-sharing mechanisms or that the 
benefits were not adequate in comparison to the wealth associated with RBM. For instance, 
54% of the household survey respondents who indicated that they benefit mentioned that they 
were not satisfied with the benefits they were obtaining, while a further 77% of all the 
respondents in the household surveys indicated that they do not benefit at all from RBM or its 
benefit-sharing mechanisms. Although the reasons were not explicit enough to comprehend, 
there appeared to be certain factors that influenced or contributed to them, i.e. the turbulent 
relationship between RBM and the Mbonambi community and its leaders, as well as the 
perceived lack of accountability by community leaders to the wider community. It was thus 
apparent that like Sokhulu, RBM‟s benefit-sharing mechanisms in Mbonambi did not 
necessarily have negative impacts on the community, but it was rather these aforementioned 
















In 2008, for instance, a conflict arose between RBM and the Mbonambi community. Some 
community members staged a march to RBM offices and barricaded roads, asserting that 
RBM wanted them to sign the BBBEE deal so that certain black RBM executives would 
benefit and get the money (RBM 1; PMG, 2010). In addition, community members at 
Mbonambi expressed discontentment that RBM was not doing enough for their community, 
and that RBM advertized itself as a socially responsible company when what they had done 
for the community had been mediocre. As a result, RBM charged the Mbonambi community 
with character defamation and the community lodged an interdict to close the BBBEE deal. 
Richards Bay Minerals subsequently won the court case as the community was found guilty 
of character defamation and was ordered by the court to pay for damages. Although RBM 
officials that were interviewed asserted that the conflict was resolved in September 2008, this 
court ruling may have created more friction in the relationship between the Mbonambi 
community and RBM (Parliament, 2010). Although this may be the case, RBM did not 
reverse the BBBEE deal, which the Mbonambi community signed the deal at the end of 2009. 
However, there have been suspicions of businessmen from outside the Mbonambi community 
involved in the BBBEE deal and liaising with some community leaders (Parliament, 2010). 
These suspicions were restated during the research, with one key informant noting that the 
BBBEE deal had attracted a lot of shrewd business people in Mbonambi, such as 
entrepreneurs from Johannesburg, Dubai and other places (RBM 1). Observers noted that this 
occurred because Mbonambi no longer had strong leadership since the former traditional 
leader had passed away in 2005. The community had thus become dismantled and vulnerable 
to outsider influence about how benefits coming to the community should be controlled 
(RBM 1).  
 
When it comes to decision-making processes about the distribution of benefits from mining, 
mining employees in Sokhulu pointed out that the wider Sokhulu community is completely 
excluded from decision-making processes between RBM, the TA and the Councilor, as well 
as the Youth Development Committee. Figure 5.16 illustrates this perception by Sokhulu 
mining sector employees and shows that community members felt excluded from decision-
making processes about sharing benefits from mining as RBM and its community institutions 
were not transparent in decision-making matters. However, Figure 5.17 shows that although 
the Sokhulu Youth Development Committee did admit to the fact that RBM is not transparent 
to the wider community, there appeared to be a mismatch between the way they perceived 















opposed to the way the community perceived them. Figure 5.16 shows that the community 
members felt there was no accountability and transparency by all the decision-making 
structures, including the Committee and the TA. In contrast, the Committee claimed that they 
and the TA work closely with the community, and RBM is the only one that does not involve 
the community. However, the survey results of this study revealed that 44% of Sokhulu 
respondents who were aware of the committee felt that the committee did not fairly represent 
















Figure 5.16: Perceptions of Sokhulu mining employees about decision-making power in mining 









































Figure 5.17: Perceptions of Sokhulu Youth Development Committee about decision-making 
power in mining (The dotted arrow indicates that the group perceived that the relationship 
between the wider Sokhulu community and the community decision-making structures is 
strong, but the relationship between the wider community and RBM is weak) 
 
The Mbonambi Community Trust raised concerns that RBM only liaised with the TA and 
undermined the Community Trust‟s powers as a prominent decision-making body in the 
community (MMFG 1). Figure 5.18 illustrates the perception of the Mbonambi Community 
Trust that RBM sits at the centre of decision-making processes and has the most power. The 
Mbonambi Community Trust referred to RBM as „the beast‟, implying that RBM did as they 
pleased in the area and benefited the community only if was efficient to them and could not be 
told otherwise (MMFG 1). A recent government report on economic development in 
Mtubatuba and Umhlathuze Municipalities revealed that provincial government in KwaZulu-
Natal noted concerns that RBM has been reluctant in giving local businesses opportunities 
significant shareholding in the mine. Moreover, there had been concerns by the community 
members that RBM does not adequately consult with the community on decision-making 
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Figure 5.18: Perceptions of the Mbonambi Community Trust about decision-making power in 
 mining  
 
 
An RBM official responded to these criticisms by stating that it is not within RBM‟s mandate 
to consult with everyone in the communit , but it is the job of the designated committees and 
BBBEE Trusts to communicate RBM‟s benefit-sharing mechanisms and processes to the 
wider communities (RBM 1).On the other hand, a local municipality representative in 
Mbonambi revealed that there were underlying factors outside the control of RBM that 
blocked benefits from mining from filtering through to the wider community in Mbonambi 
(MKI1). The municipality representative accused the Mbonambi TA for hardly consulting 
with himself or the wider community on decision-making matters, especially the ones 
involving benefits to the community from the interventions of RBM and other stakeholders. 
He asserted,  
 
There are a lot of things the community does not know and is not 
told about, e.g. incentives received by the community from 
different industries operating at Mbonambi, i.e. RBM, 
Siyaqhubeka, Mondi and Sappi, as these industries plough 
something back to the community…I don‟t know anything about 
the BBBEE deal because issues concerning money are negotiated 















incentives meant for the community drown in the hands of the TA 
(MKI 1).  
 
 
Two broad conclusions can therefore be drawn. First, although the Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
communities acknowledged RBM‟s efforts to benefit the community, their concern is that the 
benefits do not filter down to the wider communities due to issues of unaccountability of 
community leaders. The communities held RBM partly liable for allowing this to happen by 
giving the TAs and the Committees autonomy over the benefits and their distribution. 
Community members felt that this was largely attributed to the fact that neither the TAs nor 
RBM adequately involved the wider community in decision-making processes about benefit-
sharing strategies. Hence, the DMR (2009) asserts that, “the disjuncture between consultation 
and collaboration with affected communities minimizes the developmental impact of the 
mining industry on communities”. Moreover, the unstable relationship between RBM and the 
Mbonambi community also undermined benefit distribution and negatively impacted the 
community‟s perception about RBM‟s interventions within the community. It is also apparent 
that the perceived lack of downward accountability of mining committees and TAs to the 
wider community, the use of political patronage by community leaders and RBM‟s failure to 
follow up on these structures perpetrated the negative view that the communities members 
have against RBM, aggravating the conflicts between RBM and the communities. 
 
Second, there seem to be many institutional arrangements put in place by RBM within 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi for benefit-sharing. For instance, the Youth Development 
Committee, TA, Community Development Trust and Shareholding Trust are all community 
institutions in Sokhulu with whom RBM works. Each of these institutional structures, except 
TAs, have a different mandate so structures work separately from each other even though they 
all operate under RBM. For instance, the Youth Development Committee and the Community 
Development Trust have community upliftment roles but use separate benefit-sharing 
strategies, i.e. CSR and BBBEE, and thus they do not work together. One could argue that 
multiple benefit-sharing mechanisms are blockages in themselves as they confuse community 



















The findings of this study show that coastal resources have brought various ecological, social 
and economic benefits to the people in Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities, through the 
fisheries and mining sectors. However, it is apparent that these benefits have been paralleled 
by significant losses that negatively impact the livelihoods of these communities. For 
instance, although fisheries co-management in Sokhulu and Mbonambi resulted in perceived 
ecological benefits as it enhanced the sustainability of the resources, fishers in these 
communities pointed out that the fishing regulations that were introduced alongside co-
management have imposed losses to their livelihoods, as their ability to harvest resources is 
now restricted, putting pressure on their livelihoods as they struggle with food security. 
Furthermore, although 30% of households in Mbonambi received monthly incomes from 
employment in mining, people in both Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities expressed 
concern that the benefits they obtain from the mining sector are outweighed by the losses and 
the negative impacts that they have incurred due to mining. It is apparent from the findings of 
this study that flawed institutional arrangements for benefit distribution in the fisheries and 
mining sectors in both communities, have impinged on the ability of the communities to 
realize benefits emanating from these sectors. Disregarding community livelihoods, political 
patronage and lack of accountability by those responsible for distributing benefits to the wider 
communities were among the major perceived blockages to benefit-sharing in the fisheries 
and mining sectors in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, resulting in a mismatch between benefits 
intended for communities through benefit-sharing mechanisms, and the actual benefits that 



























MANKOSI CASE STUDY 
6.1 Introduction  
The Eastern Cape comprises some of the country‟s poorest coastal communities, 
characterized by high population, unemployment and poverty rates (Ashley and Ntshona, 
2003; Department of Social Development, 2009). This chapter provides an in-depth socio-
economic profile of people in the coastal community of Mankosi, as well as the background 
of coastal resource use by people in these communities. The benefits obtained by local fishers 
from fisheries and tourism are also described, together with a review of factors that enhance 
or hinder benefit-sharing in this community.  
6.2 The background of Mankosi community and coastal resource use 
This section provides a summary of some of the key events that have occurred over time that 
have impacted the manner which the Mankosi community has benefited from the use of and 
access to coastal resources. Because there was limited information available about the 
background of the Mankosi community and its use of coastal resources, this study sought to 
uncover the history of the community and its use of coastal resources through PRA exercises. 
This information was triangulated with information from the household surveys and key 
informant interviews and other relevant documentary evidence
11
. Figure 6.1 provides a 
timeline of key events or interventions perceived by coastal resource users in the community 
to have affected the manner in which they have accessed and used resources.  
 
People in the community have a long history of utilizing the coast and its resources. In the 
focus group discussions, some of the oldest community members asserted that they had 
harvested fisheries resources well before the 1940s (MFF1; MFFG3). It also appeared that 
there had been a strong historical link between fisheries and tourism activities even before the 
1950s (MFFG1; MTFG). Raemaekers (2009) confirms that tourists in the Transkei coast have 
historically created a demand for most marine resources.  
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 Due to the limited information available on small-scale fisheries in Mankosi, the findings of this study were 


























Fisheries resources harvested. Holiday cottages built.
New Transkei government which established ‘Nature’. Coastal law 
enforcement began for monitoring the use of marine resources.
Commercial sale of crayfish and oyster to Coffee Bay buyer began.
Tshani camp established which was a missionary church. This is 
now the location of Mdumbi backpackers.
Fisheries Co-operation established in preparation for DEAT 
Poverty Relief Project.
DEAT Poverty Relief Project & Stellenbosch University 
implementing agent set up the Mankosi Fisheries Co-op; Mankosi
Community Trust established; Mdumbi backpackers established.
Fisheries permits introduced; Oyster project started.
TransCape formed.
DEAT Coast Care project implemented.
2010 Aquaculture project launched for lobster and oysters. 
 
 Figure 6.1: Key events that have influenced the use of coastal resources in Mankosi  
 
In the 1950s, white people began to build cottages along the Mdumbi beach and provided 
seasonal jobs and a market for local fishers (MFFG1; MTFG).  Fishers at Mankosi expressed 
no memory of fisheries law enforcers that controlled how the fisheries resources were used 
and harvested at the time. By the early 1970s, fisheries resources were allegedly abundant and 
there was traditional communal open access to the fishery (MFFG3). Fishermen at Mankosi 
stated that fishing was a very important community livelihood at that time, although it had 
limited commercial value to them because they were not educated about money and thus they 
were not conscious about the prices for which they sold the resources (MFFG3). However, the 
effects of the apartheid regime intensified after Transkei independence in 1976, as the state 
began buying out white businesses in the Transkei region (Fay et al, 2002). This resulted in 
the Anchorage Hotel being handed over to the black government designated to the Transkei 
area by the apartheid government. Fishers in Mankosi stated that the transfer of ownership of 
the Anchorage Hotel from white to black management caused local fishers to lose out on the 
market that they had obtained from the white people and tourists who used to visit the area 
because the black government hotel managers had no interest in consuming or buying 
fisheries resources (MFF1).  
 
Local fishers reportedly suffered even further in the mid-1970s because when the black 















(which local people referred to as „Nature‟
12
), who began to monitor the manner in which 
local people harvested coastal resources (MFFG1). New fisheries resource use rules were 
introduced, stating that local people had to obtain recreational fishing permits in order to have 
access to fisheries resources. This allegedly had a negative impact on local fishers because 
they could not afford to buy the permits, and as a result only white fishers had formal access 
to coastal resources because they could afford to buy permits at the time. Consequently, 
fishers at Mankosi were deemed illegal harvesters by the government and fisher access to the 
resources was reduced as they were scared of being caught by „Nature‟ at the beach if they 
were found fishing without permits. As a result of this, local people poached and sold marine 
resources at night or at times when „Nature‟ was not patrolling (MFFG1). Fishers in Mankosi 
remarked: 
 
In 1976 when the new government came into effect, conservation 
police lived on the coast and said we were supposed to have permits 
to harvest resources. We needed permits not just to harvest resources 
but also to have access to the sea but we couldn‟t buy them because 
they were too expensive.  Only white people could have access to 
thecoast and resources because they bought permits at post office.  
So we would harvest illegally. We also couldn‟t sell anything 
because it was illegal, so we just fished for food (MFFG 1). 
 
The enforcement of coastal resource use rules was said to intensify even further in the 1990s, 
as the Transkei government reportedly implemented a law
13
 that prohibited the establishment 
of settlements by local people within two kilometers from the high-water mark and inland, 
and some people in Mankosi who already resided within the two kilometer boundary were 
said to be removed by government law enforcers, with the exception of white people that had 
cottages along the coast (MFFG1; MFFG3). Local fishers then had begun to go to Coffee Bay 
to sell their catch to a commercial buyer. The buyer at Coffee Bay taught Mankosi fishers and 
others how to value fisheries resources commercially and how to price them (MFFG1; 
MFFG2). However, the majority of fishers did not possess recreational or other permits for 
harvesting. 
 
During the early 1990s, marine resource stocks had allegedly decreased due to increased 
numbers of people harvesting and selling these resources (MFFG1). However, at the end of 
the apartheid era in 1994, Mankosi fishers claimed that their access to marine resources 
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 „Nature‟ is a term used by people in Mankosi to refer to government nature conservation authorities. 
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increased again as law enforcement along the coast decreased and there were more tourists 
coming back into the area, providing a market (MFFG2). In addition, the resource stocks (i.e. 
oyster and lobster in particular) had allegedly increased again and local people started making 
money by selling these resources to tourists (MFFG2).  However, by 2001 (i.e. after the 
promulgation of the MLRA in 1998), MCM introduced the first fishing regulations for local 
fishers and required all local fishers to possess subsistence permits to access small-scale 
fisheries resources. These were issued by the then DEAT (MCM) in an effort to formalize 
subsistence fisheries practices. This reportedly changed people‟s access to the resources as the 
permit regulations placed limits on how much local people could harvest, as opposed to 
harvesting as much as they wanted (MFFG2). The permits restricted the harvest to 25 oysters, 
30 mussels and eight crayfish a day during the legal season. In addition, MCM regulations 
later stipulated that tourists or tourism facilities should also possess permits to buy fisheries 
resources from local fishers (Raemaekers, 2009). Community Monitors were then introduced 
by MCM to monitor local people‟s catch. The MCM Compliance Officers were also 
employed to monitor adherence to permit regulations. Thus, the regulation, monitoring and 
enforcement of access to marine resources intensified over this time.  
 
In Mankosi, a Fisheries Co-operative (Co-op) was established in 1999 by DEAT as part of a 
Poverty Relief Project, in partnership with an implementing agent from Stellenbosch 
University. This was in preparation for the introduction of the aquaculture project for fishers 
in 2002 in Mankosi and other surrounding fishing communities. The year 2002 also saw the 
establishment of the Mdumbi backpackers within the Mankosi TA, attracting more tourism 
into the area. Although the owners of the backpackers initially sought to establish a facility to 
boost tourism in the area, local people began to come to them seeking help for various social 
and health issues (MKI4). Due to the realization by the backpackers owners that the 
community lived in vulnerable social conditions and that there was no adequate involvement 
by the government to assist, the owners of the backpackers took it upon themselves to team up 
with a locally based doctor and established a non-profit organization (NPO) called TransCape, 
with the aim of assisting the community (MKI4).  
 
TransCape sources funds from tourism at the backpackers as well as from international donors 
to assist the community with resources, employment, capacity building, and other skills so 
that they can improve their livelihoods (TransCape, 2008). The aim of TransCape is to help 















community, and as a result, they have implemented various projects and sponsored projects 
within Mankosi to help uplift the lives of the local people and local fishers. These projects 
include an Education Centre, TransCape micro-finance to local entrepreneurs, an HIV/AIDS 
prevention program, and village based accommodation for tourists on the hiking trail from 
Port St. Johns to Coffee Bay, to name but a few (TransCape, 2008). The establishment of the 
Mdumbi backpackers in Mankosi not only contributed to the social conditions of the people in 
the community, but also created a market for local fishers, as they began to sell their catch to 
the backpackers. For instance, Raemaekers‟ (2009) study in Mankosi in the 2007/2008 
crayfish seasons revealed that a total of 159 different lobster fishers brought their catch to sell 
at the backpackers because the Mdumbi backpackers is the first available market for fishers in 
Mankosi. 
 
In the same year the Mdumbi backpackers was established, the Mankosi Community Trust 
was formed through European Union (EU) funding obtained via DEAT. The purpose was to 
administer all community development initiatives, including the aquaculture project. The 
aquaculture project was worth R2 million and a number of community members were 
employed in the construction of the shellfish holding facility (Raemaekers, 2009). However, 
the facility remained dormant after it was built. Community members claimed that this was 
because electricity was never installed within the facility (MFFG1; MFFG3; MKI6). 
However, according to Raemaekers (2009), the holding facility never took effect due to 
uncertainties about the sustainability of the facility, as previous research showed that the 
number of permits and bag limits allocated to the Mankosi and surrounding fishing 
communities would not make the facility economically sustainable. In 2003, an oyster project 
(which involved primarily women) began. A commercial buyer started buying oysters (and 
sometimes lobster) from local women at market prices in 2004, and the shellfish holding 
facility was used at the trading point between the women and the buyer
14
. The oyster project 
later came to an end when the buyer stopped buying (MFFG1; MFFG3; MKI6).  
 
Despite the lack of success of the aquaculture project at the time, and the fact that the 
Fisheries Co-op was dissolved by DEAT because they had not carried out the work they were 
supposed to do due to reported conflicts that occurred among the members, Mankosi fishers 
stated that there had been several lobster commercial buyers licensed by MCM since 2005 
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 This buyer was a company called Mbasa Sea Farms (Pty) Ltd. The company traded with communities in 















that were buying from Mankosi fishers at market prices (MFFG1; MFFG3). Community 
fishers, with the help of the TA and MCM, had been given the liberty to choose the buyer that 
they wanted and MCM gave permission to several commercial fisheries companies to 
convince communities to supply lobster exclusively to them (Raemaekers, 2009). As a result, 
by 2008, the Mankosi community lobster fishers, together with 12 other communities along 
the Transkei coast, signed a contract with Live Fish Tanks (Pty) Ltd., as the communities‟ 
chosen exclusive lobster buyer (Raemaekers, 2009). In 2010, the restructured national 
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA, formerly DEAT
15
) finally managed to launch the 
aquaculture facility and installed it with electricity. The DAFF Branch Fisheries department 
(formerly MCM) licensed Live Fish Tanks (Pty) Ltd, as the chosen lobster buyer by the 
Mankosi community for 2010, to run the facility and purchase live and dead lobster, as well 
as oysters, from the community and others licensed with the company. In addition to the 
aquaculture project, DEAT, in conjunction with a local Coastal Working Committee along the 
Transkei coast, implemented a coastal conservation project called Coast Care in 2008, 
employing local people in the cleaning and maintenance of the coast. These institutions hired 
subcontracting companies to implement the Coast Care project and hire local people. 
 
The history and background of the Mankosi community and their use of marine resources 
provided in this section has provided an understanding of the context of resource use in this 
community, and a foundation for the next section which looks at the benefits and losses from 
the fisheries sector in Mankosi in more detail and, the role played by the tourism sector.  
6.3 Socio-economic status of Mankosi  
The Mankosi community exists within the Wild Coast region and is situated within the 
Nyandeni Local Municipality, which is one of eight local municipalities within the O.R. 
Tambo District Municipality (Ashley and Ntshona, 2003). The O.R. Tambo District 
Municipality covers an area of 15, 946 km² and is located on the eastern coast of the Eastern 
Cape province, stretching from the Mbhashe river in the south to the Mthavuna river on the 
KwaZulu-Natal border (O.R. Tambo District Municipality, 2008). The District is the least 
socio-economically developed in the province, and includes 27% of the province‟s 
population, high unemployment levels (68% of economically active population) and the 
highest poverty levels (72% of the population live in poverty), in the Eastern Cape (Eastern 
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Cape Department of Social Development, 2009; O.R. Tambo Municipality IDP Review, 
2010/11). In 2007, the poverty gap (i.e. the amount of income that would be required to bring 
every poor person exactly above the poverty line) within the O.R. Tambo District was R2, 6 
billion. The majority of this District is rural and there are low education and literacy levels, 
placing the people in this region in a marginalized societal position (O.R. Tambo District 
Municipality, 2008; Department of Social Development, 2009). This is consistent with the 
fact that the Eastern Cape as a whole is one of the poorest provinces in South Africa, 
containing approximately 27% of the country‟s ultra poor population (Department of Social 
Development, 2009).  
 
The Nyandeni Local Municipality is also considered a poverty stricken area and it is primarily 
rural, with 79% of households living in traditional settlements (Nyandeni Local Municipality, 
2010). The key priority of the Nyandeni Local Municipality is to promote poverty alleviation 
through Local Economic Development (LED), which is a strategy that involves attracting new 
investments in key local sectors, providing support to Small, Medium and Macro Enterprises 
(SMMEs), as well as promoting agriculture, farming and tourism development (Department 
of Social Development, 2009; Nyandeni Local Municipality 2009/2010 IDP Review). The 
population of this municipality is estimated at 314, 273 people, and the total household 
numbers in Nyandeni at 56, 851 people (Nyandeni Local Municipality, 2010).  
 
The Mankosi community occurs south of the Nyandeni Local Municipality, in Municipal 
Ward 26 (Figure 6.2). The Mdumbi and Umtata Rivers act as geographical boundaries 
between Mankosi and its neighboring communities. The homesteads in Mankosi are located 
immediately along the coast. The Mdumbi backpackers lodge, several holiday cottages, as 
well as the Anchorage Hotel are the key tourism facilities within the area. Other major land 
uses in Mankosi include TA land (under the administration of the headman on behalf of all 
the households in the TA area), coastal land governed by the provincial environmental affairs 






































 Figure 6.2: Map showing the location of the Mankosi community within the Nyandeni Local Municipality. 
   
 
The Mankosi community, otherwise known as Tshani-Mankosi, is one of various 
communities under the administrative authority of the Khonjwayo TA. Mankosi consists of 
about 800 households in12 villages, each headed by a Nduna (i.e. sub-headman) on behalf of 
the headman present in Mankosi (referred to in this context as the Nkosi, representing Chief 





















 Table 6.1: Profile of the Mankosi community according to household survey data 
 
Location Nyandeni Local Municipality 
Municipal ward 26 
Number of villages in the 
Mankosi TA 
12 
Number of homesteads ±800 
Household survey sample size 80 homesteads 
Gender breakdown (%)  75% females 
25% males 
% female headed households  42% 
Average no. of people per 
household 
8, 6 
Main material for dwelling 
construction 
Walls – Mud brick/clay (91% of 
households) 
Roof – Thatch (90% of households) 
Main household energy source Firewood (i.e. for 91% of households) 




Fisheries, tourism and conservation are the key coastal sectors that involve (to different 
extents) the people in the Mankosi community. Table 6.2 provides a breakdown of these 























Table 6.2: Actors, resources and their role in the use/management of coastal resources in Mankosi 
 Actors Resource 
use/management 
Roles of actors 
Fisheries sector National level: Branch 





management of access 
to and sustainable use 
of marine resources 
Local level: Fishing 
committee and community 
monitors 
Lobster, line fish, 
oyster, mussels 
and octopus 
Monitor local use of 
fisheries resources and 
assist with verification 
of permit holders 
 
Small-scale fishers 
Lobster, line fish, 
oyster, mussels 
and octopus 
Users of fisheries 
resources for sale or 
subsistence 
 





Buys crayfish from 




Tourism sector Nyandeni Local Tourism 
Board 
 
The coastal zone Management of 
tourism activities 
Mdumbi backpackers – 
TransCape NPO 
 









The coastal zone Potential market for 
local fishers through 
tourism 




The coastal zone 
Responsible for the 
maintenance and 
conservation of the 
coast and resources 
occurring along the 
coast 
Coastal Working Committee 



























  Figure 6.3: Occupation of respondents in Mankosi based on household survey results (n=80) 
 
 
  Figure 6.4: Education levels in Mankosi based on household survey data (n=80) 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Key activities contributing to household monthly income in Mankosi based on household 















In addition to the high unemployment rate in Mankosi, formal education levels were also low. 
Twenty eight percent of the surveyed population had no formal education, while only 3% had 
completed high school education (see Figure 6.4). Poor school infrastructure, overcrowding in 
schools, as well as the lack of accessibility to schools were the key education challenges faced 
not only by Mankosi, but also by the wider Nyandeni Municipality area, leading to low 
literacy levels (Nyandeni Local Municipality 2009/2010 IDP Review).  
 
Living standards in Mankosi are poor, as revealed by the household survey results of this 
study. These results revealed that 90% of the community live in traditional dwellings made 
from mud brick, clay or sand, and roofs primarily made of thatch sourced from the grassland 
area found within the community boundaries. Basic service delivery within Mankosi is very 
poor, with erratic electricity supply, no tarred roads and a lack of sanitation facilities.  
 
The Nyandeni Municipality statistics reveal that 36% of the population in the region has no 
access to regular monthly income, while 77% of households in the region have either no 
monthly income or income less than R800 per month (Nyandeni Local Municipality 
2009/2010 IDP Review). The same trend applies for the Mankosi community, with 65% of 
the respondents in the surveyed households unemployed (see Figure 6.3). 
 
Thirty four percent of households earned a monthly income less than R1,000, while most of 
the households earned between R1,001-R1,700 per month. These incomes were particularly 
low when one considers that the average household size in Mankosi was high, i.e. 8, 6 people 
per household. Figure 6.5 presents the key activities that contributed to monthly household 
incomes in Mankosi. The results indicate that, as within the wider Nyandeni region, 
government pension and child support grants were the highest contributors to monthly 
household incomes in Mankosi. Pensions contributed to 19% of monthly household incomes, 
while child support grants contributed 62% of monthly household incomes. The sale of 
fisheries resources (either to tourists, commercial lobster buyers or local people) contributed 
to the monthly incomes of 12% of Mankosi households, and the tourism sector (particularly 
by the Mdumbi backpackers) contributed 6% of household monthly incomes. These statistics 
confirm that the majority of Mankosi households did not partake in the formal economic 
sectors for income, possibly because the geographical location of Mankosi in relation to the 
areas with economic activities (i.e. Umtata, which is the nearest town but is approximately 















there to seek employment or other opportunities. Because the former Transkei is the least 
developed region in the Province, there are fewer businesses and limited local job 
opportunities, and therefore a lack of diversified income sources (Ashley and Ntshona, 2003). 
Results of this study confirm that government child support grants have become a significant 
income source for marginalized rural communities such as Mankosi, similar to results from 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi.  
6.4 The fisheries sector in Mankosi 
6.4.1Fisheries actors and resources in Mankosi fisheries 
People in Mankosi claim to have a long history of harvesting fisheries resources including: 
crayfish, line fish, oyster, mussels and octopus. Table 6.3 provides a profile of fishers in 
Mankosi based on the results of this study. Fisheries resources that were used in Mankosi 
were distributed along the Mdumbi beach and the rocky shore adjacent to the community, and 
there were different sites where the people in the community harvested different fisheries 
resources. Figure 6.6, drawn from mapping exercises conducted with different fisher groups 
in Mankosi, depicts the different parts of the Mankosi coast where the fishers indicated that 



















 Figure 6.6: Different parts of the coastal zone where the Mankosi community harvests  
  different fisheries resources.  
 
About 74% of female fishers in Mankosi were unemployed and relied on child grants as 















were household heads. The level of education of Mankosi fishers was also low. Most 
respondents had either an incomplete primary or incomplete high school education. 
Approximately 84% households who were involved in fishing earned monthly incomes less 
than R2,000.  
 
Table 6.3: The socio-economic profile of male and female fishers at Mankosi based on household 
survey results (n=51) 
 
Fishers Males Females 
Gender  12  39 
Age (standard deviation) 37.7 ± 18.7 39.4 ± 15.5 
Occupation  Employed 1 (8%) 3 (8%) 
Self-employed 4 (33%) 0 
Unemployed 6 (50%) 29 (74%) 
Pensioner 1 (8%) 5 (13%) 
Monthly household 
income 
<R1000 4 (33%) 15 (39%) 
R1001-R1700 5 (42%) 19 (49%) 
R1701-R3000 3 (25%) 5 (13%) 
R3001-R7000 0 0  
R7500+ 0 0 
Education level No formal education 1 (8%) 10 (26%) 
Incomplete primary 
school education 
4 (33%) 13 (33%) 
Incomplete high school 
education 
5 (42%) 11 (28%) 
Complete high school 
education 




Household heads 8 (67%) 13 (33%) 
 
Sixty four percent of households in Mankosi harvested fisheries resources, and most of them 
had used the resources for more than twenty years.  Forty five percent of the households who 
indicated that they harvest fisheries resources stated that they used the resources for food, 
while 59% of the households indicated that they sell the fisheries resources they harvest, 
either to the backpackers, the lobster buyer or to tourists. However, 22% of fishers indicated 















fishery has increased over the years. The results also revealed that that not all the surveyed 
fishers in Mankosi who harvested the resources possessed fishing permits. Table 6.4 
illustrates the fisheries resources harvested at Mankosi and proportions of fishers who had 
legal permits. Of the 29% of resource users who indicated that they harvest crayfish, only 
33% had permits. A similar pattern applied for all the other resources harvested.  
 
Table 6.4: Fisheries resource users and those with permits to harvest the specific resources 
(n=51) 
 
Fisheries resource % of fishers who harvest the resource  
crayfish  29% (33% of these possess permits) 
line  57% (31% of these posses permits) 
mussel  61% (13% of these possess permits) 
oyster  45% (26% of these posses permits) 
octopus  10% (none of these possessed permits) 
  
6.4.2 Role of tourism in Mankosi fisheries 
Tourism and the involvement of a locally based NGO in Mankosi have been responsible for 
enhancing benefits to local fishers and their livelihoods. Although the history of tourism in the 
former Transkei region dates far back before the 1950s, tourism in the region is still under-
developed, constituting only 14% of all tourism in the country (Ashley and Ntshona, 2003). 
Along the former Transkei coast, tourism facilities include hotels, cottages and backpacker 
lodges (see Mankosi in Figure 6.2), and tourists are attracted to the area by its natural beauty, 
scenery, marine resources and its climate.  
 
In Mankosi, the Mdumbi backpackers provides employment to local people and has been 
instrumental in promoting community benefits through tourism. The Mdumbi backpackers 
has played a role in enhancing benefits to Mankosi fishers through the market created by 
tourists that visit the area and stay in the backpackers. This is confirmed by the fact that 59% 
of Mankosi fishers who indicated that they sold their lobster catch stated that they sold their 
catch to tourists, the lobster buyers, and the Mdumbi backpackers, hence the backpackers is 
the immediate market for local fishers within the community (Raemaekers, 2009). Other 
holiday accommodation facilities in Mankosi, i.e. Anchorage Hotel and holiday cottages, 
employ some local people but do not engage in community development initiatives. 
TransCape has used profits from tourism and funds from international donors to support 















centre and pioneering an HIV/AIDS prevention project (TransCape, 2008). Mdumbi 
backpackers buys fisheries resources from local fishers and supports the Mankosi community 
by paying R500 per month to the community from its income from tourism (Mdumbi 
backpackers, 2011). In addition to this, Mdumbi backpackers has boosted local tourism by 
establishing village based accommodation for tourists on the hiking trail from Port St. Johns 
to Coffee Bay and assisting local entrepreneurs in developing small local businesses (MKI 4). 
Therefore, through boosting local tourism and providing livelihood support to people in 
Mankosi, Mdumbi backpackers and TransCape have played an important role in enhancing 
benefits to local people and to local fishers. Officials from the Eastern Cape Tourism Board 
and O.R. Tambo Municipality acknowledged this:  
 
A positive example of benefit-sharing in Eastern Cape tourism is what 
Mdumbi backpackers is doing for the people in Mankosi - sharing the 
benefits from tourism with the local people through employing them 
and doing all sorts of things for the community (ECKI2).  
 
A positive example of benefit-sharing in the District is that of Mdumbi 
backpackers in Tshani where local people get employment from 
tourism and the backpackers assists local fishermen with a market, 
helping the local people to benefit (ORKI). 
 
6.4.3 Role of TA and Community Trust in Mankosi 
There are three institutional structures in Mankosi that are responsible for administering all 
activities taking place at the community level: TA, the Ward Councilor and the Mankosi 
Community Trust. The Mankosi headman is the custodian of communal land in Mankosi and 
together with the 12 sub-headmen representing the TA in each of the villages, is responsible 
for administering communal affairs in Mankosi (MKI 1; MKI 3). The headman is accountable 
to the Chief of the Khonjwayo TA, which includes Mankosi and other communities in Ward 
26. The headman works in parallel to the local government representative, the Councilor, as 
well as the Mankosi Community Trust. The Mankosi Community Trust was established in 
2002 in connection with the establishment of the aquaculture project, and comprises elected 
community members. The role of the Trust has since been to administer all development 















Mankosi Community Trust is accountable to the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) 
and the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). 
 Although the Mankosi TA, the Mankosi Community Trust and the Councilor work in parallel 
to each other, they were not directly involved in activities related to the fisheries sector in 
Mankosi. However, the TA‟s and the Community Trust‟s roles in the distribution of benefits 
from tourism appeared to be conflicting. The TA was under the impression that as the 
custodian of the communal land, benefits from tourism (such as the community levy paid by 
local tourism facilities to the communities) should be administered by them (MKI 1). On the 
contrary, the DRDLR representative asserted that benefits aimed at developing the 
community were to be administered by the Community Trust and not the TA (ECKI3), since 
the Trust was established for this purpose. It appeared that the Mankosi TA felt that the 
establishment of the Trust reduced its powers, as they remarked that they were not adequately 
consulted by the Trust in issues pertaining to community development (MKI 1). As a result, 
the TA and the Community Trust in Mankosi do not have a good working relationship, as 
their roles in the community are not clearly defined, and the two structures do not consult 
adequately with each other in their activities, which creates confusion and conflict (MKI 1; 
MKI 3).  
For instance, the chairperson of the Mankosi Community Trust asserted the following as an 
example of conflicting roles between the Trust and the TA in Mankosi, 
 
…sometimes they (the TA) do not do things accordingly because 
 there were once random developers who came to them and asked for 
permission to build a lodge at the Mdumbi beach and the headman 
said yes without even consulting with me or anyone. 
 
When the headman of Mankosi was asked about the relationship between the TA and the 
Mankosi Community Trust, he remarked, 
 
They (the Mankosi Community Trust) overlook me and never 
report to me – they do their own thing! 
 
It is thus apparent that conflicts exist between the TA and the Trust in Mankosi. In addition to 
this, the TA, the Trust chairperson and the Councilor all asserted that they do not work well 
together, largely due to perceptions of political patronage. The association of the TA, the 















turbulent, and as a result affected the manner in which they worked as well as their 
perceptions of each other. For instance, the chairperson of the Mankosi Community Trust 
pointed out that the reason why the relationship between himself, the Councilor and the TA is 
characterized by conflict is because they are associated with different political parties (i.e. 
ANC and COPE
16
) which are competing for a dominant following at the local level. The 
dynamics that exist between these local institutional structures are important to take account 
of when seeking to understand the manner in which benefits are distributed. 
 
6.4.4 Perceptions of benefits and losses from the fisheries sector in Mankosi 
Apart from the different interventions and mechanisms that have played a role in enhancing 
benefit-sharing in the Mankosi fisheries sector (discussed later in this section), marine 
resources have been important assets to the livelihoods of the people of Mankosi, historically 
providing people with various benefits. Benefits perceived by fisheries resource users and 
others in Mankosi have included the following:  
a) Food obtained from harvesting the resources, enabling the fishers to provide a food 
source for themselves and their families (MFF1; MFFG2; MFF3); 
b) An increase in tourists attracted by the Mdumbi coast and the Mankosi fishery, 
providing a source of money for local fishers when they sell fisheries resources to 
tourists and tourism facilities within the community (MFF1; MFFG2; MFF3); and 
c) Traditional healers utilize marine resources for traditional medicines, and therefore 
obtain economic benefits to support their families (MTHFG 1). 
No direct negative impacts from the fisheries or tourism sector were raised by either the 
fishers or the wider community in Mankosi. This implies that the economic benefits secured 
by fishers in Mankosi have mostly had a positive impact on their livelihoods. As discussed, 
there have been state and private sector interventions related to the fisheries sector in Mankosi 
that have been introduced to the community over the past decade. These have included the 
issuing of small-scale fishing permits to local fishers and the introduction of lobster buyers, 
which have impacted on the ability of local fishers to benefit from the resources. These 
interventions have acted as mechanisms that sought to enhance benefits from the fisheries 
sector in Mankosi and are explained in detail in the following sub-section. 
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 COPE is an acronym for „Congress of the People‟ – a new South African political party formed by breakaway 















6.4.5 Mechanisms and tools for enhancing benefit-sharing in the Mankosi fisheries sector 
Benefits to Mankosi fishers were not only channeled through the fisheries sector, but also 
through the tourism sector, involving the state (MCM), private sector (lobster buyer – Live 
Fish Tanks (Pty) Ltd. and an NGO (TransCape-Mdumbi backpackers) (see Table 6.5). 
However, there is no co-management of fisheries resources in Mankosi, and no defined 
benefit-sharing mechanism or institutional arrangement put in place by fisheries managers. 
The aquaculture project and the introduction of lobster buyers have also acted as mechanisms 
to enhance benefits to local fishers. 
 
Table 6.5: Table showing state and private sector driven mechanisms for enhancing benefit-sharing in 
the fisheries sector through fisheries and tourism activities  




Fisheries Mankosi fishing 
committee 
Live Fish Tanks (Pty) Ltd. 














The national fisheries department, Branch Fisheries (formerly MCM), is directly responsible 
for managing small-scale fisheries in Mankosi and in the former Transkei coast, and there is 
no decentralization of management powers to the provincial or local levels, as is the case in 


















DAFF – Branch Fisheries 
(formerly MCM)
Community line 








 Figure 6.7: Institutional structure involved in Mankosi fisheries     
 
The South African government recognized the need to include subsistence fishers in the 
formal fishing sector and after promulgation of the MLRA in 1998, the designated fisheries 
authority at the time, MCM, assigned a Subsistence Fisheries Task Group (SFTG) to produce 
guidelines to assist in the management of subsistence fisheries. Consequently, co-
management came highly recommended by the SFTG as a mechanism that would enable the 
re-incorporation of subsistence fishers into the formal sector (Branch et al., 2002; Sowman, 
2006). In the Eastern Cape Province, a Subsistence Fisheries Management Unit (SFMU) was 
established by MCM which appointed environmental officers to assist the extension officers 
with distributing permits to identified fishers in the fishing communities, including Mankosi 
(Raemaekers, 2009). Marine and Coastal Management also appointed community monitors in 
Mankosi to monitor the activities of local fishers and report to MCM. These monitors were 
also used by MCM to help distribute fishing permits every year to local fishers. A fishing 
committee in Mankosi (comprising community fishers working with fishers in the 
community) was set up by MCM when extension officers were appointed to work in small-
scale fisheries in the Transkei (Raemaekers, 2009). However, since co-management never 
materialized in the fisheries sector in this region, the role of the committee was unclear as 















Commercial lobster buyers also operate at the local level in Mankosi, as some of them, such 
as the Phumalali Seafood Company which was the licensed lobster buyer for Mankosi in 
2009, have a local base. The commercial lobster buying companies are industrial fishing 
companies that obtain rights from the national fisheries department to buy lobster exclusively 
from small-scale fishers (Raemaekers, 2009). The community fishers, together with the 
fishing committee, meet every year to vote in the buyer that they want to sell lobster to, based 
on the negotiations with the buyers that lobby to sell to the community. In 2010, Phumalali 
Seafood was voted out by community fishers and they Live Fish Tanks (Pty) Ltd. was voted 
in to be the new buyer. Commercial fishing companies are not the only market for fishers in 
Mankosi, as the Mdumbi backpackers also serves a market for local fishers, enhancing 
benefits from harvesting the resources.  
6.4.6 Perceptions of benefits, losses and negative impacts arising from benefit-sharing 
mechanisms in Mankosi fisheries 
Table 6.6 presents the benefits that Mankosi fishers perceived to obtain as a result of 
interventions that have been made in the fisheries sector in Mankosi.  The smiley faces
17
 next 
to each benefit represent the ranking that the community gave to each benefit, depending on 
how much it impacted their lives (see Methodology in Chapter Two). 
 
Table 6.6: Benefits perceived by Mankosi fishers and the ranking of the benefits 
 
BENEFITS BENEFIT RANKING 
 
Legal rights of access – small-scale fishing permits issued by 







From selling to lobster or 
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 The significance of benefits is ranked in ascending order from one to three, and three smiley faces represent 
the highest impact. Fishers were given a maximum ranking of three faces, however, where they were very happy 
about the benefits they obtained, they gave a ranking of more than three faces to express the positive impact of 















All three fisheries groups, i.e. the fishing committee, male fishers and female fishers, 
indicated that the money they received from selling fisheries resources, either from the 
commercial buyer or the backpackers, was a significant benefit to them. While the female 
fisheries group highlighted that they perceived legal access rights from permits to be an 
important benefit to them, the male fishers group perceived that food obtained from 
harvesting the resources was the most important benefit (MFFG2; MFFG3). A Nyandeni 
Local Municipality official confirmed that permits enabled the community to sell the 
resources to tourists, and that the community was also the major beneficiary of the 
aquaculture project in Mankosi because they are able to sell lobster at market prices.  
 
A former MCM monitor from the community asserted, 
 
MCM policies have made great efforts to maximise benefits for local fishers 
who sell to cottage owners in this area because cottage owners usually rob 
local people and buy at a very low price. But now MCM has increased the 
price at which they buy and MCM also helps organise buyers for our local 
fishermen through the aquaculture project... Aquaculture is important for 
local people because now the money they will make from selling lobster will 
be much more than they make when they sell in the cottages and to tourists 
because they will now get R55 per 1kg of crayfish... (MKI 6). 
 
There were, however, various factors that impeded the community‟s ability to obtain optimum 
benefits from harvesting resources, and these are discussed below. 
 
6.4.7 Factors influencing benefit-sharing in Mankosi fisheries – losses and negative 
impacts 
The results of this study indicate that national government controls the use and access of 
fisheries resources, as well as how benefits from resources are distributed in Mankosi. Thirty 
seven percent of fishers in Mankosi perceived the national fisheries authority (MCM) to be 
the most powerful decision-making stakeholder, determining the extent to which they could 
benefit from fisheries resources and the manner in which they could benefit. Figure 6.8 
illustrates network diagrams conducted with fishers in Mankosi, depicting their perceptions of 
the role of national government in controlling access, benefits and ownership of fisheries 














































Figure 6.8: Network webs between fisheries stakeholders in Mankosi and the perceived decision-
making power held by each stakeholder, as perceived by the female and male fishers in Mankosi.  
 
Although fishers in Mankosi noted that they benefited from the recognition of their access 
rights to the fishery by MCM through the provision of permits, government fishing rules in 
the permits were largely perceived to hinder the ability of community fishers to benefit from 
the fishery. Although permits were meant to be a tool for redistributing fishing rights to 
fishers in Mankosi and other previously excluded small-scale fishing communities, 22% of 
Mankosi fishers in the surveys perceived that the permit regulations were not fair because 
they imposed restrictions on their livelihoods. Table 6.7 presents some of the losses by 
Mankosi fishers from the fisheries sector, perceived to be posed primarily by permit 
regulations. 
 
Table 6.7: Losses perceived by Mankosi fishers and the ranking of the losses 
Losses/negative impacts Losses ranking 
 




















In all three fisheries focus groups, there was consensus that permit regulations imposed 
negative impacts on fishers‟ livelihoods. Permits were perceived to infringe on fishers 
historical ability to harvest as many resources as they wanted. The male fishers and the 
fishing committee also pointed out that because of permit regulations, they lost freedom to 
access the resources due to enhanced resource monitoring. A further negative impact incurred 
by Mankosi fishers due to permit regulations was that from 2001 onwards, MCM required 
local tourism accommodation facilities, i.e. Mdumbi backpackers and Anchorage Hotel, to 
obtain licenses in order to possess more than eight lobsters per day (Raemaekers, 2009). 
Raemaekers (2009) reveals that backpacker lodges and hotels along the former Transkei coast 
never received those licenses, and consequently, purchasing lobster from local fishers became 
illegal for these tourist facilities. Although other tourist facilities continued to buy from local 
fishers anyway, this rule by MCM imposed negative impacts on the livelihoods of fishers in 
Mankosi, particularly because it weakened their local market for lobster (Raemaekers, 2009). 
The Manager of one of the tourist facilities in Mankosi confirmed this,  
 
The major loss to the community is that we can no longer benefit them by 
buying fisheries resources because the law prohibits us to do so and this is 
sad for the community because there is nothing we can do... MCM‟s law 
that prohibits us from buying fish from the locals is a blockage to benefit-
sharing because it doesn‟t make sense why we have to buy fisheries 
resources from outside when we can source them locally and benefit local 
people. It‟s been years now that they don‟t want to give us a buyer‟s 
permit and this is troubling because it causes local people to lose out on a 
market we could potentially give them (MKI 4). 
 
The Mankosi community and other communities along the Wild Coast also lost out because 
MCM reportedly took too long to issue permits to local fishers, and the whole process of 
annual permit issuing to these communities was deemed inefficient (Raemaekers, 2009; 
CBMP 1). This was problematic because once the lobster season opened fishers would get 
arrested by MCM officials if they were found fishing without permits, even though it was not 
their fault. A member of the Coffee Bay
18
 mussel project pointed out that MCM was 
inefficient in issuing permits in most places along the former Transkei coast, and sometimes 
would only issue the permits when the season was about to close: 
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 Coffee Bay is also a fishing community south of Mankosi. An in-depth study of Coffee Bay fisheries was not 
undertaken for this study, however, several key informant interviews were conducted with key stakeholders in 















One of the problems is that MCM comes here and prosecutes people for 
not having permits – MCM compliance confiscates people‟s catch and eats 
it and this is a problem for fishers because MCM is the one who takes too 
long to issue permits… I don‟t think MCM policies and laws facilitate any 
access, instead they inhibit it...There is some sort of political will to 
subject people to state welfare and this is a huge issue (CBMP). 
 
 These problems could explain why only 47% of all Mankosi fishers in the surveys indicated 
that they possessed permits. Raemaekers (2009) confirmed that 76% of the time, lobster 
fishers in Mankosi presented their catch for sale at the backpackers without possessing 
permits (Raemaekers, 2009). The reason for this was because most bona fide traditional 
fishers in Mankosi, Coffee Bay, and other fishing communities in the former Transkei were 
never issued with permits by MCM because of institutional discrepancies posed by the under-
capacitated, inefficient, bureaucratic, top-down institutional arrangement put in place by 
MCM to distribute the permits.  
 
In addition to these negative impacts, competition and politics between and among lobster 
buyers and community fishers have caused conflicts between competing buyers, and between 
the buyers and community fishers, and have also caused Mankosi fishers to incur negative 
impacts. One of the issues raised by community fishers is that once buyers are voted in, they 
sometimes take too long to pay local fishers or to collect catch from the community. 
Community fishers remarked that they lose out because of these (MFFG1; MFFG3).  One of 
the key informants reinforced this sentiment: 
 
Live Fish Tanks bribes local community members for exclusive contracts 
with the local divers, but ever since they signed with the local people, 
they have not come here even once to collect. I don‟t understand why 
they look for exclusive rights to buy from here when they don‟t utilize 
them– this needs to be investigated (CBMP). 
 
A former lobster buyer in Mankosi pointed out that there are politics that exist between 
buyers, and some buyers take advantage of fishers in the community to meet their own ends. 
He asserted, 
 
Lusitania won the contract to buy crayfish from the community this year. 
The only way Lusitania can beat me is by bribery…when I came through on 
the day that the Mankosi fishermen were voting for this buyer earlier this 
year, none of my fishermen were there because Life fish tanks paid my 















against me. Lusitania bribed the head of the fishing committee even in 
another area along this coast and they gave him R600. I don‟t mind losing to 
them in a fair way but not by them stealing my fishermen and coming to 
community meetings with beer. MCM was also involved in this… (CLB). 
 
It appears that fishers in Mankosi are unaware that they have become subject to such politics 
and competition between commercial buyers who are looking out for their own interests, and 
national government has not protected fishers in communities such as Mankosi. These 
findings reveal that the perception of unfair fishing regulations, as well as institutional 
inefficiencies, have impacted negatively on opportunities for  benefits for local fishers.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The findings of this study show that coastal resources bring social and economic benefits to 
the people in Mankosi, through the involvement of local people in fisheries and tourism 
activities. The money that local fishers obtained from selling to the backpackers, the lobster 
buyer and tourists was regarded as the most important benefit by fisher groups in Mankosi. 
However, restrictions imposed by fisheries regulations were perceived to have had negative 
impacts on the livelihoods of fishers. In addition, the lack of willingness of government to put 
in place an institutional arrangement to involve local fishers in decision-making processes has 
negatively impacted on fishers‟ rights to access the resources, causing them to lose out on 
enhanced benefits from their markets. Competition between lobster buyers had negative 
impacts on local fishers, as some buyers appeared to take advantage of the community. The 
results confirm that a lack of robust mechanisms and institutional arrangements for enhancing 























CHAPTER SEVEN – DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the influence of institutional arrangements on access to and benefit-
sharing from coastal resource use in Sokhulu, Mbonambi and Mankosi by examining factors 
underpinning benefit-sharing processes, as well as looking at why certain people or 
institutions benefit from resources at the expense of others and why benefits from resources 
and resource use are distributed as they are.  
 
There are four key themes relating to institutions drawn from the results of this study that are 
discussed in this chapter. The first theme emerged from the fisheries sector results, and a 
comparison between KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape relates to the role of 
decentralization (or lack thereof) of decision-making power to local level institutions. The 
second theme analyzes the mining sector in Sokhulu and Mbonambi in order to highlight the 
significance of accountability of local institutional arrangements in benefit distribution. The 
implications of multiple institutions for equitable benefit-sharing are discussed as the third 
cross-cutting theme across all sectors in the three case study communities. These first three 
themes discuss elements that impact on the robustness institutional arrangements in benefit-
sharing processes.  
 
The fourth theme is about the role of state and non-state benefit-sharing institutions in rural 
coastal communities. This theme explores the pressure placed on benefit-sharing institutions 
in the respective sectors (i.e. RBM, TransCape and EKZN Wildlife) by local communities to 
play a developmental role at the local level, in the face of poor basic service delivery by 
government. Although the fourth theme does not directly relate to access and benefit-sharing 
of coastal resources, it is discussed here because it outlines broader institutional factors that 
have an indirect impact on the ability of people in rural coastal communities to benefit from 
coastal resources.  
 
Although Ribot and Peluso‟s (2003) theory of access was pivotal in providing a theoretical 
framework for this study that was used to frame what is meant by „access‟ and „benefits‟, and 
how institutions influence these, the key themes that emerged out of this study are not fully 















key emerging themes discussed in this chapter were thus informed more by the findings of 
this study and broader related literature, rather than the theory of access alone.  
7.2 Decentralization or deconcentration of power  
Decentralization of decision-making power to the local level is one way to promote local 
participation in decision-making to enhance benefits to local people from resource use 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). The findings of this study reveal that the management of small-
scale fisheries in South Africa is characterized by two different forms of decentralization. 
These are democratic decentralization in KwaZulu-Natal and deconcentration or 
administrative decentralization in the Eastern Cape. Agrawal and Ribot (1999:475) define 
decentralization as “any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors 
and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy”. Where 
there is decentralization of decision-making power in benefit distribution, accountability and 
equity are important factors determining how benefits are distributed (Ribot, 2003). 
Democratic decentralization occurs where powers are devolved from the state to local actors 
or locally operating institutions that are downwardly accountable to local people, while 
deconcentration occurs where powers are transferred to upwardly accountable appointees of 
the state or committees (Manor, 1997; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Larson and Ribot, 2004). 
These characteristics, enshrined in the small-scale fisheries management regimes in KwaZulu-
Natal and Eastern Cape, have shaped the way in which fishers have been impacted by the 
small-scale fisheries sector in both provinces.  
 
Decentralization and co-management go hand in hand, as they have similar goals and 
attributes, which include the strengthening of local people‟s participation in decision-making 
processes and enhancing the equitable distribution of power in resource management 
(Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). The co-management arrangements in Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
which represent government authorities and fishers, and powers are devolved to the local co-
management committees who represent local fishers in decision-making processes about the 
use and management of marine resources. The results of this study have revealed that 
decentralization of decision-making power in fisheries management can, in certain aspects, 
result in efficient fisheries management, while the lack of devolution of power to a local 
institutional arrangement results in inefficiencies in the fisheries management system, which 
is the case in Mankosi fisheries. Proponents of decentralization in the development literature 















efficiency, greater local participation, and resource sustainability (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 
Larson and Ribot, 2004). The results of this study have shown that effective co-management 
of small-scale fisheries in KwaZulu-Natal has enhanced opportunities for fishers to benefit 
from the resources through local representation in decision-making processes, and has also 
enhanced resource sustainability and capacity. This has been through the efforts of EKZN 
Wildlife (Harris et al, 2003; SFFG1; SFFG2; MFFG1).  
 
Decentralization in the management of resources can also promote greater equity because it 
gives marginalized communities the ability to have greater influence on rules through open 
decision-making processes, and facilitates a sense of ownership of decisions by bringing 
decision-making processes closer to the community level (Larson and Ribot, 2004). Line fish 
and mussel committees in Sokhulu and Mbonambi remarked that involvement in decision-
making processes through co-management has been important to them because they have 
learnt a lot about how to use the resources more sustainably. In contrast to the past when 
conflict was experienced, co-management has reinforced a positive relationship between local 
fishers and the conservation authorities (SFFG1; SFFG2; MFFG1). The findings of this study 
showed that fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi expressed unhappiness about the fact that 
fishing regulations restricted the amount of resources that they could harvest. This has had 
negative implications on fishers‟ abilities to sustain their livelihoods. Although presence of 
EKZN Wildlife at the local level has meant increased fisheries law enforcement and close 
monitoring of resource stocks and use patterns, some fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi 
indicated that they were happy about obtaining fishing permits and about the access they have 
to the resources (EKZN Wildlife, 2010b).   
 
In contrast, small-scale fisheries in Mankosi are managed by national government, without 
any proper co-management structure to include small-scale fishers in decision-making 
processes. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) assert that decentralizing powers to the local level 
should involve the establishment of a platform in which local communities can exercise some 
degree of autonomy in decision-making processes. This was not the case in the management 
of small-scale fisheries in Mankosi and the rest of the former Transkei coast. Although there 
have been efforts to implement co-management in the Eastern Cape, there have been 
insufficient human resources and capacity to implement it within the province (Sowman, 
2006; Raemaekers, 2009). As an example, MCM appointed understaffed and under 















with exemption permits, as a way of allocating administrative roles to the local level. This is 
defined as deconcentration of power to the local level, as these officials are upwardly 
accountable to the state and hold no real decision-making powers. As a result of this, there is 
poor decentralization of small-scale fisheries management in the Eastern Cape.  
 
Although MCM established a fishing committee in Mankosi, this committee does not have 
any decision-making powers to manage resources. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) assert that for 
decentralization to be effictive, powers that are devolved to the local level should include 
those to make decisions about the use of a certain resource; to mediate conflicts; to implement 
and ensure compliance and to create rules. The transfer of such powers to the local level is 
evident in co-management in KwaZulu-Natal. Here, committees are representative of all 
community fishers and have powers to decide on resource quotas of qualifying resource users 
(but not to decide on amounts allocated), to ensure resource users comply with resource use 
rules through community monitors, to decide on the harvesting system and harvesting zones, 
and to educate community fishers about sustainable resource use (Harris et al, 2003; EKZN 
Wildlife, 2010b).  
 
This is not the case in the Eastern Cape as MCM exercises top-down management of small-
scale fisheries resources and there is no platform to consult fishers in decision-making 
processes, hence the fishing committee in Mankosi and other fishing communities along the 
former Transkei coast do not possess any decision-making powers. Raemaekers‟ (2009) 
study, which focused on the abalone fishery in the Transkei, confirms that the locally elected 
committees that MCM established in the former Transkei were created to facilitate relations 
between the communities and commercial buyers, but lacked the additional skills, knowledge 
and capacity training that is possessed by the fisheries co-management committees in 
KwaZulu-Natal. Because MCM manages fisheries resources in Mankosi and the rest of the 
former Transkei coast from Cape Town offices, and by  appointing extension officers at the 
local level who perform administrative duties, with no proper local institutional arrangements, 
various management gaps have resulted that have disadvantaged fishers.  
 
For instance, MCM prohibits local fishers from selling their catch to tourists and tourist 
facilities, and they have hesitated to approve license applications of tourist facilities to buy 
catch from local fishers (Raemaekers, 2009). This is problematic because tourism provides a 















or is not aware of this local reality, local fishers lose out. This was confirmed by several 
fisheries and tourism stakeholders in Mankosi and the former Transkei coast as they stated 
that MCM prohibits them from buying fisheries resources from local fishers and delays 
issuing them with permits when they have applied (MKI 4; CBMP; LTKI). However, some of 
the owners of tourism facilities that were interviewed admitted that they continue to purchase 
fisheries resources from local fishers, even if they do not possess permits because “it is 
unreasonable to tell people from the community who are hungry not to sell because they need 
the money” (LTKI). 
 
There is also evidence that deconcentration has resulted in compromised resource 
sustainability and lost opportunities for enhanced benefits to local fishers. One of the fisheries 
key informants in the Transkei coast confirmed that the failure of MCM to devolve the 
management of small-scale fisheries to the local level by setting up an efficient local 
management structure has had implications for the sustainability of the resources, particularly 
lobster:  
 
MCM law is flawed and is making inaccurate harvest records 
because fishermen are no longer allowed to fish or sell during 
weekends or public holidays because the monitors and MCM 
compliance are not working on those days. This has left a huge 
question mark in our catch data because whatever is now fished or 
sold on weekends is no longer recorded, causing whatever stock 
surveys that are done now to be flawed… (CLB).  
 
 
Raemaekers (2009) also notes that due to the high demand for abalone harvesting, MCM‟s 
management structure of fisheries resources in the Eastern Cape is not sufficient to ensure the 
sustainable use of the resource.   
 
These findings also have resonance elsewhere in the world. For example, there is substantial 
evidence revealing the reluctance of governments in many African countries to transfer 
discretionary powers for natural resource management to the local level (Pomeroy and Berkes, 
1997; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2003; Poteete, 2004). A common observation is that 
governments tend to oppose local resource use and management, as they cling to conservation 
discourses which do not view local resource users as capable of managing resources (Ribot, 
2003; Poteete, 2004). As a result, governments centralize the management of natural resources 















institutions, as is seen for marine resources in the Eastern Cape. Ribot (2003) notes that this is 
a problem manifesting in many developing countries, with governments devolving insufficient 
powers to local structures managing natural resources, and failing to decentralize these 
powers. Some authors suggest that governments do not decentralize decision-making power 
for fear that their power would be threatened and resource sustainability would be 
compromised, especially in cases where local communities use resources not only for 
consumption, but also for economic benefits or profits (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Poteete, 
2004).   
 
There is evidence, however, that collaboration between the state and communities in 
managing natural resources facilitates the ability of local people to benefit (Johnson, 2001).  
Murphree (1991) confirms that resource management and decentralization mutually reinforce 
each other, as communities have the ability to be effective institutions for resource 
management. Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) provide examples of effective fisheries co-
management in Japan and Tanzania, which resulted from governments‟ dedication in both 
countries to decentralize fisheries management to the local level. Furthermore, the Communal 
Area Management Project for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe was 
instrumental in facilitating decentralization in the co-management of the Lake Kariba inshore 
fishery (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). In this case, fishing communities were empowered to 
benefit and to hold responsibilities for managing the resources and implementing decisions, as 
management control was relinquished from the state to the community level.  
 
In Bangladesh, however, where there is poor decentralization in fisheries management, bona 
fide fishers have incurred losses due to increased privatization of benefits by middlemen-
entrepreneurs who pose as bona fide fishers and purchase leases auctioned by government 
which are used to determine who can occupy fishing spots in the inland openwater fishery, 
(Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997). As a result, the middlemen sell leases to bona fide fishers, and 
end up benefiting more than them, while the bona fide fishers end up indebted to the 
middlemen. This shows that the lack of decentralization in fisheries management can result in 
losses to fishers due to gaps that result in management systems. This is consistent with 
Raemaekers (2009) findings which reveal that the failure of MCM to decentralize small-scale 
fisheries management in the former Transkei has resulted in the exclusion of many bona fide 
fishers who lose out on permits that are issued to people who pose as bona fide fishers, and 















government‟s failure to successfully recognize and provide access to traditional subsistence 
fishers amidst new entrant fishers with other sources of income in fishing communities has 
resulted in the exclusion of many poor fishers from accessing marine resources.   
 
A study undertaken by Schell (2011), comparing small-scale fisheries co-management in 
communities in the KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Western Cape provinces, also revealed 
that participation and involvement of local fishers in decision-making processes with EKZN 
Wildlife in KwaZulu-Natal resulted in effective co-management that led to the empowerment 
of fishers. This is contrary to top-down forms of small-scale fisheries management by MCM 
in the Eastern and Western Cape provinces, characterized by poor participation and 
consultation of resource users at the local level. For instance, due to a failure to decentralize 
power to the local level, MCM organizes permit allocation meetings in the former Transkei at 
short notice, and as a result, fishers who do not get notified in time about these meetings are 
not able to register and obtain permits (Raemaekers, 2009). Moreover, there is no platform for 
local fishers to have an input in setting the criteria for permit allocation in the former Transkei 
coast, as opposed to KwaZulu-Natal where local co-management committees are included by 
EKZN Wildlife in determining permit allocation criteria. Many non-fishers in the former 
Transkei coast who have other alternative income sources end up obtaining exemption 
permits instead of bona fide fishers with no alternative income sources, due to institutional 
gaps (Raemaekers, 2009). These examples indicate that sufficient decentralization is an 
important prerequisite of effective small-scale fisheries management. Hence, Berkes et al 
(2001) assert that devolution of fisheries management by the state and the allocation of 
decisions to local community level may be more effective than management efforts provided 
by fisheries managers that are distant, understaffed or under-funded by national government, 
which is evident in the Eastern and Western Cape.  
 
However, the KwaZulu-Natal case studies also revealed obstacles to co-management of 
small-scale fisheries resources. These were primarily attributed to the lack of understanding of 
the socio-economic aspects of fishers‟ livelihoods by fisheries authorities, which caused 
fishers to perceive negative impacts to livelihoods from restrictions imposed by fishing 
regulations. Moreover, the results of this study showed that the livelihood needs of fishers 
change over time, and as a result, resource sustainability from co-management is decreasingly 















economic and social benefits from resource use that can overcome their livelihood constraints.  
Hence, Berkes et al (2001) point out that,   
 
Co-management should be viewed not as a single strategy to 
solve all the problems of fisheries management, but rather as a 
process of resource management, maturing and adjusting to 
changing conditions over time, and involving aspects of 
democratization, social empowerment, power sharing, and 
decentralization (Berkes et al. 2001:203).  
 
Although this is the case and although co-management may not always be appropriate, it is a 
more effective approach than centralized management approaches. Hence, a conclusion can 
thus be drawn that decentralization of power in small-scale fisheries management, as seen in 
fisheries co-management by EKZN Wildlife, yields better results than deconcentration of 
power by government. The findings have shown that co-management enhances equity in 
decision-making processes about fisheries resource use and access, and thus enhances the 
ability of fishers to benefit. In contrast, centralized and deconcentrated small-scale fisheries 
management has proved to be a failure in many countries around the world (Pomeroy and 
Berkes, 2009). Ostrom (2005) confirms that the participation of local people in decision-
making about resource use is crucial because local environments change consistently over 
time, and officials making decisions far away from the local level do not know of these 
changes. Hence the failure of government to establish robust institutional arrangements for 
managing resource use and access at the local level has caused inefficiencies in the 
management of fisheries resourc s in the Eastern Cape. This has not only negatively impacted 
small-scale fishers in this province by compromising their access to the resources and 
impinging on their ability to benefit economically, but it has also compromised resource 
sustainability.  
7.3 Accountability in institutional arrangements 
The accountability of institutions, both at central and local levels, is crucial for efficient 
decentralization and the establishment of robust local institutional arrangements (Manor, 
1997; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Ostrom, 2005). Johnson (2001) 
points out that democratic decentralization in rural areas is essential in achieving enhanced 
accountability and empowerment of poor people. The results of this study, however, show 
that mining institutional arrangements in Sokhulu and Mbonambi had questionable downward 
















Ribot (2003) points out that the transfer of benefit distribution powers within or into local 
institutions may promote or undermine representative, accountable and equitable processes, 
depending on the local actors being entrusted with the powers to distribute benefits.  Ordinary 
community members in Sokhulu and Mbonambi had concerns that RBM‟s local institutional 
structures represented their own private interests and not those of the communities, and that 
these committees and the TAs absorbed benefits from RBM meant for the wider communities, 
due to a lack of accountability and use of political patronage.  
 
Power is a significant factor impacting on the ability of people to benefit from natural 
resources and is manifested in the ability of certain stakeholders to influence how others 
benefit from a resource (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). The degree to which the decision makers 
involve people in deciding how benefits are shared determines the power relations between 
institutions and resource users (McDermott, 2009). For example, in this study the TAs, CSR 
and BBEEE committees or Trusts in Sokhulu and Mbonambi were given power by RBM to 
distribute benefits from mining to the wider communities in Sokhulu and Mbonambi. People 
in Sokhulu and Mbonambi remarked that the TAs and mining committees have power over 
benefit distribution and misused it as they did not consult widely with the communities on 
benefit distribution matters that they discussed with RBM. As a result, the opportunities for 
local people to benefit from mining were compromised.  
 
A comparison between the appointment of those representing the communities in the fisheries 
co-management committees and in the mining institutional arrangements (including the TAs) 
in Sokhulu and Mbonambi may provide a possible explanation for the accountability concerns 
associated with the distribution of mining benefits. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) and Poteete 
(2004) assert that democratic decentralization that does not involve democratic processes 
(such as elections) in establishing institutional arrangements to represent local people in 
decision-making processes promotes the unaccountability of local representative structures. 
The example of fisheries co-management in Sokhulu and Mbonambi shows how the 
democratic election of community representatives in the co-management committees 
enhances downward accountability. In Sokhulu and Mbonambi, members of the fisheries co-
management committees are and always have been elected by community fishers themselves 
(Harris et al, 2003). Fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi pointed out that the co-management 
committees are accountable to them and take their views into account when making decisions 
















However, people in Sokhulu and Mbonambi did not feel the same about the local institutional 
structures for distributing mining benefits. In Sokhulu, the Youth Development Committee 
comprises community members that are employed by RBM to recruit community members on 
their behalf, and also community members that are affiliated to the TA. The BBEEE Trusts in 
Sokhulu, i.e. Community Development Trust and the Shareholding Trust, were formed to 
represent the community in the BBEEE consortium by RBM, and they comprise members of 
the Sokhulu Tribal Council and the Sokhulu Ward Councillor. Similarly, in Mbonambi, the 
Job Seekers Committee comprises community members employed by RBM or its contractors, 
while the BBEEE Trusts that are similar to those in Sokhulu, comprise members of the Tribal 
Council. None of these institutional structures were voted for by the wider communities and 
the community members in them have a stake in RBM mining, either through employment, or 
through affiliation with the TAs. The selection of the TAs themselves is also not by popular 
vote but is based on heredity and is for life (Beall et al, 2004).  
 
Based on these comparisons, one can argue that RBM‟s local institutional structure for 
benefit-sharing lacks accountability because these structures were not elected by the wider 
communities, in contrast to the case of fisheries co-management representatives that were 
voted for by local people. Larson and Ribot (2004:11) remark that “leaders who cannot be 
selected – or removed – by constituents have only limited downward accountability”. 
Agrawal and Ribot (2003) confirm this assertion by providing an example from the 
Senegalese forestry sector where rural councils which receive powers to distribute benefits to 
local people from government are selected by government and not elected by community 
members. As a result, villagers often feel that the rural councils do not represent community 
needs. Moreover, councils are not accountable to the local people since there are no formal 
mechanisms put in place by government to allow for this. This shows that the lack of 
democratic decentralization negatively impacts on the accountability of local institutional 
structures for benefit distribution. This affirms Ribot‟s (2003) finding that problems often 
arise with local institutional arrangements (such as the ones put in place by RBM in Sokhulu 
and Mbonambi) that merely exist to administer activities and decisions already prescribed by 
institutions without community involvement, as they neither represent nor are accountable to 
















These problems are exacerbated in situations where relationships between external actors and 
local communities are not strong. In Mbonambi, the turbulent relationship between RBM and 
the community needed to be resolved to enhance the ability of local people to benefit from 
RBM mining. Veiga et al (2001) concurs that in communities that do not have a strong 
relationship with a mining company, and where benefits from mining have not been 
collaboratively determined or equitably shared, there is often a general perception that mining 
operations are intruding into the community‟s environment, culture and their livelihoods. This 
may explain the mismatch between RBM‟s efforts to involve and benefit the community, and 
the lack of satisfaction of the community about the benefits they obtain and their involvement 
in decision-making processes (MMGF1; MMFG2). These institutional gaps in mining benefit 
distribution affirm that the control of  benefits from resource use by upwardly accountable 
institutional structures (such as the mining committees and the TAs) that are appointed or put 
in power through means other than democratic election compromises equity and 
accountability (Manor, 1997; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Poteete, 2004).  
 
Another key issue emerging from the results concerned accountability in the distribution of 
mining benefits, and the perception that this was compromised by RBM‟s failure to follow up 
on the TA and related committees to ensure that community members are consulted on issues 
relating to benefit-sharing. Larson and Ribot (2004) point out that for convenience, 
institutions often decentralize power to unaccountable local structures and fail to monitor their 
activities, which effectively compromises the ability of wider communities to benefit. Tolsi 
(2011) confirms that many members of the communities in Sokhulu and Mbonambi feel 
excluded from developments and Black Economic Empowerments deals by RBM and other 
large companies in these communities, and that people in these communities felt that they 
were being used as a labor pool by these companies on land that was traditionally theirs. 
Moreover, it appears that the local structures for benefit-sharing that RBM put in place in 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi are a convenient way for the company to comply with the law and to 
improve its reputation and its profit margins, in order to be considered socially responsible 
(Jenkins and Obara, 2008). 
 
People in Sokhulu were aware that RBM sought to distribute benefits from mining to the 
wider community, but that there were factors that blocked these benefits from filtering to the 
ground. Members of the wider community believed that the local authorities in Sokhulu 















an equitable flow of benefits to the wider community was blocked. This was affirmed by the 
household survey results which revealed that 44% of Sokhulu households who were aware of 
the Sokhulu Youth Development Committee believed that it did not fairly represent the 
community and its needs in the mining sector. The lack of accountability of RBM‟s local 
institutional structures was exacerbated by the fact that RBM did not follow up on whether its 
community institutions were consulting widely and whether they were truly representative of 
the needs of the community. Ironically, this is well noted by the national minerals authority 
which has asserted that the misuse of power by local individuals or institutions who pose as 
representatives of the interests of host communities within benefit-sharing structures in the 
mining industry, negatively impacts on the ability of the communities to benefit from mining 
(DMR, 2009).  
 
7.4 Multiplicity of institutions and benefit-sharing 
One of the issues that affected equitable benefit-sharing was related to the existence of 
multiple local level institutions involved in decision-making about benefit distribution. The 
existence of TAs alongside democratically elected representatives proved to be problematic in 
benefit distribution processes across all case study sites. This is primarily attributed to the fact 
that in the democratic dispensation, TAs still have the same amount of powers they were 
given by the apartheid government, and they still have dominant control in rural areas 
(Ntsebeza, 2002). The results of this study show how the failure of government to clarify TA 
roles in rural communities in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, has led to TAs misusing 
their powers to control benefits meant for the wider community. 
 
The interference of TAs in different sectors that provide benefits to rural communities 
undermines democratic benefit distribution. As this research affirms, the prevalence of TAs is 
one of the main blockages to democratic decentralization in rural South Africa, since they 
undermine democratic processes in rural areas in the local government dispensation 
(Ntsebeza, 2002). As discussed in the previous section, the co-management partnership 
between EKZN Wildlife and fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi has provided a prime example 
of how the establishment of a robust institutional arrangement in decentralized resource 
management and benefit distribution reduces conflicts and enhances accountability of local 
institutional arrangements. In fact, one can argue that the efficiency of the local fisheries co-
management structures in Sokhulu and Mbonambi could have also been enhanced by the lack 















the results of this study across all three cases studies was that TAs participated in local 
institutional arrangements for distributing benefits, particularly where the benefits involved 
held high economic value.  
 
Fisheries resources in Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities hold no substantial economic 
value to local people as they cannot be sold to outsiders, while in Mankosi, the economic 
value from fisheries resources to local fishers does not represent large sums of money. 
However, RBM provides dividends to Sokhulu and Mbonambi through their involvement in 
the RBM BBEEE consortium, while tourism provides economic returns in Sokhulu and 
Mankosi through the community levies paid by EKZN Wildlife in Sokhulu and the Mdumbi 
backpackers in Mankosi. For instance, RBM paid R17,5 million endowments to Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi as part of the RBM BBEEE deal in 2010 (RBM1). EKZN Wildlife also intends to 
pay R500,000 to the Sokhulu community as a community levy from tourism (EKZNW5). 
Mdumbi backpackers has collected a community levy of R25,000 to pay to the Mankosi 
community. Interestingly, the mining and tourism sectors in these communities are the ones 
where equity issues in benefit distribution were identified, primarily due to the fact that the 
economic benefits in these sectors were highly contested between the TAs and local 
committees. In contrast, there were no reports of equity issues or conflicts in the distribution 
of benefits in the fisheries sector within these communities, as the TAs did not interfere with 
the duties of fishing committees.  
 
In the mining sector, there were also a myriad of institutional arrangements for benefit-
sharing, often leading to confusion within the community and a lack of coherence. Lund 
(2006) explains that institutional plurality is prevalent in most African countries as there are 
often multiple layers of institutional arrangements operating alongside traditional institutions 
at the local level. For instance, the Youth Development Committee, TA, Community 
Development Trust and Shareholding Trust are all community institutions in Sokhulu with 
whom RBM works. Each of these institutional structures, except the TAs, has a different 
mandate so structures work separately from each other. For instance, the Youth Development 
Committee and the Community Development Trust have community upliftment roles but use 
separate benefit-sharing strategies, i.e. CSR and BBBEE, and thus they do not work together. 
This confuses community members as to who is actually responsible for distributing benefits 
and it leads to the absorption of benefits meant for the wider community by those responsible 















Lund (2006:700) asserts that the “plurality of institutions may open alternative avenues for 
some – also for poorer people – but the more affluent, the better connected, and the more 
knowledgeable tend to have the upper hand in such contexts”.  
 
Political patronage was widely used by TAs in Sokhulu and Mbonambi to determine benefit 
distribution from RBM mining. Community members in Sokhulu asserted that when RBM 
puts out tenders for the Sokhulu community, successful candidates were usually people in the 
community who were known to be members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
19
 or who 
came from the villages where the traditional leader and the Councilor reside. There was a 
belief that the TA was currying political favor with the R17.5 million BBBEE endowment 
paid by RBM to the community, saying that if local people did not join a particular party, they 
would not get access to the benefits. Beall et al (2004) confirm that one of the key problems 
in rural areas of South Africa is that TAs operate on principles that are not downwardly 
accountable and are antithetical to the ideals of democracy by using political, hierarchical and 
patriarchal systems to exclude others from obtaining benefits. Hence, it was reported that 
local people in Sokhulu had begun to „join‟ the political party affiliated to the TA in 
desperation and in fear that they would not access the benefits from the BBEEE money 
(SMFG2). This was underpinned by the fact that the Councilor had told community members 
that the Tribal Council had decided to use some of the money to give bursaries to local youth 
to study in tertiary institutions. There were reports that some local youth in Sokhulu were 
excluded from obtaining the bursaries because the villages that they came from were 
earmarked by local authorities as opposed to the locally dominating political party (SMFG2).  
 
Although a local authority representative in Sokhulu denied these claims and asserted that 
they have never discriminated on a political basis for benefit distribution (SKI 1), it is clear 
that allocating powers to non-representative authorities constituted by private interests can 
promote lack of accountability and affect fairness in decision-making about the distribution of 
benefits. Furthermore, lack of accountability can slow down democratic processes at the local 
level, making other institutions involved (i.e. RBM) lose legitimacy in the eyes of the 
communities (Ribot, 1999; 2003). A RBM official noted that communities no longer trust 
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 The IFP is a political party with a major support base from chiefs and headmen in KwaZulu-Natal (Beall et al, 
2004). The Sokhulu Tribal Council, including the Councilor, were allegedly affiliated with the IFP, and 
therefore, the villages (including the people in them) where the traditional leader and the Councilor reside were 
perceived by the people to be „IFP villages‟. Certain villages in the community were known to be opposed to the 















RBM and their leaders because “the royal family mostly wants special attention…they feel 
development should be for them and they feel that they are running the community and the 
people are just there...people have been cheated so much that they don‟t believe there is good 
that can still happen” (RBM 1).  
 
Issues of political patronage and misuse of power were not unique to the mining sector, but 
occurred also in the tourism sector in Sokhulu, the forestry sector in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, 
as well as between the local representative structures in Mankosi (i.e. the TA and Mankosi 
Community Trust). In Sokhulu, the Maphelane Nature Reserve pays a community levy from 
tourism to the communities adjacent to it, including Sokhulu. According to an EKZN Wildlife 
official, they have been paying this levy for about five years and approached the TA to 
consult with the community members to decide together about a community project to support 
(EKZNW5). However, in the surveys and interviews held with community members, it was 
evident that the community members had no knowledge of this money and had been poorly 
informed about it. There were suspicions among community members and some EKZN 
Wildlife officials that the TA wanted this money to come to them as cash and not in the form 
of a project so that they would use it for themselves; hence they had not informed the 
community about it. An EKZN Wildlife confirmed that “there is lots of political unrest among 
the Sokhulu TA and the TA is full of old people who think money is just for the TA and not 
for the entire Sokhulu community” (EKZNW5). This EKZN Wildlife official also noted that 
they have approached the TA on many occasions trying to help upgrade the schools with 
computers, as one school had requested, but their request was not successful with the TA. 
Another family in the community wanted to develop a community nursery and wanted to 
access the community levy fund money to do this, but their application was turned down by 
the TA (EKZNW5). 
 
A government official remarked that in the forestry sector, political patronage is used by the 
committees put in place to represent the community in a way that affects decision-making and 
benefit distribution patterns. He asserted, 
 
…IFP is dominating at Sokhulu while ANC dominates at Mbonambi – and 
these political divisions have a major role in plantation forestry in these 
areas. For example, three years ago we had a meeting with the Sokhulu 
committee for plantation forests by DWAF and because of political 
divisions, we had to have the same meeting twice, i.e. meet with the ANC 



















In Mankosi, conflicts between the TA and the Community Trust have blocked the distribution 
of benefits from tourism. A DRDLR official explained, 
 
… benefits are not yet reaching everyone in the community because the 
local institutional structures for benefit-sharing are flawed. For instance, in 
Mankosi, there is a power struggle between the Community Trust (whose 
members  were democratically elected) and the headman over money for 
development and this delays any other development processes underway for 
the community‟s benefit because whoever has to deposit money on the 
community‟s account gets confused as to whom to give it to (DRDLR1). 
 
The Mankosi headman was convinced that as the community leader, he should be the one 
who determines how the benefits from this money should be distributed to the wider 
community and not the Community Trust.  Furthermore, there were suspicions that issues of 
political patronage between the TA and the Community Trust members in Mankosi 
exacerbated the conflicts and competition between them about benefit distribution, as the two 
structures are affiliated with rival political parties. A DRDLR official pointed out that the TAs 
role is to govern the people but it is the role of the Community Trust to facilitate the 
distribution of economic benefits that are meant to develop the community (DRDLR1). As a 
result of these institutional ambiguities, the money that the owners of the Mdumbi 
backpackers want to pay to the community is accumulating in their account because they are 
confused about who to pay it to, and the community is still not benefiting from it because the 
TA do not want to accept that the Community Trust holds the power to distribute the benefits 
from this money to the community. The findings confirm an analysis by Ntsebeza (2002) and 
Logan (2008) who point out that the institution of TAs is opposed to most notions of 
democracy and decentralization in rural areas, as these threaten the jurisdiction of TAs. This 
research also reveals that TAs  are opposed to other forms of alternative local institutional 
arrangements as they would potentially compete with them, preferring power to be 
concentrated in their hands, as during the apartheid era. A DRDLR representative affirmed 
that in order to enhance equity in benefit-sharing, there is a need for TAs to relinquish power 
to other downwardly accountable local structures in rural communities. Hence he stated, “TAs 
cannot be a player and a referee at the same time, because if that happens, they will not be 
















It is therefore apparent that institutional plurality minimizes accountability and exacerbates 
the power struggles and misuse by community leaders, which prevents the distribution of 
benefits to the wider communities. Moreover, the lack of clarity about the roles and powers of 
TAs at the local level has proved to be a significant blockage to benefit-sharing, as TAs 
undermine the ability of rural communities to have a say in decision-making about benefit 
distribution. A local government official in KwaZulu-Natal also confirmed this by pointing 
out that, “Dual governance is a big problem in South Africa, especially in KZN - there are 
always conflicts between ward committees and the tribal authorities and that is a national 
problem. This causes dual administration, as the roles of Councillors conflict with that of 
tribal authorities – one can‟t determine who is more powerful between the two” (MLM). 
Veiga et al (2001) note that the participation of all community members in decision-making 
about benefit distribution is imperative in establishing equity in benefit distribution. Ribot 
(2003:61) summarizes this sentiment, asserting that “establishing accountable representative 
institutions is a priority – perhaps a precondition” for equitable benefit-sharing and “without 
systematic means for public participation and voice in local decisions, transfer of power to the 
local arena becomes deconcentration or privatization by default”, which concentrates powers 
to unaccountable institutions at the expense of the communities.  
 
7.5 Limited statehood and benefit-sharing institutions in rural coastal communities 
One of the trends that were identified from the findings of this study was the poor investment 
and developmental support provided by government in rural areas of  KwaZulu-Natal and 
Eastern Cape. Government also has poor authority and visibility at the local level in these 
rural communities, overshadowed to some extent by TAs. The marginalization of rural 
communities, characterized by poor development and employment opportunities, presents 
limited income or livelihood support options for people, and thus enhances their reliance on 
natural resource use (Glavovic and Boonzaier, 2007). Due to a lack of alternative economic 
and social livelihood opportunities in rural communities, there has been increased pressure on 
conservation institutions to play a developmental role at the community level. Similarly, the 
private sector and NGOs have increasingly provided basic services that are the traditional 
preserve of government. Risse (2006; 2010) refers to the lack of a political will by 
governments in „newly‟ industrialized countries like South Africa to provide services to 
certain local or policy areas in a country as limited statehood. The rural coastal communities 
in this study can be understood as areas of limited statehood, as non-state actors (i.e. 















Wildlife) either assume or are expected by local people to assume the role of the state to 
provide economic and social services at the local level.  
 
In Sokhulu and Mbonambi, RBM‟s CSR programs are contributing to infrastructure 
development, such as roads, health facilities and schools, yet these are functions that should 
be provided by local government. Because of a lack of delivery by the state, community 
members in Sokhulu and Mbonambi now see it as RBM‟s responsibility to bring development 
to these communities. In Mankosi, poor basic service and social welfare delivery by 
government to local people has resulted in TransCape playing a large role to fulfill these 
functions at the local level. TransCape assists with education, healthcare, employment, 
microfinance and other livelihood support functions to local people. However, a TransCape 
representative remarked that they receive minimal support from local government and that 
there is little interest by local government in assisting them with the welfare of local people 
(MKI3). These examples of RBM and TransCape taking over some responsibilities of the 
state are defined by Manor (1997:3) as „decentralization by default‟, which occurs when 
government institutions fail to fulfill their duties at the local level, so much so that NGOs and 
the private sector step in to play a developmental role out of necessity (Risse, 2010). This has 
compromised the potential of communities to fully benefit from the economic opportunities 
provided by RBM and TransCape because if the basic services were delivered by government, 
these institutions would focus on providing other kinds of benefits to the local people.  
 
Poor alternative livelihood support provision in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, attributed to limited 
statehood has also caused many fishers in these communities to place expectations on EKZN 
Wildlife to play a developmental role at the local level. Although fisheries co-management in 
these communities had been useful in enhancing benefit-sharing and resource sustainability, 
there was a concern by fishers that EKZN Wildlife placed more emphasis on enhancing 
resource sustainability than on the socio-economic dimensions of fishers‟ livelihoods. Fishers 
believed that because fisheries co-management has meant enhanced resource use restrictions, 
the fisheries conservation authorities should assist fishers with alternative livelihood options, 
in order to reduce fishers‟ reliance on the resources. Scholte (2003) confirms that worldwide, 
there is increasing pressure from local communities on conservation authorities to play a 
developmental role to assist their livelihoods. Fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi were under 
the impression that „co-management‟ with EKZN Wildlife not only meant partnering in 















fishers‟ livelihoods.  To some extent, this occurred when mussel co-management started in 
Sokhulu in 1995, as an EKZN Wildlife official assisted female mussel harvesters by teaching 
them alternative livelihood skills, such as crafting, so that they could get an income source 
that would supplement their livelihoods (SFFG 2; SFFG 3). However, when this official was 
no longer in charge of co-management in Sokhulu, the alternative livelihood projects stopped, 
and the mussel harvesters claimed that since then they have suffered. Although fishers noted 
that they benefited from obtaining legal rights to harvest resources when co-management 
started, they no longer see legal rights as a benefit. It is apparent that economic benefits and 
alternative livelihood support options are highly sought after by fishers in Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi. For instance, fishers in Sokhulu and Mbonambi stated that prohibitions to sell 
fisheries resources by EKZN Wildlife is adding strain to their livelihoods because they need 
income sources to feed their families and take their children to school (SFFG 1; SFFG 2; 
SFFG 3; SFFG 4; MFFG 1; MFFG 2).  
 
Due to pressures on livelihoods, it is apparent that what EKZN Wildlife believed is a benefit 
to fishers through co-management (i.e. legal rights of access and enhanced resource 
sustainability), is no longer satisfactory. Institutions and people may of course value benefits 
differently (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). An EKZN Wildlife official remarked that,  
 
People in the committees no longer seem keen for joint 
management and no longer see benefits from it. They no longer 
see access to resources as a benefit anymore – they want more – 
they want bag limits to increase, they want to be paid, monitors 
want salary increases, etc. It has become glaringly evident that 
alternative livelihoods are important because people only fish 
because they are desperate and they can‟t make money  
(EKZNW 3).    
 
 
It is therefore apparent from these findings that in the face of limited statehood and 
marginalization in rural communities, government needs to balance constraints presented by 
conservation rules with livelihood diversification opportunities in order make conservation 
meaningful in these contexts. Furthermore, government needs to focus on providing more 
alternative livelihood support options to rural coastal communities in order to enhance 
livelihood diversification options. Allison and Ellis (2001:383) confirm that “diversity is an 
important attribute of rural livelihoods in developing countries, and one that has tended to be 















diversification of rural livelihoods is pertinent as it reduces the risk of livelihood failure by 
increasing the pool of income sources for these communities. In addition, encouraging 
alternative livelihood options in rural coastal communities is important as it can limit their 
reliance on coastal resources (Allison and Ellis, 2001), maximize benefits from coastal 
resource use sectors and reduce pressures placed by local people on non-state actors and 
conservation authorities to play developmental roles.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
The results of this study have shown that the decentralization of decision-making power by 
governments to downwardly accountable institutional structures at the local level enhances 
the robustness of benefit-sharing mechanisms. However, accountability and equity are key 
institutional factors that are needed to enhance the fairness of benefit-sharing processes in 
rural communities such as Sokhulu, Mbonambi and Mankosi, where institutional plurality at 
the local level plays a key role in determining people‟s ability to benefit. Because natural 
resource decision makers are faced with the task of allocating benefits (and costs), increased 
fairness of decisions and outcomes are significant as they increase the level of trust that 
people have in decision makers (Smith and McDonough, 2001). Furthermore, it is also 
apparent that government needs to play a role in providing basic services, providing 
alternative livelihood opportunities and supporting the local institutions that provide benefits 
which enhance the livelihoods of rural coastal communities in KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern 
Cape. This can help enhance livelihood diversification and reduce the reliance of the 
communities on coastal resources. Hence, Larson and Ribot (2004) assert that central 
governments have a responsibility to provide services to local communities, as well as 


























CHAPTER EIGHT – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The results of this study show that there are various ways in which rural coastal communities 
benefit from coastal resources. Rural coastal communities obtain social, ecological and 
economic benefits from the use of fisheries resources, as well as social and economic benefits 
from resource use in the mining sector. The institutions involved in using, controlling or 
regulating access to and benefits from resources in the fisheries and mining sectors have 
impacted significantly on people‟s ability to benefit from coastal resource use. Various 
mechanisms for benefit-sharing existed within the case study communities to distribute 
benefits from resource use, and were used by the institutions involved within the respective 
sectors to enhance benefits to local people. These mechanisms included partnerships by the 
state and/or private sector institutions with resource users in the communities, the setting up 
of local institutional arrangements, such as committees, for distributing benefits to the wider 
communities, as well as NGO involvement in local tourism, enhancing benefits to local 
fishers and wider communities.   
 
The study has shown that limited involvement of the state in rural coastal communities in 
South Africa impacts negatively on the governance of natural resources and the distribution of 
benefits arising from their use. Although sectoral activities like fisheries and mining have 
brought about benefits to people in rural coastal communities of KwaZulu-Natal and the 
Eastern Cape, there are certain factors that have curtailed their positive impacts. These include 
national government‟s failure to resolve the issue of dual governance in rural communities, 
including the enforcement of a robust governance system. The lack of robust rural institutions 
for benefit distribution has led to a multiplicity of actors and institutions from diverse sectors 
working within rural communities, largely operating in isolation. Communities thus find it 
difficult to determine to whom they can assign blame for incurred losses. Institutional 
multiplicity and dual governance in these areas are also a central reason for communities 
being misinformed or uninformed by their leaders about their rights in terms of benefits, as 
well as about decision-making processes related to benefit distribution. This finding resonates 
with other studies which suggest that where there are multiple actors present in areas of 
„limited statehood‟, it becomes impossible for people to hold certain actors responsible for 
bad governance or negative impacts incurred to communities (Schmelzle, 2007).  This is an 
issue that needs to be taken into account by those seeking to develop institutional 















Moreover, the lack of robust rural governance systems has resulted in power struggles among 
those charged with distributing benefits to the wider communities. The power of local 
institutions plays a central role in determining who in the community benefits and why 
benefits are distributed in the manner that they are (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). The results of 
this study reveal that in rural coastal communities, economic benefits from high value coastal 
resources are highly contested by traditional authorities (TAs). Traditional Authorities tend to 
misuse their powers and absorb economic benefits aimed at wider communities, believing that 
that all community benefits should come to them. For instance, in KwaZulu-Natal, benefit-
sharing from mining was largely hindered by the fact that TAs were unaccountable and used 
political patronage to determine who in the community should receive benefits. This was 
exacerbated by RBM‟s inadequate monitoring of the distribution of benefits by the TA to 
wider communities. In the Eastern Cape, benefits from tourism, also holding economic value, 
are similarly contested by TAs, and as a result have been blocked from reaching the wider 
community. The root cause of this elite capture is the failure of national government to clarify 
the roles of TAs in the democratic dispensation (Ntsebeza, 2002), and this has jeopardized 
rural development and the ability of rural communities to fully benefit from initiatives to 
improve livelihoods. In order to eliminate elite capture of benefits, the powers exerted by the 
institutions mediating access, use, control and benefits from natural resource use should be 
channeled in a manner that will empower rural communities and foster equitable benefit-
sharing of resources.  
 
The results of this study affirm that decentralized decision-making and increased participation 
of fishers in fisheries resource management are important for the more equitable management 
of resources and enhanced resource sustainability. Centralized or deconcentrated small-scale 
fisheries management has proved to be a failure in many countries around the world 
(Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). This study suggests that partnerships 
between state, non-state actors and local fishers may enhance benefits from resource use. 
However, devolved natural resource management is not enough. Management approaches 
need to give attention not only to the sustainability of resource use, but should also pay 
adequate attention to social and economic issues facing resource users. Increasingly, there is 
recognition that environmental governance systems such as co-management and other 
community-based approaches for managing natural resource use should not only be about 















and the wider livelihood needs of communities (Nkhata and Breen, 2010). This is a sentiment 
strongly supported by the findings of this study. 
 
Béné (2003) and Coulthard et al (2011) point out that the problem with many fisheries policy 
makers in developing countries is that they presume a link between small-scale fisheries and 
poverty, and thus make policies primarily upon that premise. It is argued that fisheries policy 
makers tend to focus on the fact that poor communities overfish and exhaust resource stocks 
because they are poor, without careful consideration of broader social and economic issues 
that affect how and why fishers fish. This assumption is increasingly under question  due to 
the fact that fishing communities often rely on different income activities and assets apart 
from fishing, with some fishers poor and others not (Allison and Ellis, 2001; Béné, 2003). The 
findings of this study contribute to this argument by showing that fishing communities do not 
necessarily rely on fishing to support their livelihoods because of poverty alone, but because 
of poor alternative livelihood support options available to them. For instance, fishers involved 
in co-management in KwaZulu-Natal were unhappy about th  constraints placed on their 
livelihoods by regulations, not because they do not care about resource sustainability, but 
because they lack alternative income sources or employment to support themselves when 
fishing seasons are closed or when their harvest is insufficient to meet household consumption 
needs. Alternative or diversified livelihood options are thus crucial for the resilience of 
fishing communities to decrease their reliance on fisheries resources (Allison and Ellis, 2001). 
Policy makers should take this into account as it may influence how communities respond to 
fisheries policies and laws, and their willingness to comply. Furthermore, decisions about 
resource management should not be made based on the fishers‟ impacts on resource stocks 
alone, without understanding the holistic and context-specific social and economic livelihood 
aspects of fishing communities that influence why they fish. 
 
One of the main recommendations that could help enhance access and equitable benefit-
sharing from coastal resource use in rural communities is to establish robust institutional 
arrangements for benefit-sharing. For instance, in small-scale fisheries in the Eastern Cape, 
national government needs to make provision for enhancing the participation of local people 
in decision-making processes. In KwaZulu-Natal, EKZN Wildlife needs to shift away from 
focusing primarily on resource sustainability in co-management, and towards enhanced 
understanding of the realities of the socio-economic aspects of fishers‟ livelihoods. Although 















opportunities to fishers, they could use their resources to help local government identify these 
options. Alternative livelihood options may provide for diversification, and potentially reduce 
reliance on coastal resources for survival. This may also increase the willingness of local 
communities to work with fisheries managers and to comply with resource use regulations.  
 
Another recommendation is for provincial and local government to make sufficient efforts to 
provide basic service delivery in rural communities. This would enhance the ability of these 
communities to benefit from economic opportunities provided by different economic sectors. 
Practical ways should be found to foster the collaboration of various institutions present in 
rural areas, through local government IDPs, to maximize benefits from the sectors involved in 
natural resource use and management. This could help reduce people‟s reliance on coastal 
resources, and maximize opportunities for alternative socio-economic livelihood options. 
Government needs to provide full support to non-state actors such as NGOs which work at the 
local level to promote rural development, in order to enhance potential benefits to local 
people. The role of TAs at the local level needs to be clearly defined and a platform provided 
to allow democratically elected structures to represent local people, without the interference 
of TAs. Strengthening democracy in rural areas through the establishment of representative 
institutional structures is fundamental and can help promote human rights, development and 
the empowerment of rural communities. 
 
Finally, but most importantly, it is critical that all government, private sector and NGO 
institutions operating in rural communities ensure that the arrangements they use to distribute 
benefits from different sectoral activities are efficient, reliable, downwardly accountable and 
representative of community, and not individual, interests. This may reduce community 
perceptions of loss from sectoral activities, and enhance equity in benefit distribution 
processes. This is a finding that resonates well with that of Ostrom (2005) who asserts that 
robust institutional arrangements for resource use and management are ones that promote 
fairness and the participation of affected individuals in decision-making processes. 
Furthermore, institutions working in rural communities should provide capacity building to 
local people to empower them to be informed about their rights and to participate in decision-
making processes.  
 
This study has provided an in-depth understanding of benefits from coastal resource use in the 















economic and ecological benefits to rural communities, and to other actors and institutions 
responsible for using or managing coastal resources. However, these benefits are paralleled by 
losses that are mostly incurred by communities. The mechanisms used by institutions that 
manage or that are involved in the use of coastal resources to distribute benefits from resource 
use to adjacent communities largely determine the extent and the manner in which wider 
communities benefit. Limited statehood, local power struggles among those charged with 
benefit distribution, elite capture of benefits, lack of accountability by local institutions, as 
well as centralized decision-making power by the state are key blockages to equitable benefit-
sharing. The findings of this study thus affirm the need for robust, representative and 
downwardly accountable institutional arrangements for equitable benefit-sharing of coastal 
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APPENDIX 1: Household Questionnaire 
Household Questionnaire Number---------- 
 
ANALYSIS OF BENEFITS FROM COASTAL RESOURCES AND MECHANISMS FOR EQUITABLE BENEFIT-SHARING IN 
SELECTED WIO COUNTRIES 
 
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
NOTE TO RESEARCHER 
 
[1] The respondent for this questionnaire must be a RESOURCE USER and does not necessarily need to be the head of the household; 
 
[2] ALL coastal resource use and benefits should be explored in this questionnaire 
 
[3] Introduce yourself to the respondent (name, surname, institution) 
 
[4] Ask the respondent if they wish to give you permission to use their identity or if they wish to remain anonymous 
 




PROJECT SUMMARY (please summarise to respondent):  
 
The aim of this research is to develop an understanding of the use of coastal resources in the Western Indian Ocean region, and to explore the 
benefits derived from this use.  A key objective of the project is to understand current initiatives and approaches that exist in coastal 
communities to encourage equitable benefit-sharing. Moreover, this project aims to identify the institutional structures and arrangements put in 

















Interviewer‟s Name: _______________________________________________ 
Respondent‟s Name: _______________________________________________ (Optional) 
 
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.1 Study Site Location 
1. Region/Province ________________________________________________________ 
2. District _______________________________________________________________ 
3. Village/Community /Locality______________________________________________ 
4. Name of Ward /Sub-Location______________________________________________ 
 
1.2 Respondent’s Information 
5. Gender  [1] Male  [2] Female 
 
6. Age ____________ (Give exact years) 
 
7. Marital status of the respondent: [1] Single [2] Married [3] Divorced [4] Widow [5] Separated [6] Widower 
 
8. Level of education of respondent.  
[1] No formal Education  
[2] Incomplete primary education [between Gr.1 and Gr.4] 
[3] Complete Primary education [finished Gr.5] 
[6] Incomplete High School Education [between Gr. 6 and Gr.11]  
[7] Complete High school Education [finished Gr. 12] 
[8] Technical/ College Education  















9. Occupation of Respondent 
[1] Employed  
[1b] If employed (please state) __________________________________________ 
[2] Self-employed  
[2b] If self-employed (please state - e.g. Farmer, livestock keeper, agro-pastoral, fisher, taxi driver, shop owner, trader 
etc)_________________________ 
[3] Unemployed 
[4] Pensioner  
[4b] If a Pensioner, please state former occupation ________________________ 
[5] School-going learner 
[6] Other (please state) ______________________________ 
 
10. Where were you born? 
1. In this village  
2. In different village within the district 
3. Outside the District but within the Region/Province 
4. Outside the Region/Province 
5. Outside the Country  
 
11.  For how long have you lived in this village _______________ (Mention years) 
 







13. How many HOUSES are there in your homestead/Compound? _____________________. 
14. How many HOUSEHOLDS live in your homestead/Compound? _____________________ 















16. What is the MAIN material used for 
 the walls and roof of the MAIN dwelling? Observe and tick only one for each. 
 
7. WALLS (tick one)  8. ROOF (tick one) 




Temporary shack (plastic, cardboard, plywood) 
   
Corrugated iron 
 
Permanent shack (corrugated iron, mixed brick)    
Tiles 
 
Permanent house (brick, block)     
Other (specify)     
 
1.4 Household Characteristics and Income 
17.  How many people live in your household/homestead?  ________________ 
 
18. How many adults, older than 18, live in your household/homestead? ________________ 
 
19. How many people, younger than 18, live in your household/homestead? ________________ 
 
20. Are you the household/homestead head? [1] Yes or [2] No _______________ 
 
21. If No, what is your relation to the Head of Household? ___________________________ 
 
22. What is the occupation of the head of your household/homestead? 
[1] Employed  
[1b] If employed (please state) __________________________________________ 
[2] Self-employed  
[2b] If self-employed (please state - e.g. Farmer, livestock keeper, agro-pastoral, fisher, taxi driver, shop owner, trader etc) 
________________________ 
[3] Unemployed 
[4] Pensioner __________________________________ 















[5] School-going learner 















23. What is the range of your household monthly income (pensions, grants, other sources of income included?) [Ask range and not specific amount]  
 
South Africa Tanzania 




[5] R7501 or more 
[1] <150,000 
[2] 150,001-300,000/= 





24. What present activities contribute towards your monthly income? Circle ALL that are applicable and go through each. 
 
 [1] The sale of marine resources 
 [2] Sale of crops (fruit, vegetables) 
 [3] Sale of livestock (poultry etc) 
 [4] Sale of wood 
 [5] Employment in tourism industry (state type of work) ___________________________________________________________________ 
 [6] Employment in forestry industry (state type of work)___________________________________________________________________ 
 [7] Employment in agriculture (state type of work)________________________________________________________________________ 
 [8] Employment in fishing industry  (state type of work)____________________________________________________________________ 
 [9] Employment in mining industry (state type of work)____________________________________________________________________ 
 [10] Employment in other activities (please state) _________________________________________________________________________ 
 [11] Pension 
 [12] Grants (please specify: ie: disability, child)___________________________________________________________________________ 















25. RANK the THREE most important activities in terms of monthly income (1=most important)? (Add notes where relevant) 
 
 [1] The sale of marine resources 
 [2] Sale of crops (fruit, vegetables) 
 [3] Sale of livestock (poultry etc) 
 [4] Sale of wood 
 [5] Employment in tourism industry ___________________________________________________________________ 
 [6] Employment in forestry industry ___________________________________________________________________ 
 [7] Employment in agriculture________________________________________________________________________ 
 [8] Employment in fishing industry ____________________________________________________________________ 
 [9] Employment in mining industry____________________________________________________________________ 
 [10] Employment in other activities (please state) ________________________________________________________ 
 [11] Pension 
 [12] Grants (please specify: ie: disability, child)____________________________________________________________ 
 [13] Others (please specify) ___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Is your household connected to an electricity supply? 
      [1] Yes              [2] No 
 
27. What is the source of energy for cooking in your household? [Tick all that apply] 
a. Electricity 
b. Solar power 
c. Charcoal 
d. Kerosene  
e. LPG gas 
f. Biogas 
g. Firewood 















28. What is the most often used source of DRINKING water in your household? [Tick all that apply] 
[1] Piped/tap water inside household/homestead  
[2] Piped – Single tap in yard 
[3] Piped – public stand post 
[4] Hand pump well (Borehole with hand pump, shallow well fitted with pump) 
[5] Rainwater tank 
[6] Collect water from flowing river/stream 
[7] A constructed Dam with outlet for fetching water 
[8] Stagnant water (ponding water, natural/traditional pool, swamp, dug out pits/holes) 
[9]Open unprotected well (traditional well) 
[10]Open but lined well with a container for lifting water  
















2. RESOURCE USE  
2.1 Consumptive Resource Use  
 
29. What are the natural 

























































1) Yes 2) 
No 
34a. If there 
have been 
any changes 


















 (give code) 
36. What is the 
resource used for? 
(Please state) 
37. What do you do with the resource that you 
harvest? Indicate Yes  or No and indicate 
percentage if possible 
 
If you Sell, please indicate to whom you sell to 









        Own use Sell 





            
          
          
          
          
Forest 
Products 
            
          
          
          
          
Minerals 
            
          
          
Agriculture 
            
          
          
Sand 
            
          
Wildlife 
            















3. BENEFITS FROM THE USE OF COASTAL RESOURCES 
 
38. List the resources that you harvest-as mentioned above-and explain how your life benefits from this use 
 








































39. Have any of these activities/sectors had a negative impact on your life?  
Sector Yes No If yes, explain why and/or how 
Marine resource harvesting 
 
 
   
Forest products harvesting 
 
   
Mining 
 
   
Agriculture 
 
   
Tourism  
 
   
Conservation    
Other (specify) 
 

















4. UNDERSTANDING EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR BENEFIT-SHARING OF 
COASTAL RESOURCES. 
 
Coastal resources 40. Is there a local committee or group 
who makes decisions about resource 
use and access?  
41. If YES, do you participate in this 
committee or group? 
42. If YES, do you think this committee 
or group fairly represents the people who 
use coastal resources? 
Yes No Don‟t Know Yes No Don‟t Know Yes No Don‟t Know 
Marine          
Forestry          
Mining          
Agriculture          
Tourism          
Conservation          
Other          
















5. Understanding Stakeholders in Decision-making 
 
Sector 
43. In each sector, which stakeholder do you 
think is MOST POWERFUL in making 
decisions (i.e.: 1. individual, 2. community 
group, 3. traditional authority, 4. village 
government 5. local /provincial, 6. central 
government, etc) 












































6. GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL RULES 
 




45. Are there 
government rules in 
place that outline how 
people should use 
resources? 
46. Do you think these rules are fair? 47. Do local people keep to (comply 
with) these rules? 
48. Are there other (traditional) rules 
that are used? 


















































          
 


























7. SITE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RELEVANT TO EACH CASE STUDY SITE and EACH BENEFIT-SHARING 






49. Are you 
aware of these 
activities in 
your area? 
1. YES 2. NO 
50. Are you 
involved in these 
activities? 1. 
YES 2. NO. 





52. Do you 
benefit from 
these activities? 
1. YES 2. NO 
53. If you benefit, 
are you 
SATISFIED with 
how you are 
benefiting? 1. 
YES 2. NO 
54. If you are 
NOT satisfied, 










56. Are there any 
specific issues 
you would like 






































       
 
















        
 
        
 


































APPENDIX 2: Household survey sampling calculations 
 
a) Simple random sampling: The formula used from Yamane (1967:98) to determine the 
sample size for the Mankosi case study household surveys takes into account precision 
and reliability. Hence the formula is as follows 
 
n = Nz² pq / Nd² + z² pq   (without replacement) 
Here, n (represents the total sample size), z (represents the normal sampling 
distribution-where z = 2 indicates a 95% confidence interval), p (represents the 
estimated proportion of behavior in the population-where 0.5 or 50% 
represents complete uncertainty) and q (represents 1/p).  
 
*Calculation  
n = Nz² pq / Nd² + z² pq    
n = 800 (2)² (0.5)(0.5) / 800 (0.11)² + (2)² (0.5)(0.5) 
n = 800 / 10.68 
n = 75 
As a result of the above calculation, the total sample size for Mankosi was 
determined to be 75 homesteads, which were rounded off to the nearest 10 to 
give a total of 80 homesteads that were surveyed. The research timeframes and 
budget were taken into account in determining the sample size and desired 
variance of the sample size. 
 
b) Stratified random sampling: The formula from Yamane (1967:154) for determining 
samples sizes for proportion allocation was used to determine the sample sizes of 
homesteads for the household surveys in Sokhulu and Mbonambi. The formula is as 
stated below: 
  n = N  Nn Pn Qn / N² D² +  
Here n (represents the total number of homesteads), N (represents the total number of 
homesteads in Sokhulu and Mbonambi, respectively), P (represents the estimated proportion 
of behavior in each community group), Q (represents 1/p) and D (represents the desired 


















n = N  Nn Pn Qn / N² D² +  
n = 3036(540x0.5x0.5 + 2494x0.5x0.5) / 3036²(0.035)² + 540x0.5x0.5 + 
2494x0.5x0.5 
n = 2302806 / 45923.2504 
n = 191  
Therefore, 191 is the total sample size of homesteads from Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi, which was rounded off to the nearest 10 to equal 190 homesteads. 
Sample size for Ward 1 (Sokhulu) = 540 / 3036 * 190 = 34 























































Exercise 1: Defining benefits 
*Note – This was the first exercise that took place in this focus group and it was a 
brainstorming exercise where the participants were asked to discuss what they perceived to be 
tangible or intangible benefits they obtain from participating in subsistence fisheries in their 
area. This exercise was done so that all the participants would have a common understanding 
of what is meant by the term „benefits‟ and they were encouraged to give examples of what 
they define as benefits. Smiley face icons () were used to rank the impact of each benefit. If 
the benefit had a very positive impact on people‟s lives, it got a ranking of three smiley faces. 
If the impact of a benefit was moderately positive, it got a ranking of two smiley faces. Lastly, 
if the impact of a benefit was slightly positive, it got a ranking of one smiley face. In the same 
way, frowning face icons () were also used to indicate rankings of negative impacts (i.e. 
three frowning faces indicated a very negative impact, two frowning faces indicated a 
moderately negative impact and one frowning face represented a slightly negative impact). 
 
Exercise 2: Timeline 
*Note – The timeline was the second exercise that was conducted during this focus group 
meeting. A timeline is a participatory rural appraisal (PRA) technique that is used to assess 
the impacts of particular events to people over a certain time period. In this focus group 
meeting, the timeline was conducted in order to understand the various interventions or events 
that have taken place at Sokhulu since the start of coastal resource conservation practices (i.e. 
since 1984) to date. The timeline was intended to reveal the benefits and losses that were 
incurred by the people of Sokhulu because of the particular events or interventions, as 
discussed by the participants. In addition, the focus group participants were asked to rank 
each event on the timeline in order to indicate the extent of the impact of that particular event 
on their lives. Smiley face icons () and frowning face icons () were used to rank the 
impact of each event on the lives of the participants.   
Below is the timeline of the different events or interventions that have taken place since 1984 
and the responses of the focus group participants on how these events or interventions 
















Exercise 3: Ranking of decision-making stakeholders in intertidal resource harvesting at 
Sokhulu and power ranking 
*Note – In this exercise, the participants were asked to list and rank all the stakeholders in 
mussel harvesting at Sokhulu and rank them according to who has the most decision-making 
power. Ranking starts from the number 1, with the stakeholder with the most decision-making 
power gets a ranking of 1, followed by 2, and so on.  
Below are the stakeholders mentioned by the focus group participants and how they were 
ranked according to decision-making power. 
 
Exercise 4: Venn Diagram 
*Note – A Venn diagram is another PRA technique that is used to understand the significance 
of actors in a given network and to depict the relationships that exist among those actors. In 
this case, the Venn diagram is used to understand who the different stakeholders involved in 
subsistence fisheries at Sokhulu are and what relationships exist among them. The circle sizes 
depict the amount of decision-making power, i.e. the bigger the circle, the bigger the decision-
making powers of an actor. Colour of the circles represents nothing in particular. Proximity of 
circles to and from each other depicts the relationship between the stakeholders represented in 
each circle, i.e. the closer the circles to each other, the stronger the relationship represented, 



































 Sokhulu focus group schedule
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DATE FOCUS GROUP CODE PARTICIPANTS 
08 February 
2010 
Sokhulu fisheries focus group 
1 
 – Mussel Committee  
 
SFFG 1 
11 members (including 
committee chairperson, 
treasurer and monitors) 
08 February 
2010 
Sokhulu fisheries focus group 
2  
– Line Fish Committee 
 
SFFG 2 
8 members (including 
committee chairperson, deputy 
chairperson and secretary) 
09 February 
2010 
Sokhulu fisheries focus group 
3 
 – Mussel harvesters 
 
SFFG3 
13 mussel harvesters 
09 February 
2010 
Sokhulu fisheries focus group 
4  






Sokhulu mining focus group 1   




7 members (including 
chairperson, deputy 









Sokhulu mining focus group 2    
- Sokhulu mining employees 
 
SMFG 2 
7 mining workers (3 work at 
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Mbonambi focus group schedule
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DATE FOCUS GROUP CODE PARTICIPANTS 
12 February 
2010 
Mbonambi Community Trust  
MMFG 1 
3 members (i.e. chairperson, 
treasurer and co-ordinator) 
16 February 
2010 
Mbonambi fisheries focus 
group 1 




7 members (including 
committee chairperson, deputy 
chairperson and monitors) 
16 February 
2010 
Mbonambi fisheries focus 
group 2  







Mbonambi fisheries focus 
group 3 




51 mussel collectors/farmers 
19 February 
2010 
Mbonambi traditional healers  
MHFG 




Mbonambi mining focus group 









Mankosi focus group schedule
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DATE FOCUS GROUP CODE PARTICIPANTS 
17 November 
2009 
Mankosi fisheries focus group 1 
 – Line Fish Committee 
 
MFFG 1 
10 members (including 
chairperson, treasurer, 
secretary and monitors) 
17 November 
2009 
Mankosi fisheri s focus group 2 
 – Female fishers 
 
MFFG 2 









Mankosi tourism focus group  






Mankosi Community Trust  
MCTFG 
4 members (i.e. secretary, 
deputy chairperson, 




Mankosi fisheries focus group 3 
 – Male fishers  
 
MFFG 3 
10 fishermen and divers 
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 In Mbonambi, six focus group meetings were conducted, and there were 76 participants in total. 
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APPENDIX 4:  KwaZulu-Natal key informant interviews and interview schedule 
 
RBM representatives interview template  
 
Researchers explain the project and its focus on different sectors (tourism, conservation, 
fisheries, mining, forestry). 
 
1. What is your role in relation to community engagement and ensuring that communities 
benefit from mining?  
2.  
3. What is RBM‟s strategy in terms of benefit-sharing? What is the institutional 
arrangement that is used by RBM to enable the communities of Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi to benefit from mining activities? 
 
4. What are the benefits that the Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities obtain from RBM 
mining activities? 
 
5. What is the current status of the RBM BBBEE transaction endowments that were set to 
be given to Mbonambi and Sokhulu (R17.5 million)? 
. 
 
6. What is the relationship between RBM and tribal authorities? 
 
7. Can you explain the court case between RBM and Mbonambi. Was it resolved? 
. 
  
8. Who in the communities are benefiting from RBM‟s interventions, and how are they 
benefiting?  What are the losses that the communities have experienced as a result of 
mining activities? 
 
9. How does the Department of Forestry make decisions about the rehabilitation of 
mining land and the land-use/forest type used? When was the decision taken to plant 
2/3 casuarina and 1/3 indigenous forest in areas mined by RBM? And why? Has this 
decision ever been revisited? What has been the role of RBM in this decision? What 
are the ecological impacts of casuarinas? 
 
10. List the people/organisations/institutions that you work with in relation to communities 
that are affected by mining activities. 
 
11. Rank these people/organisations/institutions according to who you think have the most 






















KZN Regional Forestry representative template 
 
Researchers explain the project and its focus on different sectors (tourism, conservation, 
fisheries, mining, forestry). 
 
1. What is your role in relation to forestry management and conservation? 
 
2. What benefits do Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities derive from the forestry sector 
and forest resources? Have they experienced any losses in relation to forest resources? 
 
3. Has the development of commercial forestry at Sokhulu and Mbonambi over the years 
changed the way in which these communities access the coast and its resources? If 
yes, how so? 
 
4. Who has the right to access : 
(a) Indigenous forests in the KZN coast, particularly at Sokhulu and Mbonambi? 
(b) Commercial forests at Sokhulu and Mbonambi?  
 
5. How is access and benefit-sharing facilitated in terms of policy and law in the 
province?  What are the blockages? 
 
6. Are you aware of specific forestry cases where there are positive or negative examples 
of equitable benefit-sharing?  Why are these considered positive or negative? 
 
7. Who determines access rights for the indigenous and commercial forests respectively? 
How are the rights allocated? 
 
8. What is the relationship between KZN Regional Forestry and companies such as 
Siyaqhubeka, Z.G. Forestry, Mondi and Sappi that operate at the community level? 
Are there any institutional arrangements that facilitate this affiliation? 
 
9. How do small-scale timb r growers, such as gumtree growers at Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi, access commercial markets? What mechanisms facilitate this? 
 
10. What is the relationship between mining activities and forestry at Sokhulu and 
Mbonambi? 
 
11. What is your knowledge of the forest conversion to sugarcane proposed by RBM for 
the Sokhulu-Mthunzini forest? 
 
12. What are the ecological impacts of forestry activities at 
(a) Sokhulu and 
(b) Mbonambi 
13. How does the Department of Forestry make decisions about the rehabilitation of 
mining land and the land-use/forest type used? When was the decision taken to plant 
2/3 casuarina and 1/3 indigenous forest in areas mined by RBM? And why? Has this 
decision ever been revisited? What has been the role of RBM in this decision? What 
















14. Can you explain ownership of land by the Department of Forestry in the area of 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi and how this may change with the land claim? How will this 
impact the community? 
 
15. List the people/organisations/institutions that you work with that take decisions in 
relation to forestry use and access in KZN. 
 
16. Rank these people/organisations/institutions according to who you think have the most 





















































KZN Regional Land Claims Commission representative  (LCCKI 1) 
Researchers explain the project and its focus on different sectors (tourism, conservation, 
fisheries, mining, forestry). 
1. What is your role in relation to the management of land and land issues in KwaZulu-
Natal? 
 
2. Can you explain ownership of land by the forestry, mining and conservation sectors as 
well as the tribal authorities in the area of Sokhulu and Mbonambi. How will this 
change with the land claim made by Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities? How will 
this impact the communities? 
 
3. What is the current status of the land claims by Sokhulu and Mbonambi? Have the title 
deeds been issued? (*request any documentation for this) 
 
4. Who is benefiting from coastal land and its resources (in different sectors) and how?  
Who is losing and how?  FOCUS ON CASE STUDY AREA IF POSSIBLE 
 
5. List the people/organisations/institutions that you work with that take decisions in 
relation to coastal resource use and access in KZN. 
     
6. Rank these people/organisations/institutions according to who you think have the most 
















Sokhulu and Mbonambi local key informants’ template 
Researchers explain the project and its focus on different sectors (tourism, conservation, 
fisheries, mining, forestry). 
Questions to be asked: 
1. What is your role in the community in relation to coastal resource management and 
conservation? 
 
2. Describe your relationship with the traditional authority in the Sokhulu community. 
  
3. How is the traditional authority affiliated with government structures like the local and 
district municipalities? 
 
4. How is the Tribal Authority chosen? 
 
5. Do you think that the Tribal Authority fairly represents the community and their 
needs? 
 
6. What benefits does the Sokhulu community derive from: 
a. Commercial forestry  
b. Indigenous forests 
c. Mining 




7. What losses (or negative impacts) have resulted in the Sokhulu community from: 
a. Commercial forestry 
b. Indigenous forests 
c. Mining 




8. Who has the right to access resources in these different sectors? How are the rights 
allocated? 
a. Commercial forestry  
b. Indigenous forests 
c. Mining 




9. Can you explain ownership of land in the area of Sokhulu and how this may change 
with the land claim? How will this impact the community? 
 
10. How is access and benefit-sharing facilitated in terms of policy and law?  What are the 
blockages? 
 
11. List the people/organisations/institutions that you work with that take decisions in 
















12. Rank these people/organisations/institutions according to who you think have the most 


















































EKZN Wildlife and conservation authority representatives interview template 
 
Researchers explain the project and its focus on different sectors (tourism, conservation, 
fisheries, mining, forestry). 
1. What is your role in relation to fisheries management and conservation? 
2. Has the development of co-management arrangements at Sokhulu and Mbonambi over 
the years changed the way in which these communities access the coast and its 
resources? If yes, how so? 
3. Who has the right to access fisheries resources (intertidal and linefish) in the Sokhulu 
and Mbonambi communities?  Who allocates this right? 
4. Are there any conflicts of access between recreational and subsistence fishers along 
the coasts of Sokhulu and Mbonambi? Explain. 
 
5. How is access and benefit-sharing facilitated in terms of policy and law?  What are the 
blockages? 
 
6. The Sokhulu mussel harvesting project is a well documented case of benefit-sharing.  
a. Why was this project initiated?  What were the drivers? 
b. What have been the benefits?  Who has benefited? 
c. Have there been any losses? If so, by whom? 
d. What have been the key challenges related to this project? 
e. What have been the ecological impacts? 
 
7. Why has a similar mussel project not been initiated in the community of Mbonambi?  
What has been the impact of this on the community? 
 
8. Explain the initiatives that have been set up for the co-management of linefisheries in 
Sokhulu and Mbonambi. 
a. Why was co-management initiated? What were the drivers? 
b. What have been the benefits?  Who has benefited? 
c. Have there been any losses? If so, by whom? 
d. What have been the key challenges? 
e. What have been the ecological impacts? 
 
9. What benefits do the Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities (respectively) receive 
from: 
a. Mapelane Nature Reserve 
b. Tourism 
c. Forestry conservation 
 
10. What losses do the Sokhulu and Mbonambi communities (respectively) receive from: 
a. Mapelane Nature Reserve 
b. Tourism 
c. Forestry conservation 
 
11. Can you explain ownership of land in the area of Sokhulu and Mbonambi and how this 
may change with the land claim? How will this impact the community? 
12. List the people/organisations/institutions that you work with that take decisions in 
















13. Rank these people/organisations/institutions according to who you think have the most 
decision-making power in managing the use and access of marine resources in KZN. 
 
*Other questions will need to be devised in a similar fashion for Terence for example 
(manager of Maphelane – tourism/conservation) and other key people in area not necessarily 







































ACLME tourism representative interview template 
Researchers explain the project and its focus on different sectors (tourism, conservation, 
fisheries, forestry). 
Questions to be asked: 
1. What is/has been your involvement in relation to tourism along the coast of South 
Africa, and other areas of Africa? Have you been involved in any activities that 
explore community benefits in relation to tourism? 
 
2. In your experience, have communities living adjacent to tourism ventures/initiatives 
benefitted in any way? If yes, what have some of these benefits been?  
 
3. Can you give positive and negative examples of tourism initiatives that have impacted 
on communities? Why are these examples positive or negative? What have been the 
benefits and what have been the losses to communities in these examples (or case 
studies?). 
 
4. Are there tourism initiatives that you know of that intend at the outset to involve and 
benefit the communities that they operate next to? What drives these particular 
tourism initiatives? Give examples if possible. 
 
5. How can tourism facilitate access and benefit-sharing for local communities? What are 
the challenges? 
 
6. Who are the main beneficiaries of tourism initiatives and what factors determine how 
these benefits are distributed? 
 
7. What are the benefits that the rural coastal communities get from tourism related 
activities? 
 
8. How is access and benefit-sharing in the tourism industry facilitated in terms of policy 
and law?  What are the blockages? 
 
9. Rank these people/organisations/institutions according to who you think have the most 
decision-making power in ensuring benefits to the local community. 
 
10. Are there any other key people in the tourism arena that have knowledge of 
community impacts/involvement in tourism initiatives that you think I should speak 
to?  Can you recommend any key papers or reports that you think are key for me to 








KwaZulu-Natal key informant interview schedule
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DATE KEY INFORMANT CODE INSTITUTION/ORGANIZATION 
11 February 2010 RBM representative 1 RBM 1 RBM 
25 February 2010 RBM representative 2 RBM 2 RBM 
25 February 2010 RBM representative 3 RBM 3 RBM 
26 February 2010 KZN Regional Forestry 
representative  
DWAF 1 DWAF 




23 February 2010 EKZN Wildlife 
representative 1 
EKZNW 1 EKZN Wildlife 
25 February 2010 EKZN Wildlife 
representative 2 
EKZNW 2 EKZN Wildlife 
26 February 2010 EKZN Wildlife 
representative 3 
EKZNW 3 EKZN Wildlife 
31 October 209 EKZN Wildlife 
representative 4 
EKZNW 4 EKZN Wildlife 
25 February 2010 Mbonambi Ward 3 
Councillor 
MKI 1 Mfolozi Local Municipality 
01 March 2010 Sokhulu Ward 1 
Councillor 
SKI 1 Mfolozi Local Municipality 
24 February 2010 Mbonambi Traditional 
Authority representative 
MKI 2 Mbonambi Traditional Authority 
27 February 2010 Sokhulu Traditional 
Authority representative 
SKI 2 Sokhulu Traditional Authority 
03 March 2010 Mfolozi Local 
Municipality 
representative 
MLM Mfolozi Local Municipality 
02 June 2010 ASCLME Tourism 
representative 
TKI ASCLME 
03 June 2010 EKZN Wildlife 
representative 
EKZNW 5 EKZN Wildlife 
04 June 2010 iSimangaliso Authority 
representative 


















APPENDIX 5:  Eastern Cape key informant interview template and interview schedule 
 
Government department representatives interview template  
Researchers explain the project and its focus on different sectors (tourism, conservation, 
fisheries, forestry). 
Questions to be asked: 
1. What is your role in terms of coastal zone management within Eastern Cape? 
 
2. What are the institutional arrangements for coastal management in the Eastern Cape 
coast – and how do they fit into provincial and national level institutions? 
 
3. Who is benefiting from coastal resources (in different sectors) and how?  Who is 
losing and how?  FOCUS ON CASE STUDY AREA IF POSSIBLE 
 
4. How is access and benefit-sharing facilitated in terms of policy and law in the 
province?  What are the blockages preventing access to resources and equitable 
benefit-sharing? 
  
5. Are you aware of specific cases where there are positive or negative examples of 
equitable benefit-sharing?  Why are these considered positive or negative? 
 
6. List the people/organisations/institutions that you work with that take decisions in 
relation to coastal resource use and access in Eastern Cape. 
 
7. Rank these people/organisations/institutions according to who you think have the most 

























Mankosi local key informants interview template 
Researchers explain the project and its focus on different sectors (tourism, conservation, 
fisheries, forestry). 
Questions to be asked: 
1. What is your role in the community in relation to coastal resource management and 
conservation? 
 
2. Describe your relationship with the local councillor in the Mankosi community. 
 
3. How is the traditional authority affiliated with government structures like the local and 
district municipalities? 
 
4. Do you think that the Mankosi councillor fairly represents the community and their 
needs? 
 
5. Do you think the Mankosi Chief fairly represents the community and their needs? 
 
6. Do you think the Mankosi traditional authority fairly represents the community and 
their needs? 
 
7. What benefits does the Mankosi community derive from:  






8. What losses (or negative impacts) have resulted in the Mankosi community from:  






9. Who has the right to access resources in these different sectors? How are the rights 
allocated 
a. Indigenous forests 
b. Tourism 




10. What is the institutional arrangements put in place for external stakeholders to work 
with the community, i.e. 
a. Commercial fisheries resources buyer e.g. lobster buyer 
b. Coast Care managers 
c. Other? 
 
















12. How is access and benefit-sharing facilitated in terms of policy and law?  What are the 
blockages? 
 
13. List the people/organisations/institutions that you work with that take decisions in 
relation to coastal resource use and access in Mankosi. 
 
14. Rank these people/organisations/institutions according to who you think have the most 
































Tourism key informants interview template 
Researchers explain the project and its focus on different sectors (tourism, conservation, 
fisheries, forestry). 
Questions to be asked: 
 
1. What is your role in relation to community engagement and ensuring that communities 
benefit from tourism? 
 
2. What is your role in Mankosi tourism?   
 
3. Based on your experiences, what facilitated and what has obstructed benefit-sharing in 
the community in relation to your actvities? 
 
4. How would you describe the relationship between the your facility and  
 
a. Mankosi traditional authority 
b. Mankosi Chief 
c. Mankosi Community Trust 
d. Nyandeni Local Municipality 
e. Mankosi Councillor 
f. Anchorage hotel 
 
5. What is your strategy in terms of benefit-sharing? What is the institutional 
arrangement that you use to enable the community of Mankosi to benefit from tourism 
and other activities? 
 
6. What are the benefits and losses that the Mankosi community gets from tourism 
activities? 
 
7. How are benefits distributed (ie: who takes these decisions on how and who and how 
much?) 
 
8. How is access and benefit-sharing facilitated in terms of policy and law?  What are the 
blockages? 
 
9. List the people/organisations/institutions that you work with in relation to 
communities that are affected by tourism activities. 
 
10. Rank these people/organisations/institutions according to who you think have the most 
















Commercial lobster buyer interview template 
Researchers explain the project and its focus on different sectors (tourism, conservation, 
fisheries, forestry). 
Questions to be asked: 
1. What is your role in relation to fisheries resource use in the Mankosi coast? 
 
2. Has the way in which people in Mankosi access fisheries resources over the years 
changed? If yes, how so? 
 
3. Who has the right to access shellfish resources in the Mankosi coast?  Who allocates 
this right? 
 
4. Describe your relationship with local Mankosi fishermen and fisheries resources 
harvesters? 
 
5. What is your relationship with external commercial buyers of fisheries resources? 
 
6. What institutional arrangement is in place in order for you to liaise with fishers in the 
community?  
 
7. Are there any conflicts of access between large scale commercial fishers and small-
scale fishers along the coasts of Mankosi? Explain. 
 
8. How is access and benefit-sharing facilitated in terms of policy and law?  What are the 
blockages? 
 
9. Is the current model for buying lobster from permit holders economically viable for 
your company for the long term? 
 
10. What is the good way to market lobster on the local and regional market? 
 
11. List the people/organisations/institutions that you work with that take decisions in 
relation to marine resource use and access in Eastern Cape. 
 
12. Rank these people/organisations/institutions according to who you think have the most 
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DATE KEY INFORMANT CODE INSTITUTION/ORGANIZATION 
27 May 2010 DEDEA representative  ECKI 1 DEDEA 
27 May 2010 Eastern Cape Tourism Board 
representative 
ECKI 2 Eastern Cape Tourism Board 
28 May 2010 DRDLR representative ECKI 3 DRDLR 




O.R. Tambo District Municipality 
28 May 2010 Nyandeni Local Municipality 
representative 
NLMKI Nyandeni Local Municipality 
22 May 2010 Nyandeni Ward 26 Councilor MKI 1 Nyandeni Local Municipality 
21 May 2010 Mankosi traditional authority 
representative 
MKI 2 Mankosi Traditional Authority 
21 May 2010 Mankosi Community Trust 
representative 
MKI 3 Mankosi Community Trust 
21 May 2010 TransCape and Nyandeni Local 
Tourism Board representative 
MKI 4 TransCape  
22 May 2010 Anchorage Hotel representative  MKI 5 Anchorage Hotel 
26 May 2010 Coffee Bay mussel project 
representative 
CBMP - 
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 In Mankosi, eight key informant interviews were conducted for this study. 
